# FKJ Masterfile

## 1AC

### Performance 1 – general

I have to be "more compelling" to win ballots. I need to wear panty hose or heels to meet some archaic expectation of femininity in order to garner your attention and attempt to obtain some respect from the debate space. I am forced to be put in a position where I feel scared or victimized in round in order to try and advance my narrative because advocacy is all I want to achieve. I'm constantly told that I am too shrill, too feminine, or too aggressive. I am not too aggressive, you cannot gauge my rage in life but especially not in this debate round. Debate is about education and I only have 4 minutes to teach, so hear me.

### Performance 2 – TOC

Welcome to the TOC! Congrats on making it to Kentucky, it’s been a long year! If you are female in the activity, then you already beat back last year’s 19/92 odds of even making it this far. ☺

Justice in debate is one-sided. Women are told that they are bitchy, aggressive, and shrill, while men from big teams earn 30s and the W with the same exact behavior. No matter what, we do what men do, but somehow wrongly.

When we LARP, we’re too arrogant

When we debate framework, we’re too tricky

And when we run K’s, we’re too whiney.

We are just too much

All the while we are trying to balance being the nice, sweet, appropriate debaters that you expect us to be.

So, thank you for giving me your attention for 13 minutes to talk, to teach, and to, for at least a moment, have a voice because any time we protest in tab for biased ballots and RFDs, challenge coaches and their debaters’ sexist behavior, or post on Facebook about our experiences, we are chastised, lectured, mocked, and told to quiet down about our ‘needless complaining’ or our slander against someone ‘reputable’ or our ‘oversensitivity’. Or as Sara Ahmed says:

“When we speak about what we come up against, we come up against what we speak about”\*

But, don’t worry theory hacks, Debate is about education and I only have 6 minutes to teach, so hear me.

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### Performance extension 1

Do you feel uncomfortable about the aff? Good. The narrative is a specific reason to vote aff. The impacts of the killjoy LOOK LIKE THIS. The Killjoy can take any form but is MOST NECESSARY in places where complacency is rampant. I am caught between how I feel about the debate space and how I’m supposed to feel. My voice is an act of violence you can tangibly hear and vote off of. Extend Vincent, this discourse demands that you affirm in order to recognize the unhappiness that the killjoy creates both in academic institutions outside of the round AND in the institution you are in RIGHT NOW. His arguments ignore and perpetuate the institution that the killjoy so deeply stands against.

### Shell

#### Performance of narratives is a teaching tool. Stories allow us to analyze modes of power and understand how poisonous pedagogy is used to justify the killing of willful, loud, and rule-ignoring individuals

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Once upon a time there was a child who was willful, and would not do as her mother wished. For this reason God had no pleasure in her, and let her become ill, and no doctor could go her any good, and in a short time she lay on her death-bed. When she had been lowered into her grave, and the earth was spread over her, all at once her arm came out again, and stretched upwards, and when they had put it in and spread fresh earth over it, it was all to no purpose, for the arm always came out again. Then the mother herself was obliged to go to the grave, and strike the arm with a rod, and when she had done that, it was drawn in, and then at last the child had rest beneath the ground.1 What a story. **The willful child: she has a story to tell. This story can be treated as a teaching tool, as well as a way of teaching us about tools (the rods, the machinery of power).** We learn how willfulness is used as an explanation of disobedience: a child disobeys because she is willful, when she is not willing to do what her mother wills her to do. We do not know in the story what it is that the child was not willing to do. Disobedience is not given content because disobedience as such becomes a fault: the child must do whatever her mother wishes. She is not willing, whatever. What is striking about the story is how willfulness persists even after death: displaced onto an arm, from a body onto a part. The arm inherits the willfulness of the child insofar as it will not be kept down, insofar as it keeps coming up, acquiring a life of its own, even after the death of the body of which it is a part. Note that the rod, as that which embodies the ill of the parent, of the sovereign, is not deemed willful. The rod becomes the means to eliminate willfulness from the child. One form of will judges the other wills as willful wills. One form of will assumes the right to eliminate the others. We might note here how the very judgement of willfulness is a crucial part of the disciplinary apparatus. **It is this judgement that allows violence (even murder) to be understood as care as well as discipline.** **The rod becomes a technique for straightening out the willful child with her wayward arm. I return to this wayward arm in due course. She too has a feminist history. She too is a feminist history.**

#### Debate doesn’t end when your 2AR timer goes off; your flow reflects real conversations had between people. Our performances in this space reflect the way we act when we exit the round and our ballot is turned in. Our educational praxis has an obligation to be focused on using our discourse as a performance to access debate’s liberatory potential.

Vincent 13 (Christopher Debate Coach, former college NDT debater “Re-Conceptualizing Our Performances: Accountability In Lincoln Douglas Debate”<http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate)>  
Charles Mills argues that “the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview.” For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities.  In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate.  This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill’s argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said.  Again for debaters of color, their performance is always attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in relation to the speech act. Whites [Some] are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. It is never a question of “should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies,” it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities.  As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution.  Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round. We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech. As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we also have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it.  Judges have become complacent in voting on the discourse, if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected. Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act. We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow. Likewise, judges must be held accountable for what they vote for in the debate space. If a judge is comfortable enough to vote for discourse that is racist, sexist, or homophobic, they must also be prepared to defend their actions. We as a community do not live in a vacuum and do not live isolated from the larger society. That means that judges must defend their actions to the debaters, their coaches, and to the other judges in the room if it is a panel. Students of color should not have the burden of articulating why racist discourse must be rejected, but should have the assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. Until we re-conceptualize the speech and the speech act, and until judges are comfortable enough to vote down debaters for a performance that perpetuates violence in the debate space, debaters and coaches alike will remain complacent in their privilege. As educators we must begin to shift the paradigm and be comfortable doing this. As a community we should stop looking at ourselves as isolated in a vacuum and recognize that the discourse and knowledge we produce in debate has real implications for how we think when we leave this space. Our performances must be viewed as of the body instead of just by it. As long as we continue to operate in a world where our performances are merely by bodies, we will continue to foster a climate of hostility and violence towards students of color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could have.

#### Interpretations about the “best form of education” emulate systems of poisonous pedagogy. These systems of discourse are actions used to imply moral correction and deplete the will of those marginalized in the institution.

Ahmed 2 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, *Willful Subjects*, Duke University Press, pp 63-67.//Accessed 2/2/17 KE)

The story gives us a portrait of obedience as virtue. We could thus consider how the project of eliminating willfulness relates to obedience. Aquinas in his reflection on the virtue of obedience refers to the work of Gregory who argues that obedience has “more merit” the “less it has of its own will” (Summa Theologiae, 2a.2ae.104.60). For Gregory obedience becomes a virtue when persons obey commands that do not go in the direction of their own will. There is no virtue in obeying a command that is agreeable to one’s own will: “obedience requires little or no effort when it has as its own will in agreeable things.” Rather “the effort is greater in disagreeable or difficult things.” Obedience occurs when one’s “own will tends to nothing apart from the command” (63). This is how Gregory can conclude that “by obedience we slay our own will” (64). To obey is to go where your will would not take you. Willfulness might refer to willing in agreement with one’s own will. Another way of putting this would be to say that a willful will is one that wills what it wants, and that has yet to eliminate want from will.6 As I noted in my introduction to this book, the Grimm story can be considered as part of the educational tradition described by Alice Miller (1987) as “poisonous pedagogy.” Miller draws on the earlier work of Katharina Rutschky who describes this tradition (problematically) as “Black pedagogy,” which has as its primary aim “the domination and control of the child for the child’s own good” (Zornado 2001, 79).7 As Joseph L. Zornado points out, following both Rutschky and Miller, this pedagogy rests on willfulness: “Because the child is willful, stained by original sin and destructive, the adult must enact decisive and punitive measures so that the child will not grow up ‘full of weeds’ ” (2001, 79). **The violence toward the child is thus presented as being for the child**. One of the examples of poisonous pedagogy quoted at length by Alice Miller is J. Sulzer’s An Essay on the Education and Instruction of Children (1784).8 I will follow Miller in quoting this essay at length as it gives us a fuller and affective picture of what is at stake in the history of willfulness. In Sulzer’s essay willfulness is described as that which must be “driven out” before children can receive a good education. Willfulness is an obstacle to the educable will: As far as willfulness is concerned, this expresses itself as a natural recourse in tenderest childhood as soon as children are able to make their desire for something known by means of gestures. They see something they want but cannot have; they become angry, cry, and flail about. Or they are given something that does not please them; they fling it aside and begin to cry. Th ese are dangerous faults that hinder their entire education and encourage undesirable qualities in children. If willfulness and wickedness are not driven out, it is impossible to give a child a good education. Th e moment these flaws appear in a child, it is high time to resist this evil so that it does not become ingrained through habit and the children do not become thoroughly depraved. (cited in Miller 1987, 10– 11) Indeed driving out willfulness, Sulzer suggests, should be the “main occupation” of those concerned with the education of children. He argues that driving out willfulness must be done “in a methodical manner”; other wise children “will finally become the masters of their parents and of their nursemaids and will have a bad, willful, and unbearable disposition with which they will trouble and torment their parents ever after as the well- earned reward for the ‘good’ upbringing they were given” (11). **The rod makes an appearance as the proper instrument for moral correction:** “If parents are fortunate enough to drive out willfulness from the very beginning by means of scolding and the rod, they will have obedient, docile, and good children whom they can later provide with a good education” (11). The rod and scolding are techniques of parental will that aim to create a docile child. Note here that **docility appears an end of will, as what will,** transformed into a disciplinary technique, **is intended to actualize.** As such the will seeks to eliminate the child’s will, understood as willful insofar as it is his own: “A child who is used to obeying his parents will also willingly submit to the laws and rules of reason once he is on his own and his own master, since he is already accustomed not to act in accordance with his own will. Obedience is so important that all education is actually nothing other than learning how to obey” (12, emphasis added). Becoming obedient is learning to act without accordance to one’s own will. If children are to act without self- accordance, their own will must be broken: It is not very easy, however, to implant obedience in children. It is quite natural for the child’s soul to want to have a will of its own, and things that are not done correctly in the first two years will be diffi cult to rectify thereafter. One of the advantages of these early years is that then force and compulsion can be used. Over the years, children forget everything that happened to them in early childhood. If their wills can be broken at this time, they will never remember afterwards that they had a will, and for this very reason the severity that is required will not have any serious consequences. Just as soon as children develop awareness, it is essential to demonstrate to them by word and deed that they must submit to the will of their parents. Obedience requires children to (1) willingly do as they are told, (2) willingly refrain from doing what is forbidden, and (3) accept the rules made for their sake. (13) **To eliminate willfulness is thus to eliminate not only the will defined as independence from what is willed by others, but to eliminate the very memory of this will or at least to aim for this elimination**. The child’s identification with parental will would become so complete that identification is experienced as willingness, as not only willingly doing what they are commanded to do, but as being this doing, as having always been this doing. Once the child is willing, any memory of having a will that was willing other wise is eradicated. Or at least that is the idea. A subject that is willing to obey is a subject without will: a willing subject becomes a will- less subject. What is this subject required to do? Katharina Rutschky explores how the genre of poisonous pedagogy provided the psychic conditions for the emergence of Fascism within Germany in the twentieth century (creating subjects whose obedience rested on the acceptance and perpetration of cruelty and punishment). As Alice Miller shows in For Your Own Good, we can track the emergence of poisonous pedagogy across Europe and America during the eighteenth century. Take, for example, the work of John Wesley who was influenced by Arminian doctrines. Wesley writes of children: “Break their wills betimes. Begin this work before they can run alone, before they can speak plain, before they can speak at all. Whatever pains it costs, break the will, if you would not damn the child. Let the child from a year old be taught to fear the rod; and to cry softly; from that age, make him do as he is bid, if you whip him ten times running to effect it. If you do spare the rod, you spoil the child; if you do not conquer you ruin him” (1811, 71). **If breaking the will is painful it is understood as necessary pain. This pain must be prior even to speech.** **The child must be conquered to avoid damnation**. Reading these literatures is difficult given how violence against children is rationalized and enacted in the works themselves. The works are implicated in the **histories** they enact; they **are conduits of violence**. In the brutish maxim “Spare the rod, spoil the child,” history is summarized as instruction. When reading about Wesley, I came across another text by the twentieth- century Baptist evangelical John Rice. He asks how John Wesley and his brother Christopher as leaders of the Evangelical movement and founders of Methodism were themselves taught. Rice notes: “Their mother Susannah Wesley taught them to fear the rod when they were a year old” (1946, 213). Rice himself then follows Wesley in arguing that “when the will of a child is totally subdued, and it is brought to revere and stand in awe of the parents, then a great many childhood follies and inadvertencies may be passed by. . . . No willful transgression should ever be forgiven children. . . . as self- will is the root of all sin and misery, so what ever cherishes this in children insures their after- wretchedness and irreligion” (213). After- wretchedness: this history is indeed a wretched history. To follow the figure of the willful child is to stay proximate to scenes of violence. And we learn too how those beaten by the rod become rods that beat. **This becoming is not inevitable, but it is part of a history we cannot afford to forget. It is a history still with us.**9 **Assembling a willfulness archive is a way of attending to histories that are kept alive by forgetting**

#### University policies for equality substitute action for a good view of the organization. The institutions marking that issues are “fixed” halt the need and ability for outside advocates to create change and mask inequality

Ahmed 3 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Chapter 44: Trying to Transform”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 104-107 //Accessed 3/22/2017 GK+KE)

Many practitioners and academics have expressed concerns that writing documents or **policies becomes a substitute for action**: as one of my interviewees puts it, “You need up doing the document rather than doing the doing.” Documents become all diversity workers have time to do. Documents then circulate within organizations, often referring to each other, creating a family of documents. They create a paper trail, a trace of where they have been. In some sense the point of the document is to leave a trail. Diversity work: a paper trail. The very orientation toward writing good documents can block action, insofar as the document then gets taken up as evidence that we have “done it.” As another practitioner describes, “Well I think in terms of the policies, people’s views are, ‘Well we’ve got them now so that’s done. It’s finished.’ I think actually, I’m not sure if that’s even worse than having nothing, that idea in people’s heads that we’ve done race, when we very clearly haven’t done race.” The idea that the document is doing something is what could allow the institution to block recognition of the work that there is to do. The idea that the document does race means that people can think that race has been done when it has not. The idea that we are doing race is thus how we are not doing race. One of the consequences of equality becoming embedded in audit culture is that equality itself becomes a good performance of the organization, or a way the organization can perform well. **When an equality policy is ranked as good, this rank is taken up as a sign of equality, which is how signs of inequality disappear from view.** Equality and diversity are used as performance indicators to present the best view of the organization. Diversity is thus increasingly exercised as a form of public relations: “The planned and sustained effort to establish and maintain good will and understanding between an organization and its publics.”2 In an interview I had with staff from a human resources department, we discussed a research project that was collecting what is called in the qualities sector “perception data,” that is, data about how external publics perceive an organization. This project was funded as part of the university’s equality policy. What did they find? Okay, yes. It was about uncovering perceptions about the [university] as an employer…. [The university] was considered to be an old boys’ network, as they called it, and white male dominated, and they didn’t have the right perceptions of the [university] in terms of what it offers and what it brings to the academia. I think most of the external people had the wrong perceptions about the [university]. This is another way that diversity involves image management: diversity work becomes about generating the right image for the organization by correcting the wrong one. Here the perception of the institution as white is treated as wrong; to make the perception right you change the image. **Diversity becomes about changing perceptions of whiteness rather than changing the whiteness of organizations**. And we can see a key difficulty here: even if diversity is an attempt to transform the institution, it too can be a technique for keeping things in place. **The very appearance of a transformation** (a new, more colorful face for the organization) **is what stops something from happening**. A new policy can be agreed upon without anything changing. **A new policy can be agreed upon as a way of not changing anything.** Another practitioner spoke to me about what appeared to be an institutional success story: a decision was made and agreed upon by the university’s equality and diversity committee that all internal members of appointment panels for academics should have had diversity training. This decision could be described as good practice. IT was made properly but the committee that was authorized to make the decision (the equality and diversity committee), which included members of the Senior Management Team (SMT). The minutes were then sent for approval to council, which alone had authority to make the recommendation into policy: When I was first here, there was a policy that you had to have three people on every panel who had been trained. But then there was a decision early on where I was here that it should be everybody, all panel members, at least internal people. They took that decision at the equality and diversity committee, which several members of SMT were present at. But then the director of human resources found out about it and decided we didn’t have enough resources to support it, and it went to council with that taken out and council were told that they were happy to have just three members, only a person on council who was an external member of the diversity committee went ballistic - and I am not kidding, went ballistic - and said the minutes didn’t reflect what had happened (and I didn’t take the minutes, by the way). And so they had to take it through and reverse it. And the council decision was that all people should be trained. And despite that, I have then sat in meetings where they just continued saying that it has to be just three people on the panel. And I said, but no, council changed their view and I can give you the minutes, and they just look at me as if I am saying something really stupid. This went on for ages, even though the council minutes definitely said all panel members should be trained. And to be honest, sometimes you just give up. It seems as if **there is an institutional decision. Individuals within the institution must act as if the decision has been made for it to be made. If they do not, it has not.** A decision made in the present about the future (under the promissory sign “we will”) can be overridden by the momentum of the past. The past becomes like the crowd discussed in part 1: a momentum becomes not only a direction, but a directive. A command does not have to be given to ensure things go that way, and indeed a command would not stop things from going that way. Perhaps a **yes can be said because the weight of the past will not allow that yes to acquire the force needed to bring something into effect**. I have called this mechanism non-performativity: when naming something does not bring something into effect or (more strongly) when something is named in order not to bring something into effect. When yes does not bring something into effect, that yes conceals this not bringing under the appearance of having brought. A yes might even be more utterable when it has less force; or a yes might be uttered by being emptied of force. In other words, it might be easier for an institution within an institution to say yes because there is nothing behind that yes. I return to this example in chapter 6 because it has so much to teach us about institutional walls.

#### The hegemonic order of supremacy in the university thrives on what bodies can articulate. Marginalized bodies lose their vocational power as the complicit nature of universities’ discourse uphold systems of arbitrary exclusion.

Patton 04 (Dr. Tracey Owens Patton is the director of African American & Diaspora Studies and a professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming. Dr. Patton's area of expertise is critical cultural communication and rhetorical studies.2004 Reflections of a Black Woman Professor: Racism and Sexism in Academia, Howard Journal of Communications, 15:3, 186-187, Accessed 6/27/16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170490483629)

The theory of articulation provides us with the means of critiquing language, discourse, and power. The theory of articulation is inextricably linked with and wedded to hegemony. As Asante (1998) noted, Speech is itself a political act... Whenever one categorizes society in an effort to make concepts functional, one makes a choice among possibilities. Making a choice among possibilities creates cleavages that benefit some to the disadvantage of others. Through a choice in language and action, maintenance of the current white supremacist hegemonic order becomes “intertwined in the most intricate patterns of our conversation and language.” (p.87788) The enactment of agency with regard to language choice and action **becomes a subjective choice to maintain the status quo or use language that produce**s actions th**at** challenge the current hegemonic order. The reproduction of hegemony is itself not solely a problem of color, but also a historical conceptual framework based on values granted to particular racial **categories (Asante, 1998) and values granted to particular language and action choices.** Therefore, while White supremacy may be a function of the institutional structure, it maintains its naturalization because individuals through their articulation and enactment of hegemony perpetuate marginalization. This enactment of hegemony can take the form of “the dissemination of symbols and acts of speech itself” (p.89). In other words, a conception of so-called reality takes place within the institution whether it is through action, language, or thought. Therefore, an institutionalized social framework becomes naturalized, reified, and unquestioned. As Slack (1997) explained, Epistemologically, articulation is a way of thinking the structures of what we know as a play of correspondences, non-correspondences and contradictions, as fragments in the constitution of what we take to be unities. Politically, **articulation is a way of foregrounding the structure and play of power that entail in relations of dominance and subordination**. Strategically, articulation provides a mechanism for shaping intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture or context. (p.112) The theory of articulation requires an examination of the configuration of power in any social condition and through which people or institutions “advance or defend their interests and devise tactics and strategies appropriate to their aims” (Fiske,1996, p. 67). In other words, people must examine the complicitousness through which they defend their action and language choices. Language is intertwined with articulation because socially constructed knowledge, language, and action shape the present situation and the status quo, which, in turn, have the power to shape the individual and the institution and to reinforce the hegemonic order (Hall, 1997). In higher education, as W. R. Allen (1992) argued, there are numerous barriers that, collectively, ensure that **“a status quo rooted in an unfair system of racial stratification is reproduced within the university”** (p.42). Among these barriers are culturally and economically biased standardized tests, administration and faculty that is largely White men, high tuition costs and low financial aid programs, an emphasis on competition, and little cultural pluralism and diversity. W. R. Allen stated that the "nation’s colleges and **universities seem to be not only content with, but committed to, the current system of structured inequality**, a system in which African Americans [and other ethnic minorities] suffer grievously" (p. 42). Change in higher education and in pedagogy, W.R. Allen noted, will only come when universities feel more responsibility to change and challenge the current status quo: If we fail to respond creatively and effectively to this challenge, not only will history judge us harshly, but this country will also continue to suffer the negative consequences, such as the loss of its competitive edge in the world market, that have resulted from its failure to develop fully and utilize the talents of all its people, without regard to race, gender, or class.(p.43) Whether intentionally or not, **universities can signal their collusion with maintaining the White supremacist hegemonic order even as it articulates itself as "open" and is often polemically known as "liberal" because of complicitous language and actions that on the surface appear to address hegemony, however, on closer inspection, they ultimately maintain it** (Patton, 2004). Dziech and Hawkins (1998) believed that "whether it is an extension of or a reaction against its history, an institution’s present always reflects its past, and that past influences[marginalized bodies] profoundly” (p.560).To challenge hegemonic concerns, academia must be ever-evolving. Discourses are ways of constituting knowledge or "truth." Through discourse people make meaning and make sense of their everyday world. As people communicate about their social world they create and construct "truths." According to Deetz and Mumby (1990), this process of communicating necessarily takes place in the context of power relations. As these scholars showed, communication and how it is structured can reify and restructure hegemony. In their view, "communication can be said to function ideologically in that it produces and reproduces (i.e., legitimates) a particular structure of power relations (i.e., systems of interests) **to the arbitrary exclusion of other possible configurations of interests**" (p.42).Thus a constant power struggle ensues because communication occurs in the context of hegemonic relations.

#### These actions maintain hegemony and become a depletion of will for the Other. White patriarchy relies on this promise of happiness. Oppression becomes happiness with circulated images of the happy woman in the kitchen, the thankful woman with lower pay and the happy slave. Happiness requires that the Other renounce desire and will to become complacent with death.

Ahmed 4 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism. Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke U Press, 2010. Pg. 63-64 //DOA 1/29/17 KE)

It is Sophy’s imagination that threatens to get in the way of her happiness, and thus of the happiness of all. Imagination is what allows girls to question the wisdom they have received and to ask whether what is good for all is necessarily good for them. We could describe one episode of The MiU on the Fhss¶ as Maggie becoming Sophy (or becoming the Sophy that Sophy must be in¶ order to fulfil her narrative function). Maggie has an epiphany: the answer¶ to her troubles is to become happy and good: “ it flashed through her like the¶ suddenly apprehended solution of a problem, that all the miseries of her young¶ life had come from fixing her heart on her own pleasure as if that were the¶ central necessity of the universe" (306). From the point of view of the parents,¶ their daughter has become good because she has submitted to their will:¶ “Her mother felt the change in her with a sort of puzzled wonder that Maggie¶ should be ‘growing up so good'; it was amazing that this once ‘contrairy’ child¶ was becoming so submissive, so backward to assert her own will" (309). To be good as a girl is to give up having a will of one’s own. The mother can thus love the daughter who is becoming like furniture, who can support the family by staying in the background: “The mother was getting fond of her tall, brown¶ girl, the only bit of furniture now in which she could bestow her anxiety and¶ pride” (309). It is as if Maggie has chosen between happiness and life, by giving up life for¶ happiness: ‘“I’ve been a great deal happier,’ she said at last timidly, ‘since I have¶ given up thinking about what is easy and pleasant, and being discontented because¶ I couldn’t have my own will. Our life is determined for us — and it makes the mind very free when we give up wishing and only think of bearing what is laid upon us and doing what is given us to do’” (317). Happiness is associated here with the renunciation of desire.^ It is her friend Philip whom Maggie is¶ addressing at this point. It is Philip who loves Maggie for her aliveness, who gives her books that rekindle her sense of interest and curiosity about the world. He gives her one book that she cannot finish as she reads in this book the injustice of happiness, which is given to some and not others, those deemed worthy of love. “‘I didn’t finish the book,’ said Maggie. ‘As soon as I came to the blond-haired young girl reading in the park, I shut it up and determined to read no further, I foresaw that that light-complexioned girl would win away all the love from Corinne and make her miserable. I’m determined to read no more books where the blondhaired women carry away all the happiness. I should begin to have a prejudice against them. If you could give me some story, now, where the dark woman triumphs, it would restore the balance. I want to avenge Rebecca, and Flora Maclvor, and Minna, and all the rest of the dark unhappy ones’” (348-45). Exercising a racialized vocabulary, Maggie exposes how darkness becomes a form of unhappiness, as lacking the qualities deemed necessary for being given a happy ending.\*^ **Maggie gives up on giving up her life for happiness by speaking out against the injustice of happiness and how it is given to some and not others**. The novel relies on contrasting the cousins Lucy and Maggie in terms of their capacity to be happy and dutiful. Maggie admits her unhappiness to Lucy: “One gets a bad habit of being unhappy” (389). For Lucy, being happy is a way of not being trouble; she cannot live with the reality of getting into trouble: as she says, “I’ve always been happy, I don’t know whether I could bear much trouble” (389). **Happiness involves a way of avoiding what one cannot bear.** The climactic moment of the novel comes when Stephen, who is betrothed to Lucy, announces his desire for Maggie, who is swept away by it. She almost goes along with him but realizes that she cannot: “**Many things are difficult and dark to me, but I see one thing quite clearly: that I must not, cannot, seek my own happiness by sacrificing others**” (471). Maggie chooses duty as if without duty there would be only the inclination of the moment. As a good Kantian subject, she says: “If the past is not to bind us, where can duty he? We should have no law but the inclination of the moment” (499), to which Stephen replies, “But it weighs nothing with you that you are robbing me of my happiness” (500-501).\*'\* By choosing duty, **Maggie does not avoid causing unhappiness. She must pay for her moment of transgression. Having deviated from the path of happiness, she has fulfilled her destiny as trouble.** As she says in one letter: “Oh God, is there any happiness in love that could make me forget their pain” (528). **Death** as a result of a natural disaster (a flood) thus **liberates Maggie from the unhappy consequences of causing trouble, of deviating from the paths of happiness**. **The injustice of her loss of life is how the novel speaks against happiness, which itself is narrated as the renunciation of life, imagination, and desire.** Even if books like The Mill on the Floss seem to punish their heroines for their transgressions, they also evoke the injustice of happiness, showing what and whom happiness gives up. In giving up on those who seem to give up on happiness, happiness acquires its coherence. We could describe happiness quite simply as a convention, such that to deviate from the paths of happiness is to challenge convention. What is a convention? The word convention comes from the verb “to convene.” To convene is to gather, to assemble, or to meet up, A convention is a point around which we gather. To follow a convention is to gather in the right way, to be assembled. Feminism gives time and space to women’s desires that are not assembled around the reproduction of the family form. Feminists must thus be willing to cause disturbance. Feminists might even have to be willful. A subject would be described as willful at the point that her will does not coincide with that of others, those whose will is reified as the general or social will.\*

#### Violence against the Other is upheld with questions “Why do you want so much? Why aren’t you *just happy?*” Thus, the project of feminism is to acquire the voice and will that uses speech to mark and make violence visible

Ahmed 5 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Chapter 3: Willfulness and Feminist Subjectivity”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 72-73 //Accessed 2/9/2017 GKKE)

I think of this embodied history as my own history of willfulness. And that too is a challenge to the discourse of stranger danger, which assumes that violence originates outside of home. Stranger danger could be used to retell this story as the story of the violence of the Muslim father. Here the story becomes complicated: it is a feminist of color kind of complication. When we speak of violence directed against us, we know how quickly that violence can be racialized; how racism will explain that violence as an expression of culture, which is how racism and religion become entangled. Violence would the again be assumed to originate with outsiders. Some forms of violence become cultural, and other forms of violence remain individual and idiosyncratic: the some of this distinction is racism. I return to the racism at stake in the potential reframing of my own story in chapter 7. **We must still tell these stories of violence because of how quickly that violence is concealed and reproduced. We must always tell them with care.** But it is risky: when they are taken out of hands they can become another form of beating. Willfulness comes up in part as a mechanism for justifying violence by those who are violent. And why I mention this here, this very ordinary experience of violence directed against girls and women by fathers or husbands within the supposed safety of home (that this is ordinary is why we must mention it) **is that my own father’s blows were always accompanied by words**. He would ask insistently punishing questions: why do you want so much? Why are you never satisfied? Why do you not do better at school? In other words, being judged as willful was a technique for justifying violence in the midst of violence. You are being punished for your subjectivity, for being the being you are. **You can be beaten by a judgement**. And then: **you become the cause of the violence directed against you. I did work out what to do, and found my own ways of stopping it**. I began to scream really loudly when he went for me. He would stop very quickly after I screamed. Why did this work? So often people do not recognize their actions as violent; we know this. **Hitting a willful girl, after all, has been justified as discipline and moral instruction: for her own good**. **By screaming, I announced my father’s violence. I made it audible. And I learned from this too: becoming a feminist was about becoming audible, feminism as screaming in order to be heard; screaming as making violence visible; feminism as acquiring a voice.**

#### [advo text] Thus I affirm the resolution. The 1AC is a standing resistance against institutionalized happiness in university settings through the figure of the killjoy.

#### The 1AC is a personal killjoy manifesto against the oppressive structures of happiness in academic spaces. Sharing of experiences is an assertion of our will against violence. Joy is found in our killing of happiness. To be a killjoy is to be a political activist, a nonconforming queer, or the angry black woman.

Ahmed 6 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Conclusion II”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 254-257 //Accessed 2/9/2017 GKKE)

We must stay unhappy with this world. The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, some of which 1 discusses in chapter I (see also Ahmed 2010). Happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods. As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely, "It is always easy to describe a, happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others] (1949] 1997, 28). Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon. A killjoy becomes a manifesto when we are willing to take up this figure, to assemble a life not as her (I discussed the risks of assuming we are her in chapter 7) but around her, in her company. We are willing to killjoy because the world that assigns this or that person or group of people as the killjoys is not to world a want to be part of. To be willing to killjoy is to transform a judgement into a project. A manifesto: how a judgment becomes a project. To think of killjoys as manifestos is to say that a politics of transformation, a politics that intends to cause the end of a system, is not a program of action that can be separates from how we are in the worlds we are in. Feminism is praxis. We enact the world we are aiming for; nothing Iess will do. Lesbian feminism, as I noted in chapter 9, is how we organize our lives in such a way that our relations to each other as women are not mediated through our relations to men. A life becomes an archive of rebellion, this is why a killjoy manifesto will be personal. Each of us killjoys will have our own. My manifesto does not suspend my personal story it is how that story unfolds into action. It is from difficult experiences, or being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that we gain the energy to rebel It is from what we conic up against that we gain new angles on what we are against. Our bodies become our tools; our rage becomes sickness. We vomit; we vomit out what we have been asked to take in. Our guts become our feminist friends the more we are sickened. We begin to feel the weight of histories more and more; the more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. We snap under the weight; things break. A manifesto is written out of feminist snap. A manifesto is feminist snap. And: we witness as feminists the trouble feminism causes. I would hazard a guess; feminist trouble is an extension of gender trouble (Butler 1990). To be more specific: feminist trouble is the trouble with women. When we refuse to be women, in the heteropatriarchal sense as beings for men, we become trouble, we get into trouble. A killjoy is willing to get into trouble. And this I think is what is specific about a killjoy manifesto: that we bring into our statements of intent or purpose the experience of what we come up against. It is this experience that allows us to articulate a for, a for that carries with it an experience of what we come up against. A for can be how we turn Something about a manifesto is about what it aims to bring about. There is no doubt in my mind that a feminist killjoy is for something; although as killjoys we are not necessarily for the same things. But you would only be willing to live with the consequences of being against what you come up against if you are for something, A life can be a manifesto. When I read some of the books in my survival kit, I hear them as manifestos, as calls to action; as calls to arms. They are books that tremble with life because they show how a life can be rewritten; how we can rewrite a life, letter by letter. A manifesto has a life, a life of its own; a manifesto is an outstretched hand. And if a manifesto is a political action, it depends on how it is received by others. And perhaps a hand can do more when it is not simply received by another hand, when a gesture exceeds the firmness of a handshake. Perhaps more than a hand needs to shake, If a killjoy manifesto is a handle, it flies out of hand. A manifesto thus repeats something that has already happened' as we know the killjoy has flown off. Perhaps a killjoy manifesto is unhandy; a feminist flight. When we refuse to be the master’s tool, we expose the violence of rods, the violences that built the master's dwelling, brick by brick. When we make violence manifest, a violence that is reproduced by not being made a manifesto, we will be assigned as killjoys. It is because of what she reveals that a killjoy he - comes a killjoy in the first place. A manifesto is in some sense behind her. This is not to say that writing a killjoy manifesto is not also a commitment; that it is not also an idea if how to move forward. A killjoy has her principles. A killjoy manifesto shows how we create principles from an experience of what we come up against, from how we live a feminist life. When I say principles here, I do not mean rules of conduct that we must agree to in order to proceed in a common direction. I might say that a feminist life is principled but feminism often becomes an announcement at the very moment of the refusal to be bound by principle. When I think of feminist principles, I think of principles in the original sense: principle as a first step, as a commencement, a start of something. A principle can also be what is elemental to a craft. Feminist killjoys and other willful subjects are crafty; we are becoming crafty. There are principles in what we craft. How we begin does not determine where we end up„ but principles do give shape or direction. Feminist principles are articulated in unfeminist worlds. Living a life with feminist principles is thus not living smoothly; we bump into the world that does not live in accordance with the principles we try to live. For some reason, the principles I articulate here ended up being expressed as statements of will; of what a killjoy is willing (to do or to be) or not willing (to do or to be). I think we can understand the some of this reason. A killjoy manifesto is a willful subject; she wills wrongly by what she is willing or is not willing to do. No wonder a willful subject has principles; she can be principled. She can share them if you can bear them.

#### Thus the killjoy is the praxis point to resolve other violent power structures – our project of phenomenology expose the origin of violence and call to action rage against violent structures of happiness.

#### The role of the ballot is vote for the debater that best opens up spaces for us oppressed bodies to assert our will. Every reading of the 1AC exposes a new moment of happiness in every rfd, decision, and refutation that must be sabotaged for liberation

Ahmed 7 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism. Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke U Press, 2010. Pg. 19-20//DOA 1/29/17 KE)

Every writer is first a reader, and what we read matters. I think of myself primarily as a reader of feminist, queer, and antiracist books — these books form the intellectual and political horizon of this book. I would describe these books as my philosophy books in the sense that they are the books that have helped me to think about how happiness participates in the creation of social form. But my archive does not just include books or films. If you follow the word happiness you end up everywhere! So my archive is also my world, my life-world, my past as well as present, where the word happiness has echoed so powerfully. One of the speech acts that always fascinated me is “I just want you to be happy,” which I remember being said to me an awful lot when I was growing up. Writing this book has given me a chance to wonder more about what it means to express “just want” for the happiness of another. But this is just one kind of happiness speech act. There are many! Others you will encounter in this book include “I’m happy if you are happy,” “I cannot bear you to be un­ happy,” “I want to make you happy,” “I want to see you being happy,” and “I want to be the cause of the happiness that is inside you.” How often we speak of happiness! If my task is to follow the words, then I aim to describe what kind of world takes shape when it is given that the happiness of which we speak is good. The question “what does happiness do?” is inseparable from the question of how happiness and unhappiness are distributed over time and in space. To track the history of happiness is to track the history of its distribution. Happiness gets distributed in all sorts of complicated ways. Certainly to be a good subject is to be perceived as a happiness-cause, as making others happy. To be bad is thus to be a killjoy. This book is an attempt to give the killjoy back her voice and to speak from recognition of how it feels to inhabit that place. I thus draw on my own experiences of being called a killjoy in describing the sociability of happiness. So many of the discussions I have had about this research have involved “swapping killjoy stories.” I remember one time at a conference table when we were discussing being killjoys at the family table. The conference was organized by the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association in 2007, and it was the first time I had been to a conference in Australia as a person of color from Australia where I felt at home. I now think of spaces created by such conferences as providing new kinds of tables, perhaps tables that give support to those who are unseated by the tables of happiness. I know that I risk overemphasizing the problems with happiness by presenting happiness as a problem. It is a risk I am willing to take. If this book kills joy, then it does what it says we should do. To kill joy, as many of the texts I cite in the following pages teach us, is to open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance. My aim in this book is to make room.

#### This means that only the aff is effective to create a survival mechanism for the Other in the institution; silence creates complacency under the guise of “safety” which become less safe for the marginalized in the institutions

Rodruiguez 11 (Dalia Rodriguez,2011, Qualitative Inquiry, “Silent rage and the politics of resitstance: countering seductions of whiteness and the road of politization and empowerment” https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/155f2644f681f418?projector=1 ) pg. 594

However, in addition to having critical dialogues with each other, what Whites need to understand is the need to create safe spaces for women of color to heal, and define themselves, and cope with racism. Historically, safe spaces have been “safe” because they have allowed a space for women of color to examine particular concerns that concern us (Collins, 2000). By definition, if such spaces are shared with those that are not of color, they become less safe. Recently, there were several female faculty of color who were recent hires and leaving the university. To support the initiatives supported by the administration to recruit faculty of color, I introduced the idea of creating affinity groups for female faculty of color. The reactions from White faculty members were not a surprise, but the comments were unexpected given the purpose of the committee, which was to collaboratively make social change across campus. One White faculty member said, “What you just said made me feel uncomfortable.” The words, “comments you just said made me feel uncomfortable” made me think that certainly what I had expressed bothered some people in the room. She went on to say, “I just feel like there are many White faculty that could get so much out of it too.” I understood this point, and said so in the meeting. To work toward solidarity, there certainly needs to be a dialogue between people of color and Whites. I appreciated her honesty, her willingness to disagree. This let me know that she was listening to my suggestion. It invited the “messiness” so central to making social change (Uttal, 1990). However, it was what was what said after the initial comment that reinforced how Whites can simultaneously work toward building coalitions and work to support White racism in the academy. Soon thereafter, another White faculty member said, “I’m so sick (emphasis) and tired of feeling left out. As an antiracist educator, I work and work and yet no one wants to include you.” She began getting visibly upset, and other White faculty members joined in, looking over at her to demonstrate support; one White faculty member reached her hand over, patted the self-proclaimed anti- racist educator and shook her head in agreement, and said, “I know exactly what you mean.” What most White faculty members failed to see is that by asking this question, women of color around that table were being denied the right to define self. Collins (2000) articulates it best when she says, Within this climate, African American women are increasingly asked why we want to “separate” ourselves from Black men and why feminism cannot speak for all women, including us. In essence, these queries challenge the need for distinctive Black women’s communities as political entities. (p. 110) Collins explains that one of the reasons that safe spaces are so threatening to those who feel excluded is because these spaces are free of surveillance by more powerful groups. These safe spaces offer the conditions for women of color to self-define, becoming the foundation for a politicized standpoint, affecting the organization of women of color and going beyond simply the expression of voice. It became very clear to me that I was simply done with my concern—not because I didn’t think the issue was critical for us to consider, but because most White faculty members had already made up their minds about the proposal on the table. Feeling dismissed and unheard, I sat in silence. It is often in these moments that women of color retreat to silence, as our spoken words remain unheard, and many times our words are rejected or deemed as “hopeless” and doing nothing to create social change. However, I also feel the need to question why else I chose to remain silent. Like Montoya eloquently explains, as women of color, we most often have been trained to remain silent, even during moments of intense emotion. As Montoya (2000) argues, In retrospect, I was silent because I had been well- trained, even in situations of intense emotions. I read the signals around me; I knew how to act—I knew to be silent. (p. 25) While women’s silences are often coerced (Houston & Kramarae, 1991), we have also been socialized to remain silent, (Montoya, 2000), especially in the academy. The implications of remaining silent for women of color can be detrimental for the survival of women of color in the academy. Remaining silent may lead to becoming invisible, and can be the death of us in many ways—spiritually, emotion- ally, and professionally. Voice and visibility go hand in hand in the demonstration of competence for women of color (Alfred, 2001), especially in the academy. For example, although women of color are rendered invisible by virtue of their femaleness and their race, successful female faculty of color who can get the dominant group to listen to her voice will increase her visibility among the group. In the educational context, visibility is critical for women of color during the graduate school and tenure-track process. Moreover, in the White academy, a place that often serves to silence women of color, voicing oneself may also serve as a form of comfort, if not inspiration to other women of color who have been similarly silenced (Williams, 2001). We can begin to convince ourselves that remaining silent is actually a good thing. hooks (1995) argues that part of the colonizing process has been teaching folks of color to repress our rage, to never make Whites the targets of any anger we feel about racism. She argues that most folks of color have internalized this message and it is this internalization of victimization that renders folks of color power- less. The repression of rage (if and when we feel it) and silencing the rage of other Black people (and other people of color) are the sacrificial offering we make to gain the ear of White listeners. Remaining silent can also make one complacent—perhaps even momentarily convincing our- selves that everything is ok, and even dismissing any signs of racism that may occur in front of us, to us, and to those around us. This is the result of the White supremacist world we live in and reflective of how people of color continue to be colonized in the White academy.

#### Facilitating criticism of academic spaces is key to destroying their communicative hegemony. The aff is an action of opening a space for those marginalized in the institution to create friction against the academy become oppositional to oppressive spaces.

Patton 04 (Dr. Tracey Owens Patton is the director of African American & Diaspora Studies and a professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of Wyoming. Dr. Patton's area of expertise is critical cultural communication and rhetorical studies.2004 Reflections of a Black Woman Professor: Racism and Sexism in Academia, Howard Journal of Communications, 15:3, 198-199, Accessed 6/27/16, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10646170490483629)

Is solidarity possible? Is a shift in the center possible? A shift within the center is a direct challenge to the current hegemonic order. This shift not only challenges the top-down hierarchical order and replaces it with a more horizontal order, but it also allows us to realize and recognize that culture is shared and the unquestioned center should be contested. With this in mind, then, a critical examination of power can ensue. It also raises an important question: Is a White supremacist patriarchal hegemonic institution interested in ‘‘re-articulating?’’ In light of the oppression against women and ethnic minorities, will the institution throw off the cloak of complicity in which the hegemonic order is invested? When struggle, perseverance, and enlightenment is no longer made on the backs of women and non-White bodies perhaps that will mean other standpoints have been or can be embraced. Just as an aspect of feminist standpoint theory ‘‘seeks to expose both acts of oppression and acts of resistance by asking disenfranchised persons to describe and discuss their experiences with hope that their knowledge will reveal otherwise unexposed aspects of the social order’’ (B. J. Allen et al.1999, p. 409), the theory of articulation can be used in the same manner. The theory of articulation links and examines issues of disenfranchisement, as they are interdependent with the hegemony, language, and action that articulated their subject positions. To establish a woman’s and ethnic minority woman’s standpoint is to prepare to challenge academic hegemony. However, as Flores and Moon (2002) correctly pointed out, ‘‘so long as desires are imbued with notions of superiority and domination, attempts to destabilize race [and other marginalizations] will fail’’ (p. 200). Articulation challenges hegemony through an oppositional gaze. Giroux (1993) noted that ‘‘oppositional paradigms provide new languages through which it becomes possible to deconstruct and challenge dominant relations of power and knowledge legitimated in traditional forms of discourse’’ (p. 167). Oppositional paradigms create the possibility for rearticulation to occur, thus shifting the current hegemonic order. The issue of racism and sexism in academe gains heightened importance particularly as positionality of the outsider-within not only remains entrenched, but also continues to produce and present numerous challenges and consequences. We need to recognize that alternative representations are necessary. Just as McLaren (1995) stated that pedagogical practice must be reimagined, so too must academe be reimaged in terms of racism and sexism lest we complicitly choose to remain adrift in the reproduction of dominant ideology. We must begin to produce new ways of thinking that involve deconstructing and dismantling the current hegemonic order and beginning to rebuild, reconstruct, and rearticulate the academy in inclusive and transformative ways. We are at a critical juncture in academe. The possibilities for re-imagining and re-articulating a radically different institution come both from the disenfranchised and from the centered. It is through their standpoints, language, action, and oppositional gaze that we can enable ourselves to challenge the current constructions of racism and sexism in academe in order to embrace a critical, transformative, and liberated vision. Academia can be both enlightening and oppressive. It is not enough to have the disenfranchised included in such way as to make their contributions, their voices, and their perspectives ineffective and silenced because of the maintenance of hegemony or allow them to border-cross when it benefits those in the center. Of all places, academia should be a profession that is a marketplace for the exchange of diverse ideas, diverse perspectives, and education in the value of difference

#### The 1AC is a refusal to have our words coopted and silenced inside of institutions. Only by calling attention to the violence inside of the institution can we ever recognize the walls we need to come up against & carve out our survival strategy. Disciplining us into silence only reinforces the

Nguyen 14 Nicole Nguyen and R. Tina Catania The Feminist Wire August 5 2014 "On Feeling Depleted: Naming, Confronting, and Surviving Oppression in the Academy" thefeministwire.com/2014/08/feeling-depleted-naming-confronting-surviving-oppression-academy/

We write because we cannot remain silent. And the “we” that we envision is more than our own impulses. It is a collective we that cannot be and will not be silent in the face of oppression. As Audre Lorde writes, “Your silence will not protect you.” The silence[7] of individuals who are “waiting to get a job” or “waiting to get tenure” or “keeping their heads down and doing their own thing” does not protect them from microaggressions, from oppression, from depletion.[8] What it does do is continue to reify and entrench the oppressive nature of the academy; it disciplines us to stay silent, to reinforce oppression, and to participate in its reproduction. Thus, we urge every-body, but especially those in positions of power (i.e., tenure-track and tenured faculty) to name oppression. To name sexism. To name ableism. To name racism. To be cognizant of how these -isms intersect to violently oppress and privilege particular bodies and identities. We must name instances, call attention to the ways that the academy’s daily practices are multiply oppressive. And we should do so whether we experience them through someone like Stuart, a prototypical, privileged, white male, or through anyone else whether white feminists, able-bodied people of color, or male “allies.” These violences, from whomever they come and through whatever structures make such encounters possible, must be named. They must be resisted. And they must be transformed. We recognize that, as Sara Ahmed warns, “exposing a problem is to become a problem.”[9] Yet, we refuse to be disciplined. We refuse to have our words, actions, and experiences foreclosed for fear of being read as the “problem,” always “stirring up trouble.” Fuck the fear that the discipline, field, department, administration, university, society tries to instill in us so that we do not speak up, so that we do not name our oppressions. We recognize the academic institution and its practices for what they are: inherently oppressive. We recognize that many have no desire to critique the academy because they do not want to jeopardize their privilege within it. We recognize that critiques of academia are necessarily limited by those who make them when they are invested in maintaining its structure, a structure that works for them. We seek to radically reshape and remake the institution in more equitable ways. True solidarity cannot pay lip service to feminist, de-colonial, anti-racist projects while maintaining individual investments in a system that works for only the most privileged bodies. Marginalized individuals cannot but participate in the oppression of other marginalized people if they are invested in academia’s current structure. Increased “representation” merely reifies the system rather than expands the possibilities for solidarity, for change. We see our colleagues, our cohorts, our faculty, our peers, and even ourselves as colluding in these oppressions when they (we) ignore them, when they ignore us, when they remain silent at their occurrence, when they are oblivious to their daily repetition. When your colleague does not plan an accessible, inclusive event from the beginning, they actively reproduce ableism and create exclusionary spaces. And our naming that problem, and therefore your collusion in ableist oppression, makes us the problem, rather than you or the institution. When the violent actions of white, male students not only go unpunished, but undiscussed and unrecognized by faculty, you actively participate in our racialized and gendered oppression. Within a deeply inequitable institution, we strive to navigate a space for ourselves, for understanding. We understand that we are a part of the academy and that our actions can also work to sustain it. Yet we strive for a different academy. We seek to transform the institution. For us, this includes naming the violences of those like Stuart and rejecting the common call to discipline ourselves into not writing or voicing radical critiques of the academy. So we begin here, with a naming of sorts. We write to name what we should not name. Yet writing also serves as a way to carve out alternative spaces. Spaces that contribute to our survivability and to our resistance against these structural and everyday forms of oppression. These spaces are where we “recognize each other, find each other, create spaces of relief, spaces that might be breathing spaces, spaces in which we can be inventive.”[10] We write together to claim our intersectional identities and recognize that for us, the academy must include the stories of our bodies, our exclusions, our resistances, our politics, our activism. We write to document our exhaustion in surviving, resisting, and reshaping this deeply violent institution even as we, as graduate students, occupy particularly precarious positions. Given these oppressions in the academy, this is a call for different, transnational, cross-border, and accessible forms of solidarity. We write, ultimately, as an invitation to those other depleted-yet-vibrant bodies, bodies who imagine another kind of academy. An academy that is collaborative, feminist, and inclusive. It is an invitation to strategize, to survive, to heal.

#### Scenarios of nuclear war or extinction are deemed as the ‘good form of debate’ and help construct a space where violence against womxn is especially hidden and force female debaters to be complacent reading those positions. We are supposed to be nice debaters, more compelling, appropriate and sweet. Failure to do so creates more affect against the marginalized female body. Feminine participation and speech inside debate is constantly suppressed through justifications of conformity and acting “happy”. Thus, the figure of the killjoy is uniquely good in debate.

**Bjork 92** (Rebecca, debater and university coach, “Symposium: Women in Debate: Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle”, Effluents and affluence: The Global Pollution Debate, 1992”)

While reflecting on my experiences as a woman in academic debate in preparation for this essay, I realized that I have been involved in debate for more than half of my life. I debated for four years in high school, for four years in college, and I have been coaching intercollegiate debate for nine years. Not surprisingly, much of my identity as an individual has been shaped by these experiences in debate. I am a person who strongly believes that debate empowers people to be committed and involved individuals in the communities in which they live. I am a person who thrives on the intellectual stimulation involved in teaching and traveling with the brightest students on my campus. I am a person who looks forward to the opportunities for active engagement of ideas with debaters and coaches from around the country. I am also, however, a college professor, a "feminist," and a peace activist who is increasingly frustrated and disturbed by some of the practices I see being perpetuated and rewarded in academic debate. I find that I can no longer separate my involvement in debate from the rest of who I am as an individual.Northwestern I remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the University summer debate camp. Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the "death culture." He argued that the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear war, environmental destruction, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and coaches signals a morbid and detached fascination with such events, one that views these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and neutral" advocates actively seek to find in their research the "impact to outweigh all other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint, when emotional and moral outrage may be a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; language is not merely some transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather is an incredibly powerful medium, the use of which inevitably has real political and material consequences. Given this assumption, I believe that it is important for us to examine the "discourse of debate practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate. If it is the case that the language we use has real implications for how we view the world, how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how our language does violence to others. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like, "we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am tired of the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has mastered the art of verbal assault to the point where accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being deliberately misleading is a sign of strength. But what I am most tired of is how women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless in such a discourse community. Women who verbally assault their opponents are labeled "bitches" because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive. Women who get angry and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered are labeled "hysterical" because, as we all know, women are more emotional then men. I am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples (although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But I find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of negotiating the mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, what is debate except a collection of shared understandings and explicit or implicit rules for interaction? What I am calling for is a critical examination of how we, as individual members of this community, characterize our activity, ourselves, and our interactions with others through language. We must become aware of the ways in which our mostly hidden and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only women, but ethnic minorities from the amazing intellectual opportunities that training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, but we can change our own community, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power that we have.

## 1NC

### Shell

#### Speech is an expression of will, but the voice of the oppressed is lost as it becomes docile. Violence becomes the corrective tool to reorient non-conforming bodies into obedience with oppressive rule systems "for their own good"

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The story gives us a portrait of obedience as virtue. We could thus consider how the project of eliminating willfulness relates to obedience. Aquinas in his reflection on the virtue of obedience refers to the work of Gregory who argues that obedience has “more merit” the “less it has of its own will” (Summa Theologiae, 2a.2ae.104.60). For Gregory obedience becomes a virtue when persons obey commands that do not go in the direction of their own will. There is no virtue in obeying a command that is agreeable to one’s own will: “obedience requires little or no effort when it has as its own will in agreeable things.” Rather “the effort is greater in disagreeable or difficult things.” Obedience occurs when one’s “own will tends to nothing apart from the command” (63). This is how Gregory can conclude that “by obedience we slay our own will” (64). To obey is to go where your will would not take you. Willfulness might refer to willing in agreement with one’s own will. Another way of putting this would be to say that a willful will is one that wills what it wants, and that has yet to eliminate want from will.6 As I noted in my introduction to this book, the Grimm story can be considered as part of the educational tradition described by Alice Miller (1987) as “poisonous pedagogy.” Miller draws on the earlier work of Katharina Rutschky who describes this tradition (problematically) as “Black pedagogy,” which has as its primary aim “the domination and control of the child for the child’s own good” (Zornado 2001, 79).7 As Joseph L. Zornado points out, following both Rutschky and Miller, this pedagogy rests on willfulness: “Because the child is willful, stained by original sin and destructive, the adult must enact decisive and punitive measures so that the child will not grow up ‘full of weeds’ ” (2001, 79). **The violence toward the child is thus presented as being for the child**. One of the examples of poisonous pedagogy quoted at length by Alice Miller is J. Sulzer’s An Essay on the Education and Instruction of Children (1784).8 I will follow Miller in quoting this essay at length as it gives us a fuller and affective picture of what is at stake in the history of willfulness. In Sulzer’s essay willfulness is described as that which must be “driven out” before children can receive a good education. Willfulness is an obstacle to the educable will: As far as willfulness is concerned, this expresses itself as a natural recourse in tenderest childhood as soon as children are able to make their desire for something known by means of gestures. They see something they want but cannot have; they become angry, cry, and flail about. Or they are given something that does not please them; they fling it aside and begin to cry. Th ese are dangerous faults that hinder their entire education and encourage undesirable qualities in children. If willfulness and wickedness are not driven out, it is impossible to give a child a good education. Th e moment these flaws appear in a child, it is high time to resist this evil so that it does not become ingrained through habit and the children do not become thoroughly depraved. (cited in Miller 1987, 10– 11) Indeed driving out willfulness, Sulzer suggests, should be the “main occupation” of those concerned with the education of children. He argues that driving out willfulness must be done “in a methodical manner”; other wise children “will finally become the masters of their parents and of their nursemaids and will have a bad, willful, and unbearable disposition with which they will trouble and torment their parents ever after as the well- earned reward for the ‘good’ upbringing they were given” (11). **The rod makes an appearance as the proper instrument for moral correction:** “If parents are fortunate enough to drive out willfulness from the very beginning by means of scolding and the rod, they will have obedient, docile, and good children whom they can later provide with a good education” (11). The rod and scolding are techniques of parental will that aim to create a docile child. Note here that **docility appears an end of will, as what will,** transformed into a disciplinary technique, **is intended to actualize.** As such the will seeks to eliminate the child’s will, understood as willful insofar as it is his own: “A child who is used to obeying his parents will also willingly submit to the laws and rules of reason once he is on his own and his own master, since he is already accustomed not to act in accordance with his own will. Obedience is so important that all education is actually nothing other than learning how to obey” (12, emphasis added). Becoming obedient is learning to act without accordance to one’s own will. If children are to act without self- accordance, their own will must be broken: It is not very easy, however, to implant obedience in children. It is quite natural for the child’s soul to want to have a will of its own, and things that are not done correctly in the first two years will be diffi cult to rectify thereafter. One of the advantages of these early years is that then force and compulsion can be used. Over the years, children forget everything that happened to them in early childhood. If their wills can be broken at this time, they will never remember afterwards that they had a will, and for this very reason the severity that is required will not have any serious consequences. Just as soon as children develop awareness, it is essential to demonstrate to them by word and deed that they must submit to the will of their parents. Obedience requires children to (1) willingly do as they are told, (2) willingly refrain from doing what is forbidden, and (3) accept the rules made for their sake. (13) **To eliminate willfulness is thus to eliminate not only the will defined as independence from what is willed by others, but to eliminate the very memory of this will or at least to aim for this elimination**. The child’s identification with parental will would become so complete that identification is experienced as willingness, as not only willingly doing what they are commanded to do, but as being this doing, as having always been this doing. Once the child is willing, any memory of having a will that was willing other wise is eradicated. Or at least that is the idea. A subject that is willing to obey is a subject without will: a willing subject becomes a will- less subject. What is this subject required to do? Katharina Rutschky explores how the genre of poisonous pedagogy provided the psychic conditions for the emergence of Fascism within Germany in the twentieth century (creating subjects whose obedience rested on the acceptance and perpetration of cruelty and punishment). As Alice Miller shows in For Your Own Good, we can track the emergence of poisonous pedagogy across Europe and America during the eighteenth century. Take, for example, the work of John Wesley who was influenced by Arminian doctrines. Wesley writes of children: “Break their wills betimes. Begin this work before they can run alone, before they can speak plain, before they can speak at all. Whatever pains it costs, break the will, if you would not damn the child. Let the child from a year old be taught to fear the rod; and to cry softly; from that age, make him do as he is bid, if you whip him ten times running to effect it. If you do spare the rod, you spoil the child; if you do not conquer you ruin him” (1811, 71). **If breaking the will is painful it is understood as necessary pain. This pain must be prior even to speech.** **The child must be conquered to avoid damnation**. Reading these literatures is difficult given how violence against children is rationalized and enacted in the works themselves. The works are implicated in the **histories** they enact; they **are conduits of violence**. In the brutish maxim “Spare the rod, spoil the child,” history is summarized as instruction. When reading about Wesley, I came across another text by the twentieth- century Baptist evangelical John Rice. He asks how John Wesley and his brother Christopher as leaders of the Evangelical movement and founders of Methodism were themselves taught. Rice notes: “Their mother Susannah Wesley taught them to fear the rod when they were a year old” (1946, 213). Rice himself then follows Wesley in arguing that “when the will of a child is totally subdued, and it is brought to revere and stand in awe of the parents, then a great many childhood follies and inadvertencies may be passed by. . . . No willful transgression should ever be forgiven children. . . . as self- will is the root of all sin and misery, so what ever cherishes this in children insures their after- wretchedness and irreligion” (213). After- wretchedness: this history is indeed a wretched history. To follow the figure of the willful child is to stay proximate to scenes of violence. And we learn too how those beaten by the rod become rods that beat. **This becoming is not inevitable, but it is part of a history we cannot afford to forget. It is a history still with us.**9 **Assembling a willfulness archive is a way of attending to histories that are kept alive by forgetting**

#### The aff is complacent in joy and The Killjoy exposes a genealogy between rebellion and punishment in the law. Our strive towards being unhappy and sacrificing happiness is what liberates us from the complacency of oppression inside the institutions walls.

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Going along with this duty can mean simply approximating the signs of being happy — passing as happy — in order to keep things in the right place. **Feminist genealogies can be described as genealogies of women who not only do not place their hopes for happiness in the right things but who speak out about their unhappiness with the very obligation to be made happy by such things**. **The history of feminism is thus a history of** making trouble,^ a history of women who refuse to become Sophy, by refusing to follow other people’s goods, or by **refusing to make others happy**. The female troublemaker might be trouble because she gets in the way of the happiness of others. Judith Butler shows how the figure of the troublemaker exposes the intimacy of rebellion and punishment within the law. As she argues in her preface to Gender Trouble. “To make trouble was, within the reigning discourse of my childhood, something one should never do precisely because that would get one in trouble. The rebellion and its reprimand seemed to be caught up in the same terms, a phenomenon that gave rise to my first critical insight into the subtle ruse of power: The prevailing law threatened one with trouble, even put one in trouble, all to keep one out of trouble” (1950: vii). Happiness might be what keeps you out of trouble only by evoking the unhappiness of getting into trouble. We can consider how nineteenth century bildungsroman novels by women writers offered a rebellion against Emile in the narrativization of the limitations of moral education for girls and its narrow precepts of happiness. Such novels are all about the intimacy of trouble and happiness. Take, for example, George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss, which is told from the point of view of Maggie Tulliver.'^° The early stages of the novel depict Maggie’s childhood, the difficulty of her relationship with her brother Torn, and her perpetual fear of disappointing her parents. The novel contrasts Tom and Maggie in terms of how they are judged by their parents: “Tom never did the same sort of foolish things as Maggie, having a wonderful instinctive discernment of what would turn to his advantage or disadvantage; and so it happened that though he was much more willful and inflexible than Maggie, his mother hardly ever called him naughty” ([i860] 1965: 73). Various incidents occur that contribute to Maggie’s reputation as a troublemaker: when she lets Tom’s dogs die (37); when she cuts her dark hair (73); when she knocks over Tom’s building blocks (96); and when she pushes their cousin Lucy into the water (111-12). **The novel shows us how trouble does not simply reside within individuals but involves ways of reading situations of conflict and struggle. Reading such situations involves locating the cause of trouble, which is another way of talking about conversion points: the troublemaker is the one who violates the fragile conditions of peace.** If in all these instances Maggie is attributed as the cause of trouble, then **what does not get noticed is the violence that makes her act in the way that she does, as the violence of provocation that hovers in the background**. Even when Tom is told off, it is Maggie who is the reference point in situations of trouble. Mrs. Tulliver says to Tom: “'Then go and fetch her in this minute, you naughty boy. And how could you think o’ going to pond and taking your sister where there was dirt. You know she’ll do mischief if there’s mischief to be done.’ It was Mrs. Tulliver’s way, if she blamed Tom, to refer his misdemeanor, somehow or other, to Maggie” (114), Maggie gets into trouble because she is already read as being trouble before anything happens. Maggie gets into trouble for speaking; to speak is already a form of defiance if you are supposed to recede into the background. She speaks out when something happens that she perceives to be wrong. The crisis of the novel is when her father loses the mill, threatening his ability to look after his family. Maggie is shocked by the lack off sympathy and care they receive from their extended family, Maggie speaks back out of a sense of care for her parents: “Maggie, having hurled her defiance at aunts and uncles in this way, stood still, with her large dark eyes glaring at them as if she was ready to await all consequences. . . . ‘You haven’t seen the end o’ your trouble wi’ that child, Bessy,’ said Mrs Pullet; ‘she’s beyond everything for boldness and unthankfulness. Its dreadful. I might ha’ let alone paying for her schooling, for she’s worse nor ever’” (229). Girls who speak out are bold and thankless. It is important that Maggie is compelled to speak from a sense of injustice. Already we can witness the relationship between consciousness of injustice and being attributed as the cause of unhappiness. The novel relates **Maggie’s tendency to get into trouble with her desire, will, and imagination, with her love of new words that bring with them the promise of unfamiliar worlds**. For instance, she loves Latin because “she delighted in new words” (159). For Maggie “these mysterious sentences, snatched from an unknown context — like strange horns of beasts and leaves of unknown plants, brought from some far-off region—gave boundless scope to her imagination and were all the more fascinating because they were in a peculiar tongue of their own, which she could learn to interpret” (159-60), The association between imagination and trouble is powerful. It teaches us how **the happiness duty for women is about the narrowing of horizons, about giving up an interest in what lies beyond the familiar.** Returning to Emile, it is interesting that the danger of unhappiness is associated precisely with women having too much curiosity. At one point in the narrative, Sophy gets misdirected. Her imagination and desires are activated by reading too many books, leading to her becoming an “unhappy girl, overwhelmed with her secret grief” (4.39-40). If Sophy were to become too imaginative, we would not get our happy ending, premised on Sophy being given to Emile. The narrator says in response to the threat of such an unhappy ending, “Let us give Emile his Sophy; let us restore this sweet girl to life and provide her with a less vivid imagination and a happier fate” (441).\*^ Being restored to life is here being returned to the straight and narrow. Imagination is what makes women look beyond the script of happiness to a different fate. Having made Sophy sweet and unimaginative, the book can end happily. **Feminist readers might want to challenge this association between unhappiness and female imagination, which in the moral economy of happiness, makes female imagination a bad thing. But if we do not operate in this economy— that is, if we do not assume that happiness is what is good — then we can read the link between female imagination and unhappiness differently. We might explore how imagination is what allows women to be liberated from happiness and the narrowness of its horizons**. We might want the girls to read the books that enable them to be overwhelmed with grief.

#### The alt is a personal killjoy manifesto against the oppressive structures of happiness in academic spaces. We stand up against the complacency of happiness inside of the institution allows us to rupture the patriarchal and racialized history of the university's placating commitments. Our genealogy repeats the unhappy history of students and debaters alike, where every round forces the academic institution to continually take on the weight of its past. A manifesto allows us to use our personal experiences against the institution to reassert our wills and to collapse systems of violence. To be a killjoy is to be a political activist, a nonconforming queer, or the angry black woman. There can be joy in the killing of joy – our manifesto just determines a purpose of feminist flight.

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We must stay unhappy with this world. The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, some of which 1 discusses in chapter I (see also Ahmed 2010). Happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods. As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely, "It is always easy to describe a, happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others] (1949] 1997, 28). Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon. A killjoy becomes a manifesto when we are willing to take up this figure, to assemble a life not as her (I discussed the risks of assuming we are her in chapter 7) but around her, in her company. We are willing to killjoy because the world that assigns this or that person or group of people as the killjoys is not to world a want to be part of. To be willing to killjoy is to transform a judgement into a project. A manifesto: how a judgment becomes a project. To think of killjoys as manifestos is to say that a politics of transformation, a politics that intends to cause the end of a system, is not a program of action that can be separates from how we are in the worlds we are in. Feminism is praxis. We enact the world we are aiming for; nothing Iess will do. Lesbian feminism, as I noted in chapter 9, is how we organize our lives in such a way that our relations to each other as women are not mediated through our relations to men. A life becomes an archive of rebellion, this is why a killjoy manifesto will be personal. Each of us killjoys will have our own. My manifesto does not suspend my personal story it is how that story unfolds into action. It is from difficult experiences, or being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that we gain the energy to rebel It is from what we conic up against that we gain new angles on what we are against. Our bodies become our tools; our rage becomes sickness. We vomit; we vomit out what we have been asked to take in. Our guts become our feminist friends the more we are sickened. We begin to feel the weight of histories more and more; the more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. We snap under the weight; things break. A manifesto is written out of feminist snap. A manifesto is feminist snap. And: we witness as feminists the trouble feminism causes. I would hazard a guess; feminist trouble is an extension of gender trouble (Butler 1990). To be more specific: feminist trouble is the trouble with women. When we refuse to be women, in the heteropatriarchal sense as beings for men, we become trouble, we get into trouble. A killjoy is willing to get into trouble. And this I think is what is specific about a killjoy manifesto: that we bring into our statements of intent or purpose the experience of what we come up against. It is this experience that allows us to articulate a for, a for that carries with it an experience of what we come up against. A for can be how we turn Something about a manifesto is about what it aims to bring about. There is no doubt in my mind that a feminist killjoy is for something; although as killjoys we are not necessarily for the same things. But you would only be willing to live with the consequences of being against what you come up against if you are for something, A life can be a manifesto. When I read some of the books in my survival kit, I hear them as manifestos, as calls to action; as calls to arms. They are books that tremble with life because they show how a life can be rewritten; how we can rewrite a life, letter by letter. A manifesto has a life, a life of its own; a manifesto is an outstretched hand. And if a manifesto is a political action, it depends on how it is received by others. And perhaps a hand can do more when it is not simply received by another hand, when a gesture exceeds the firmness of a handshake. Perhaps more than a hand needs to shake, If a killjoy manifesto is a handle, it flies out of hand. A manifesto thus repeats something that has already happened' as we know the killjoy has flown off. Perhaps a killjoy manifesto is unhandy; a feminist flight. When we refuse to be the master’s tool, we expose the violence of rods, the violences that built the master's dwelling, brick by brick. When we make violence manifest, a violence that is reproduced by not being made a manifesto, we will be assigned as killjoys. It is because of what she reveals that a killjoy he - comes a killjoy in the first place. A manifesto is in some sense behind her. This is not to say that writing a killjoy manifesto is not also a commitment; that it is not also an idea if how to move forward. A killjoy has her principles. A killjoy manifesto shows how we create principles from an experience of what we come up against, from how we live a feminist life. When I say principles here, I do not mean rules of conduct that we must agree to in order to proceed in a common direction. I might say that a feminist life is principled but feminism often becomes an announcement at the very moment of the refusal to be bound by principle. When I think of feminist principles, I think of principles in the original sense: principle as a first step, as a commencement, a start of something. A principle can also be what is elemental to a craft. Feminist killjoys and other willful subjects are crafty; we are becoming crafty. There are principles in what we craft. How we begin does not determine where we end up„ but principles do give shape or direction. Feminist principles are articulated in unfeminist worlds. Living a life with feminist principles is thus not living smoothly; we bump into the world that does not live in accordance with the principles we try to live. For some reason, the principles I articulate here ended up being expressed as statements of will; of what a killjoy is willing (to do or to be) or not willing (to do or to be). I think we can understand the some of this reason. A killjoy manifesto is a willful subject; she wills wrongly by what she is willing or is not willing to do. No wonder a willful subject has principles; she can be principled. She can share them if you can bear them.

#### The role of the ballot is vote for the debater that best mobilizes unhappiness as a way to fight oppression. Our manifesto is an archive of happiness that extends beyond the resolution; the ballot becomes a form of affect – every reading of the alt elicits an rfd, decision, and refutation which create new impressions to shape identity to reclaim the liberatory potential of academic settings.

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Every writer is first a reader, and what we read matters. I think of myself primarily as a reader of feminist, queer, and antiracist books — these books form the intellectual and political horizon of this book. I would describe these books as my philosophy books in the sense that they are the books that have helped me to think about how happiness participates in the creation of social form. But my archive does not just include books or films. If you follow the word happiness you end up everywhere! So my archive is also my world, my life-world, my past as well as present, where the word happiness has echoed so powerfully. One of the speech acts that always fascinated me is “I just want you to be happy,” which I remember being said to me an awful lot when I was growing up. Writing this book has given me a chance to wonder more about what it means to express “just want” for the happiness of another. But this is just one kind of happiness speech act. There are many! Others you will encounter in this book include “I’m happy if you are happy,” “I cannot bear you to be un­ happy,” “I want to make you happy,” “I want to see you being happy,” and “I want to be the cause of the happiness that is inside you.” How often we speak of happiness! If my task is to follow the words, then I aim to describe what kind of world takes shape when it is given that the happiness of which we speak is good. The question “what does happiness do?” is inseparable from the question of how happiness and unhappiness are distributed over time and in space. To track the history of happiness is to track the history of its distribution. Happiness gets distributed in all sorts of complicated ways. Certainly to be a good subject is to be perceived as a happiness-cause, as making others happy. To be bad is thus to be a killjoy. This book is an attempt to give the killjoy back her voice and to speak from recognition of how it feels to inhabit that place. I thus draw on my own experiences of being called a killjoy in describing the sociability of happiness. So many of the discussions I have had about this research have involved “swapping killjoy stories.” I remember one time at a conference table when we were discussing being killjoys at the family table. The conference was organized by the Australian Critical Race and Whiteness Studies Association in 2007, and it was the first time I had been to a conference in Australia as a person of color from Australia where I felt at home. I now think of spaces created by such conferences as providing new kinds of tables, perhaps tables that give support to those who are unseated by the tables of happiness. I know that I risk overemphasizing the problems with happiness by presenting happiness as a problem. It is a risk I am willing to take. If this book kills joy, then it does what it says we should do. To kill joy, as many of the texts I cite in the following pages teach us, is to open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance. My aim in this book is to make room.

## FW

### Agency [addon]

#### Their notion of agency misses the prior question of who gets access to being an agent In the first place – women and women of color are excluded from idealistic conceptions of agency without the k’s consciousness of social structures reproducing inequality

Rodruiguez 11 (Dalia Rodriguez,2011, Qualitative Inquiry, “Silent rage and the politics of resitstance: countering seductions of whiteness and the road of politization and empowerment” https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/155f2644f681f418?projector=1 )

For feminists of color, theorizing has always occurred in the margins (Hurtado, 1992; Pollard & Welch, 2006). As women of color, we occupy a precarious position in academe. Despite being invisible, ignored, disrespected, and our work often devalued, women of color have redefined the margins (hooks, 1984) often through our scholarship. By writing about our experiences in the margins, we pro- vide rich insight as to our roles as faculty, researchers, and mentors. Rejecting the dominant’s definition of reality is central in enabling women of color in developing a positive self-concept (hooks, 1990). We actively resist external definitions, and self-define, seeing ourselves as survivors rather than victims. Only recently has this perspective been recognized. Holding an outsider within position (Collins, 1986) and being in the margins allows for a unique perspective that includes understanding the dominant group’s actions as well as their espoused ideologies. The perspective from which women of color view our marginality is central in defining ourselves. Instead of accepting this marginality as disabling, we reconstruct our own definition of who we are— to reflect a positive image, rather than negative. Regardless of our reality of experiencing oppression daily, we always have the power to redefine self. We cannot live our lives based on what the colonizer’s definition is of us, we need to define who we are on our own terms. As hooks argues, “We are not looking for that Other for recognition. We are recognizing ourselves . . .” (hooks, 1990, p. 22). Despite the limits set on women of color, the power lies within us to redefine the self. However, redefining self is only part of the process of becoming subject. The other critical part of becoming subject is becoming critically conscious of how social structures reproduce inequality. Becoming subject emerges as one comes to understand how structures of domination work in one’s own life, as one develops critical thinking and critical consciousness, as one invents new, alternative hab- its of being, and resists from that marginal space of differ- ence inwardly defined (hooks, 1989). Fundamental to claiming our right to subjectivity is the insistence that we must deter- mine how we will be and not rely on colonizing responses to determine our legitimacy. Becoming personally empow- ered through self-knowledge, even within conditions that severely limit one’s ability to act is essential for the libera- tion process. Change can occur internally—in the private, personal space of an individual woman’s consciousness. Collins (2000) argues, By persisting in this journey of becoming more critically conscious toward self-definition, we can empower our- selves. When linked with each other, our individual struggles take on a new meaning. A changed consciousness encour- ages people to change the conditions of their lives and this change occurs through action. A critical mass of individuals with a changed consciousness can in turn foster women’s collective empowerment. The process of becoming subject also includes, moving from silence to language, from indi- vidual, to group action (Lorde, 1984).

### I will NOT read a plan

#### Your plans & interps are stale - policies dont do anything in debate but when we perform we are hit with ‘must read a plan’

It really isn’t a question of having a plan or policy action bc I think we can all agree that none of that shit happens outside of debate and just coopts the impacts, but your standards are a question of having a praxis point. Nowhere have you identified that the aff isn’t a praxis point or sufficient to give you whatever debate ground you want.

#### Not reciprocal

If you force me to run a plan but then don’t run any of the arguments that would give you the ground under that paradigm then what you are saying is that I should change and adapt my strategy and existence in debate for you so I can exist in a space where you don’t even try to exist under your framing. Drop them for wasting our time.

#### A2 Democratic deliberation

Ahmed 5 turns – topical engagement is an effort to constrain words and discourse to a matter that is comfortable and easy to engage or control. Their engagement is an attempt at happiness which the aff critiques. Means either they are a link into the aff or the aff comes first to break down the notions of happiness or complacency to give T its success.

2 – patton is topical, proves that the academic insulation and marginalization happens on college campuses – we are enough of a political praxis point for you to be able to deliberate democratically

#### Their civic deliberation assumes a stasis point however the stasis arguments do not create effective praxis – communication needs to be unpredictable and unknowable –we need complex interactions between different modes of interpretation and engagement to open a space for differentiation. That means the Killjoy is a prerequisite to engagement.

Ahmed 2000 [Sara. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths. *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality.* Routledge. Pg. number at bottom. SH]

In order to think through how an ethics of touch may ‘touch’ this other, I want to consider how touch involves ‘communication’. By communication, I am not suggesting that touch involves a transparent movement from one to an other (where, for example, by touching you I might confirm my love), or that by touching, one can speak. Rather, thinking of speaking and hearing in terms of touch might allow us to challenge the very assumption that communication is about expression, or about the transparency of meaning, or pure exchange. Communication involves working with, ‘that which fails to get across’, or that which is necessarily secret. To hear, or to give the other a hearing, is to be moved by the other, such that one ceases to inhabit the same place. To think of hearing as touch is to consider that being open to hearing might not be a matter of listening to the other’s voice: what moves (between) subjects, and hence what fails to move, might precisely be that which cannot be presented in the register of speech, or voicing. What I am calling for in thinking about the intimacy of touch and hearing, or of particular forms of touch and hearing (both can involve the violence of assimilation) is a communicative ethics. By this I am not alluding to the work of Jürgen Habermas and other such scholars who have attempted to establish rules and procedures that will make communication as deliberative dialogue more possible (see Fraser 1989; Benhabib 1992). Rather, I want to think about a communicative ethics which can deal with, or even better work with, the very impossibility of communication as dialogue, as one voice simply speaking to, and being heard by, another. Iris Marion Young in her article, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought’ suggests that a communicative ethics must begin with a recognition of the asymmetry of self and other, hence departing from the work of Seyla Benhabib who argues, in line with Jürgen Habermas, that such an ethics must involve a relation of symmetry (1997: 340). Young develops this notion of asymmetry, by suggesting that a ‘condition of our communication is that we acknowledge difference, interval and that others drag behind them shadows and histories, scars and traumas, that do not become present in our communication’ (1997: 3). Communication is not simply about the face to face, even if understood, in the Levinasian sense, as asymmetrical. For in the encounter in which something might be said or heard, there are always other encounters, other speech acts, scars and traumas, that remain unspoken, unvoiced, or not fully spoken or voiced. Particular modes of communication do not involve the rendering present of the other’s voice, precisely because they open an unfinished, unheard history, which cannot be fully presented, even if it is not absent. Such an ethics of communication would allow what cannot be spoken or voiced in the present, to be opened, or reopened, as that which remains ungrasped and unrealised, as an approach that is always yet to be taken. Young perceives the recognition of a time lag or interval as crucial to an ethics of communication – and with it, the recognition of distance, that which cannot be covered over, or filled in, by proximity. Pure proximity would constitute the violent fantasy of merger, rather than being, like Levinas’s caress, that which approaches what might be there, without seeking to do so, and without ever arriving there. Young uses the example of ‘going native’ as a way of demonstrating the danger of assuming an absolute proximity. She suggests that the fantasy of ‘going native’ assumes that one can occupy the place of the other, and asks instead that ‘we’ keep our distance, and respect the boundary lines that have already been drawn as markers not only of territory, but of power. The other ‘would prefer a stance of respectful distance in which whites acknowledge that they cannot reverse perspectives with Indians today, and thus must listen carefully across the distance’ (Young 1997: 345). In Chapter 6, I also questioned the fantasy of ‘going native’ and more generally, ‘becoming other’, as a means by which the dominant subject can reassert his agency. The implication of such a critique is that ‘proximity’ (in acts of consumption, becoming or passing) can involve a technique for getting closer to the other in order to maintain a distance. I do not think that ‘listening carefully across the distance’ can be the basis for an ethics of communication in the context of post-coloniality. There is a danger in assuming proximity or distance as the basis of an ethics. An ethics that assumes distance as its point of entry, fails to recognise the implication of the self in the encounter, and the responsibility the self has for the other to whom one is listening (as I argue in Chapter 8, we are ‘in it’). An ethical communication is about a certain way of holding proximity and distance together: one gets close enough to others to be touched by that which cannot be simply got across. In such an encounter, ‘one’ does not stay in place, or one does not stay safely at a distance (there is no space which is not implicated in the encounter). It is through getting closer, rather than remaining at a distance, that the impossibility of pure proximity can be put to work, or made to work.

### Ideal

#### Their demand for universal truths and maxims ensures that the production of these idealized values are never interrupted by the realities of lived experience. Evaluation of the Aff will always come first because encounters shape ontological frameworks.

Ahmed 2000 [Sara. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths. *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality.* Routledge. Pg. number at bottom. SH]

I suggest that we can only avoid stranger fetishism – that is, avoid welcoming or expelling the stranger as a figure which has linguistic and bodily integrity – by examining the social relationships that are concealed by this very fetishism. That is, we need to consider how the stranger is an effect of processes of inclusion and exclusion, or incorporation and expulsion, that constitute the boundaries of bodies and communities, including communities of living (dwelling and travel), as well as epistemic communities. I describe such processes in terms of encounters in order to show how they are determined, but not fully determined. The term encounter suggests a meeting, but a meeting which involves surprise and conflict. We can ask: how does identity itself become instituted through encounters with others that surprise, that shift the boundaries of the familiar, of what we assume that we know? Identity itself is constituted in the ‘more than one’ of the encounter: the designation of an ‘I’ or ‘we’ requires an encounter with others. These others cannot be simply relegated to the outside: given that the subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject’s existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered. As such, the encounter itself is ontologically prior to the question of ontology (the question of the being who encounters). At one level, we can think about encounters as face-to-face meetings. Such face-to-face meetings can be thought of as ‘eye-to-eye’, involving a visual economy of recognition (see Chapter 1), and as ‘skin-to-skin’, involving an economy of touch (see Chapter 2). In face-to-face meetings, where at least two subjects get close enough to see and touch each other, there is a necessary movement in time and space. The face to face requires that at least two subjects approach each other. The encounter, as a face to face, can only be thought of as a discrete event when the temporal and spatial function of this approach is negated. An emphasis on encounters involves a radical rethinking of what it might mean to face (up to) others (see Chapter 7). The face-to-face encounter is mediated precisely by that which allows the face to appear in the present. The face-to-face is hence not simply about two persons facing each other – the face to face cannot be thought of as a coupling. This encounter is mediated; it presupposes other faces, other encounters of facing, other bodies, other spaces, and other times. To talk about the importance of encounters to identity is to remind ourselves of the processes that are already at stake in the coming together of (at least) two subjects. Thinking of encounters as ‘face-to-face’ meetings also suggests that identity does not simply happen in the privatised realm of the subject’s relation to itself. Rather, in daily meetings with others, subjects are perpetually reconstituted: the work of identity formation is never over, but can be understood as the sliding across of subjects in their meetings with others. However, meetings do not have to involve the face-to-face encounter of at least two subjects. Meetings do not even presuppose the category of the human person. More generally, a meeting suggests a coming together of at least two elements. For example, we can think of reading as a meeting between reader and text. In this context, to talk of encounters as constitutive of identity (that which makes a given thing a thing) is to suggest that there is always more than one in the demarcation of ‘the one’: there is always a relationship to a reader, who is not inside or outside the text, in the determination of the text as such. To make the encounter prior to the form of the text (what the text would be within itself) is, not only to refuse to assume that the text or reader have an independent existence, but also to suggest that it is through being read that the text comes to life as text, that the text comes to be thinkable as having an existence in the first place. A thesis on the priority of encounters over identity suggests that it is only through meeting with an-other that the identity of a given person comes to be inhabited as living. If encounters are meetings, then they also involve surprise. The more-than- one of such meetings that allow the ‘one’ to be faced and to face others, is not a meeting between already constituted subjects who know each other: rather, the encounter is premised on the absence of a knowledge that would allow one to control the encounter, or to predict its outcome. As a result, encounters constitute the space of the familial (by allowing the ‘I’ or the ‘we’ to define itself in relation to others who are already faced), but in doing so, they shift the boundaries of what is familiar. Encounters involve both fixation, and the impossibility of fixation. So, for example, when we face others, we seek to recognise who they are, by reading the signs on their body, or by reading their body as a sign. As I will argue, such acts of reading constitute ‘the subject’ in relation to ‘the stranger’, who is recognised as ‘out of place’ in a given place. The surprising nature of encounters can be understood in relation to the structural possibility that we may not be able to read the bodies of others. However, each time we are faced by an other whom we cannot recognise, we seek to find other ways of achieving recognition, not only by re-reading the body of this other who is faced, but by telling the difference between this other, and other others. The encounters we might yet have with other others hence surprise the subject, but they also reopen the prior histories of encounter that violate and fix others in regimes of difference (see Chapter 6). Encounters are meetings, then, which are not simply in the present: each encounter reopens past encounters. Encounters involve, not only the surprise of being faced by an other who cannot be located in the present, they also involve conflict. The face-to-face meeting is not between two subjects who are equal and in harmony; the meeting is antagonistic. The coming together of others that allows the ‘one’ to exist takes place given that there is an asymmetry of power. The relationship between the encounter and forms of social antagonism requires that we consider the relationship between the particular – this encounter – and the general. At one level, we can think of this relationship as determined by that which must already have taken place to allow the particular encounter to take place, that is, the social processes that are at stake in the coming together of (at least) two subjects. However, this would presuppose that the particular is an outcome of the general, and would assume that both are already determined at different times and places. I want to consider how the particular encounter both informs and is informed by the general: encounters between embodied subjects always hesitate between the domain of the particular – the face to face of this encounter – and the general – the framing of the encounter by broader relationships of power and antagonism. The particular encounter hence always carries traces of those broader relationships. Differences, as markers of power, are not determined in the ‘space’ of the particular or the general, but in the very determination of their historical relation (a determination that is never final or complete, as it involves strange encounters).

## Links

### Link: queer comfort

#### Social systems are premised on bodies’ placements within systems of meaning. Comfort is when certain subjects fit in with dominant discursive norms. Heteronormativity relies on a repetition of norms to comfort heterosexual subjects. These repetitions transform and dominate spaces for the heterosexual subject to easily exercise its will. Because queers exist at the margin, they are always positioned as anti-normative and uncomfortable.

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Thinking about comfort is hence always a useful starting place for thinking. So let’s think about how it feels to be comfortable. Say you are sinking into a comfortable chair. Note I already have transferred the affect to an object (‘it is comfortable’). But comfort is about the fit between body and object: my comfortable chair may be awkward for you, with your differently- shaped body. Comfort is about an encounter between more than one body, which is the promise of a ‘sinking’ feeling. It is, after all, pain or discomfort that return one’s attention to the surfaces of the body as body (see Chapter 1). To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins. One fits, and by fitting, the surfaces of bodies disappear from view. The disappearance of the surface is instructive: in feelings of comfort, bodies extend into spaces, and spaces extend into bodies. The sinking feeling involves a seamless space, or a space where you can’t see the ‘stitches’ between bodies. Heteronormativity functions as a form of public comfort by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken their shape. Those spaces are lived as comfortable as they allow bodies to fit in; the surfaces of social space are already impressed upon by the shape of such bodies (like a chair that acquires its shape by the repetition of some bodies inhabiting it: we can almost see the shape of bodies as ‘impressions’ on the surface). The impressions acquired by surfaces function as traces of bodies. We can even see this process in social spaces. As Gill Valentine has argued, tthe ‘heterosexualisation’ of public spaces such as streets is naturalized by the repetition of different forms of heterosexual conduct (images on billboards, music played, displays of heterosexual intimacy and so on), a process which goes unnoticed by heterosexual subjects (Valentine 1996: 149). The surfaces of social as well as bodily space ‘record’ the repetition of acts, and the passing by of some bodies and not others. Heteronormativity also becomes a form of comforting: one feels better by the warmth of being faced by a world one has already taken in. One does not notice this as a world when one has been shaped by that world, and even acquired its shape. Norms may not only have a way of disappearing from view, but may also be that which we do not consciously feel.5 Queer subjects, when faced by the ‘comforts’ of heterosexuality may feel uncomfortable (the body does not ‘sink into’ a space that has already taken its shape). Discomfort is a feeling of disorientation: one’s body feels out of place, awkward, unsettled. I know that feeling too well, the sense of out-of-place-ness and estrangement involves an acute awareness of the surface of one’s body, which appears as surface, when one cannot inhabit the social skin, which is shaped by some bodies, and not others. Furthermore, queer subjects may also be ‘asked’ not to make heterosexuals feel uncomfortable by avoiding the display of signs of queer intimacy, which is itself an uncomfortable feeling, a restriction on what one can do with one’s body, and another’s body, in social space.6 The availability of comfort for some bodies may depend on the labour of others, and the burden of concealment. Comfort may operate as a form of ‘feeling fetishism’: some bodies can ‘have’ comfort, only as an effect of the work of others, where the work itself is concealed from view.7 It is hence for very good reasons that queer theory has been defined not only as anti-heteronormative, but as anti-normative. As Tim Dean and Christopher Lane argue, queer theory ‘advocates a politics based on resistance to all norms’ (Deanr and Lane 2001: 7). Importantly, heteronormativity refers to more than simply the presumption that it is normal to be heterosexual. The ‘norm’ is regulative, and is supported by an ‘ideal’ that associates sexual conduct with other forms of conduct. We can consider, for example, how the restriction of the love object is not simply about the desirability of any heterosexual coupling. The couple should be ‘a good match’ (a judgement that often exercises conventional class and racial assumptions about the importance of ‘matching’ the backgrounds of partners) and they should exclude others from the realm of sexual intimacy (an idealisation of monogamy, that often equates intimacy with property rights or rights to the intimate other as property). Furthermore, a heterosexual coupling may only approximate an ideal through being sanctioned by marriage, by participating in the ritual of reproduction and good parenting, by being good neighbours as well as lovers and parents, and by being even better citizens. In this way, normative culture involves the differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate ways of living whereby the preservation of what is legitimate (‘life as we know it’) is assumed to be necessary for the well-being of the next generation. Heteronormativity involves the reproduction or transmission of culture through how one lives one’s life in relation to others.

### Link: Wound Fetishism

#### Transformation of the wound into an identity of its own is the essence of commodifying suffering. Remembrance is the only mechanism to counter wound fetishization—we need specific and constant connections to these histories

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How does pain enter politics? Does pain become political only through speech, or through claims for compensation? Pain has been considered by some as a very problematic ‘foundation’ for politics. Working with Nietzsche’s model of resentiment, for example, Wendy Brown argues that there has been a fetishisation of the wound in subaltern politics (Brown 1995: 55, see Nietzsche 1969). Subaltern subjects become invested in the wound, such that **the wound comes to stand for identity itself**. The political claims become claims of injury against something or somebody (society, the state, the middle classes, men, white people and so on) as a reaction or negation (Brown 1995: 73). Following Nietzsche, Brown suggests that **reactions to injury are inadequate as a basis of politics** since such reactions make action impossible: ‘Revenge as a “reaction”, **a substitute for the capacity to act, produces identity as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history’** (Brown 1995: 73).10 Brown’s reworking of Nietzsche shows how an over-investment in the wound, ‘come[s] into conflict with the need to give up these investments’ (Brown 1995: 73). I agree that the transformation of the wound into an identity is problematic. One of the reasons that it is problematic is precisely because of its fetishism: the transformation of the wound into an identity cuts the wound off from a history of ‘getting hurt’ or injured. **It turns the wound into something that simply ‘is’ rather than something that has happened in time and space**. The fetishisation of the wound as a sign of identity is crucial to ‘testimonial culture’ (Ahmed and Stacey 2001), in which narratives of pain and injury have proliferated. Sensational stories can turn pain into a form of media spectacle, in which the pain of others produces laughter and enjoyment, rather than sadness or anger. Furthermore, narratives of collective suffering increasingly have a global dimension. As Kleinman, Das and Lock argue, ‘**Collective suffering is also a core component of the global political economy. There is a market for suffering: victimhood is commodified’** (Kleinman, Das and Lock 1997: xi). This commodification of suffering does not mean that all narratives have value or even equal value: as I show in Chapters 6 and 7, following Judith Butler (2002b), some forms of suffering more than others will be repeated, as they can more easily be appropriated as ‘our loss’. The differentiation between forms of pain and suffering in stories that are told, and between those that are told and those that are not, is a crucial mechanism for the distribution of power. **We can reflect critically** on the culture of compensation, where all forms of injury are assumed to involve relations of innocence and guilt, and where it is assumed that responsibility for all injuries can be attributed to an individual or collective. The legal domain transforms pain into a condition that can be quantified as the basis for compensation claims. The problem of wound fetishism is the equivalence it assumes between forms of injury. The production of equivalence allows injury to become an entitlement, which is then equally available to all others. It is no accident then that **the normative subject is often secured through narratives of injury**: the white male subject, for example, has become an injured party in national discourses (see Chapter 2), as the one who has been ‘hurt’ by the opening up of the nation to others. Given that subjects have an unequal relation to entitlement, then more privileged subjects will have a greater recourse to narratives of injury. That is, the more access subjects have to public resources, the more access they may have to the capacity to mobilise narratives of injury within the public domain. How should we respond to this transformation of injury into an entitlement that secures such forms of privilege? I would suggest that **our response should not simply be to critique the rhetorical use of injury or ‘wounds’, but to attend to the different ways in which ‘wounds’ enter politics**. Not all narratives of pain and injury work as forms of entitlement; so for example, to read the story of white male injury as the same as stories of subaltern injury would be an unjust reading. Whilst we cannot assume that such differences are essential, or determined ‘only’ by the subject’s relation to power, we also cannot treat differences as incidental, and as separated from relations of power. The **critique of wound culture should not operate as generalised critique**, which would mean ‘reading’ different testimonies as symptomatic. As Carl Gutiérrez-Jones argues, the critique of injury needs to recognise the different rhetorical forms of injury as signs of an uneven and antagonistic history (Gutiérrez-Jones 2001: 35). So a good response to Brown’s critique would **not** be ‘**to forget’ the wound or indeed the past as the scene of wounding.** Brown does ‘part company’ with Nietzsche by suggesting that ‘the counsel of forgetting... seems inappropriate if not cruel’ for subjugated peoples who have yet to have their pain recognised (Brown 1995: 74). I would put this more strongly: **forgetting would be a repetition of the violence or injury.** To forget would be to repeat the forgetting that is already implicated in the fetishisation of the wound. **Our task might** instead **be to ‘remember’ how the surfaces of bodies** (including the bodies of communities, as I will suggest later) **came to be wounded in the first place**. Reading testimonies of injury involves rethinking the relation between the present and the past: an **emphasis on the past** does not necessarily mean a conservation or entrenchment of the past (see Chapter 8).11 Following bell hooks, our task **would be ‘not to forget the past but to break its hold’** (Hooks 1989: 155). In order to break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attachments that are hurtful, we must first bring them into the realm of political action. Bringing pain into politics requires we give up the fetish of the wound through different kinds of remembrance. ***The past is living rather than dead***; the past lives in the very wounds that remain open in the present. In other words, harm has a history, even though that history is made up of a combination of often surprising elements that are unavailable in the form of a totality. Pain is not simply an effect of a history of harm; it is the bodily life of that history. To think through how pain may operate in this way we can consider the document, Bringing Them Home, which is a report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (1996). Bringing Them Home reports on the Stolen Generation in Australia, a generation of indigenous children who were taken away from their families as part of a brutal and shocking policy of assimilation. Generations of indigenous children grew up with little or no contact with their families, or with their community and culture. They were often taken from their homes in a violent manner.

### Link – narratives:

#### The 1AC’s display of unhappiness and injury separates pain from its bodily containment in the Other, rendering the wound as an object to be obtained. Their narrative positions the judge as a subject to appropriate and then resolve this pain only when they are compelled enough to care, where each ‘successful’ ballot elevates their power over an increasingly invisible Other.

Ahmed 04 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, “The Contingency of Pain”, 2004, Routledge, New York, pp 20-22 //Accessed 1/15/17 GK)

How does pain enter politics? How are lived experiences of pain shaped by contact with others? Pain has often been described as a private, even lonely experience, as a feeling that I have that others cannot have, or as a feeling that others have that I myself cannot feel (Kotarba 1983: 15). And yet the pain of others is continually evoked in public discourse, as that which demands a collective as well as individual response. In the quote above from a Christian Aid letter, the pain of others is ﬁrst presented through the use of the word ‘landmines’. The word is not accompanied by a description or history; it is assumed that the word itself is enough to evoke images of pain and suffering for the reader.2 Indeed, the word is repeated in the letter, and is transformed from ‘sign’ to the ‘agent’ behind the injuries: ‘Landmines are causing pain and suffering all around the world.’ Of course, this utterance speaks a certain truth. And yet, to make landmines the ‘cause’ of pain and suffering is to stop too soon in a chain of events: landmines are themselves effects of histories of war; they were placed by humans to injure and maim other humans. The word evokes that history, but it also stands for it, as a history of war, suffering and injustice. Such a letter shows us how the language of pain operates through signs, which convey histories that involve injuries to bodies, at the same time as they conceal the presence or ‘work’ of other bodies. The letter is addressed to ‘friends’ of Christian Aid, those who have already made donations to the charity. It focuses on the emotions of the reader who is interpellated as ‘you’, as the one who ‘probably’ has certain feelings about the suffering and pain of others. So ‘you’ probably feel ‘angry’ or ‘saddened’. The reader is presumed to be moved by the injuries of others, and it is this movement that enables them to give. To this extent, the letter is not about the other, but about the reader: the reader’s feelings are the ones that are addressed, which are the ‘subject’ of the letter. The ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’ the reader should feel when faced with the other’s pain is what allows the reader to enter into a relationship with the other, premised on generosity rather than indifference. The negative emotions of anger and sadness are evoked as the reader’s: the pain of others becomes ‘ours’, an appropriation that transforms and perhaps even neutralises their pain into our sadness. It is not so much that we are ‘with them’ by feeling sad; the apparently shared negative feelings do not position the reader and victim in a relation of equivalence, or what Elizabeth V. Spelman calls co-suffering (Spelman 1997: 65). Rather, we feel sad about their suffering, an ‘aboutness’ that ensures that they remain the object of ‘our feeling’. So, at one level, the reader in accepting the imperative to feel sad about the other’s pain is aligned with the other. But the alignment works by differentiating between the reader and the others: their feelings remain the object of ‘my feelings’, while my feelings only ever approximate the form of theirs. It is instructive that the narrative of the letter is hopeful. The letter certainly promises a lot. What is promised is not so much the overcoming of the pain of others, but the empowerment of the reader: ‘I hope you feel a sense of empowerment.’ The pain of the other is overcome, but it is not the object of hope in the narrative; rather, the overcoming of the pain is instead a means by which the reader is empowered. So the reader, whom we can name inadequately as the ‘Western subject’, feels better after hearing about individual stories of success, narrated as the overcoming of pain as well as the healing of community. These stories are about the lives of individuals that have been saved: ‘Chamreun is a survivor of a landmine explosion and, having lost his leg, is all the more determined to make his community a safer place in which to live.’ These stories of bravery, of the overcoming of pain, are indeed moving. But interestingly the agent in the stories is not the other, but the charity, aligned here with the reader: through ‘your regular support’, you have ‘helped to bring about’ these success stories. Hence the narrative of the letter ends with the reader’s ‘empowerment’. The word ‘landmines’, it is suggested, now makes ‘you’ feel a sense of empowerment, rather than anger or sadness. This letter and the charitable discourses of compassion more broadly show us that stories of pain involve complex relations of power. As Elizabeth V. Spelman notes in Fruits of Sorrow, ‘Compassion, like other forms of caring, may also reinforce the very patterns of economic and political subordination responsible for such suffering’ (Spelman 1997: 7). In the letter, the reader is empowered through a detour into anger and sadness about the pain of others. The reader is also elevated into a position of power over others: the subject who gives to the other is the one who is ‘behind’ the possibility of overcoming pain. The over-representation of the pain of others is signiﬁcant in that it ﬁxes the other as the one who ‘has’ pain, and who can overcome that pain only when the Western subject feels moved enough to give. In this letter, generosity becomes a form of individual and possibly even national character; something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have, which is ‘shown’ in how we are moved by others. The transformation of generosity into a character trait involves fetishism: it forgets the gifts made by others (see Diprose 2002), as well as prior relations of debt accrued over time. In this case, the West gives to others only insofar as it is forgotten what the West has already taken in its very capacity to give in the ﬁrst place. In the Christian Aid letter, feelings of pain and suffering, which are in part effects of socio-economic relations of violence and poverty, are assumed to be alleviated by the very generosity that is enabled by such socio-economic relations. So the West takes, then gives, and in the moment of giving repeats as well as conceals the taking.

### Link – power to the state:

#### They give too much credence to the institutions - The effect of university policies aimed at helping oppressed bodies vanishes in thin air, but the legal walls created stay in place. On-campus activists are put into a situation where they constantly make futile policies, while the university ignores its commitments. Only totally reorienting our existence in universities can we ever confront the walls that are constructed.

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To have evidence of a policy is not sufficient for the policy to be enacted. In this example the head of human resources removed the decision from the minutes: you can see here how the removal of evidence of something is an attempt to modify an arrangement. However what is being modified is the record of a modification. We learn how stasis can involve work: to keep an old arrangement you remove traces of the policy having been changed. [but it] was however put back in the minutes. This put back was a result of yet more diversity work: noticing the removal of evidence is evidence of labour. But then: when the practitioner tells her colleagues in meetings that the policy has changed, they look at her “like she is saying something really stupid.” She might as well not have any evidence because as far as they are concerned the policy has not been changed. The story of a diversity policy that does not do anything is a tantalizingly tangible example of what goes on so often. But even if the story makes something tangible (and that it is so is a result of the labour and testimony of a diversity worker – think of how many tales like this are not told), it shows us how some things are reproduced by remaining intangible. This remaining is “stubborn,” a stubbornness that is not dependent upon an individual (although it can involve individuals) but an effect of how things combine. She has evidence; she can point to it; but it is as if she has nothing to show. Diversity work: you learn that intangibility is quite a phenomenon. Intangibility can be the product of institutional resistance. And that is a philosophical as well as political point because it teaches us that what is not evident to the senses is not simply about the status of an object. The object here is not missing or even withdrawn. The object is right there. And it is there because the right procedures have been followed to make it there. An object that has been brought into existence does not appear. Something is not perceived despite being available or near to hand: you can not notice what is right in front of you without having to make any effort to turn away. Paper can disappear because the content of the decision that is recorded on that paper is not in agreement with what has “really” been decided, a decision that takes the form of a momentum; a direction that does not need to made into a directive because it is shared. That a policy can be agreed without being followed teaches us that a policy and a direction are not the same thing. Perhaps changing policies is a way of sustaining a direction, because those appointed to do equality and diversity (and appointments are often made to comply with the law) end up spending their time working on policies that do not do anything. As one practitioner I spoke to once said: “you end up doing the document rather than doing the doing.” Doing the document. Not doing the doing. You can see why diversity workers often talk about walls when they talk about their work. Diversity work is a “banging your head against a brick wall job.” As I commented in an [earlier post](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/06/10/hard/), what makes an institutional wall even harder is that it is not a concrete or actual wall. If there was a wall there, we could point to it. The wall might then provide evidence of itself: a wall as self-evident. Although, to qualify this (as optimism) we have also learnt something is not always perceived even when it is tangible. What makes an institutional wall harder is that unless you come up against it (because of who you are, or what you are trying to do), this wall does not appear. The walls that diversity workers speak about are assumed as phantom walls: in your head not in the world. Racism and sexism are walls in this sense: in the world but assumed as in our heads not in the world. We have to live with that assumption. In the world. What is a phantom for some for others is real. What is hardest for some does not appear to others. And so: a policy disappears despite there being a paper trail, despite the evidence, or even because of the evidence. People disappear too, because of what they make evident, of what they try to bring into view. There are many ways in which you can end up disappearing. The story I have shared with you is one story of disappearance. And it is not just a policy that disappears in the story. A diversity worker: she ends up exhausted because despite all her efforts the same thing is still happening. Sometimes you stop because it is too hard to get through. So she might leave, or turn her energy toward something else: a new policy, a new document, a new job. And: this practitioner left her post soon after I interviewed her, for another post in another university. What happens to a policy can happen to a person. People disappear too: because of what they try to make evident, what they try to bring into view. What is evident, I implied at the start, is often a weaker sense: something is evident to someone. What is evident: a matter of perception. We are now learning: perception matters. The removal of evidence is an institutional process that renders somethings not evident to those who inhabit that institution. It is as if: nothing is there. No policy, no paper. Maybe a person appears, but you look at her blankly. What is she waving around! What is she going on about! The wall that you come up against, that blocks a progression (of a policy or a person), is not encountered by those who do not come up against it. There; nothing there. [No wonder](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/10/24/heavy-histories/): There becomes despair.

### Link: “Neoliberalism”

**Their critique of neoliberalism is simply a mask that positions students that disagree with curriculum as a threat to the magnificent past of the university. Their critique is a regressive strategy to return the power of academic elites to the top of the ivory tower**

**Ahmed 15** (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism/ Ahmed, Sara. Article from her independent research blog: Against Students Posted on June 25, 2015. Web. //Accessed 2/16/17 GK)

We need to challenge this assumption that some subjects only come into existence because universities are “in hot pursuit” of the “student purse.” We know the strong critiques of curriculum made by those working within departments that led to the diversification of the curriculum. We know of the work of “chipping away” at the walls that are sometimes called canons. We know of the long histories of feminist and queer activisms that led to sexuality as well as gender being taken up as legitimate subjects within the academy. If we don’t know, we should know. These histories of labour and activism are “swept away” by the assumption that such subjects only come into existence because of the “student purse.” It is this activism that enabled a challenge to some of the decisions made by departments as well as dons about what is of value; decisions that solidify as canons. These decisions are often protected by assumptions of universality, which is a way of making a decision “indefensible” (the usual sense of indefensible is unjustifiable – I want to make this mean “that which does not need justifying”). The various subjects made possible through the labour of political critique and activism are dismissed in the flourish of a “rather than,” as simple expressions of the wanton nature of the market (that monstrous body). The figure of the consuming subject, who wants the wrong things, a student who is found wanting, is hard at work. She is how: an idea of universal knowledge or universal culture can be so thinly disguised as a critique of neoliberalism and managerialism. She is how: an academic world can be idealised in being mourned as a lost object; a world where dons get to decide things; a world imagined as democracy, as untroubled by the whims and wishes of generations to come.[3] We have an understanding of how: when students are being critical of what we are doing, when they contest what is being taught, they can be treated and dismissed as acting like consumers. In other words it is when students are not satisfied that they are understood as treating our delivery as a product. Critique as such can be “swept away” by the charge of consumerism. Students become the problem when what they want is not in accordance with what academics want or what academics want them to want: students become willful when what they will is not what academics will or not what academics will them to will. What seems to be in place here is what Paulo Freire (1970) called the “bank model” of education in which teachers deposit knowledge into the bodies of students like money into a machine. Rather ironically, students are more likely to be judged as acting like consumers when they refuse to be banks. Luckily I would say: don’t bank on it.

### Link: Offendability

**Their criticisms of safe spaces and student-led censorship position over-sensitive student as a threat to the supposed happiness and coziness of academic institutions. Critiques of offendability are a racialized, gendered, and sexual strategy to reclaim lost hegemony won by oppressed bodies**

**Ahmed 15** (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism/ Ahmed, Sara. Article from her independent research blog: Against Students Posted on June 25, 2015. Web. //Accessed 2/16/17 GK)

The figure of the consuming student has something to say to other figures such as the censoring student. I now want to return to an earlier post “You are Oppressing Us.” I referred to one letter that mobilised the figure of the censoring student (this letter has since been supplemented by yet more letters – one of which even equates alleged “no platforming” in the UK with various acts of extremism around the world). This letter speaks of how some have been stopped from speaking on campuses because they articulate viewpoints that are out of line with the views held by students (who are treated as remarkably consistent, as body or thing, and I am partly tracking what is achieved by this consistency). The figure of the censoring student exists in close relation to that of the consuming student: both work to create an impression that students have all the power to decide what is being taught as well as what is not being taught, what is being spoken about as well as what is not being spoken about; and that this power is at the expense not only of dons and departments, but also politicians, journalists and other public figures. Students: they keep coming up as having all the power. Really? Yes, really. I noted in my previous post how the letter relies on flimsy evidence because it is assembled around a desire for evidence. Indeed the instances of apparent censorship (translate: student protests) seemed to generate more discourse and discussion rather than preventing discourse or discussion. When students who protest against such-and-such speaker become censors, those who wrote and signed the letter become the ones who are silenced, whose freedoms are under threat. So much speech and writing is generated by those who claim they are silenced! But we can still ask: what is the figure of the censoring student doing. **By hearing student critique as censorship the content of that critique is pushed aside. When you hear a challenge as an attempt at censorship you do not have to engage with the challenge. You do not even have to say anything of substance because you assume the challenge as without substance.** In the first instance, critique and contestation (“they want the wrong courses!”) is dismissed as consumerism; in the second instance, protest (“they don’t want the right people!”) is dismissed as censorship. Sweep, sweep. Beep, beep. Error message. Another figure comes up, rather quickly, at this point: she is often lurking behind the censoring student. This is the over-sensitive student: the one who responds to events or potential events with hurt feelings. She also comes up as someone who stops things from happening. We can refer here to a number of recent pieces that I would read as a moral panic about moral panics. Many of these pieces refer to US college campuses specifically and are concerned with the introduction of safe spaces, and trigger warnings. The figure of **the over-sensitive student is invested with power**. The story goes: **because students have become too sensitive, we cannot even talk about difficult issues in the classroom; because of their feelings we (critical academics) cannot address questions of power and violence, and so on**. **A typical example of this** kind of rhetoric: **“**No one can rebut feelings, and so the only thing left to do is shut down the things that cause distress — no argument, no discussion, just hit the mute button and pretend eliminating discomfort is the same as effecting actual change.” Or another: “while keeping college-level discussions ‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive, **it’s bad for them and for everyone else**. **People ought to go to college to sharpen their wits and broaden their field of vision.”** **Here safety is about feeling good, or not feeling bad.** We sense what is being feared: students will become warm with dull edges, not sharp enough in wit or wisdom. The moral panic around trigger warnings is a very good pedagogic tool: we learn from it. **Trigger warnings are assumed as being about being safe or warm or cuddled. I would describe trigger warnings as a partial and necessarily inadequate measure to enable some people to stay in the room so that “difficult issues” can be discussed**. The assumption that trigger warnings are themselves about safe spaces is a working assumption (by this I mean: it is achieving something). Indeed what I have said is rather misleading because the assumption that safe spaces are themselves about deflecting attention from difficult issues is another working assumption. Safe spaces are another technique for dealing with the consequences of histories that are not over (a response to a history that is not over is necessarily inadequate because that history is not over). **The aim is to enable conversations about difficult issues to happen: so often those conversations do not happen because the difficulties people wish to talk about end up being re-enacted within spaces, which is how they are not talked about.** For example conversations about racism are very hard to have when white people become defensive about racism: those conversations end up being about those defences rather than about racism. We have safe spaces so we can talk about racism not so we can avoid talking about racism! The very techniques introduced to enable the opening up of conversations can be used as evidence of the closing down of conversations. Anyone with a background in Women’s Studies will be familiar with this: how we come up against stereotypes of feminists spaces as soft, cosy, easy, which are the exact same sexist stereotypes that make Women’s Studies necessary as a feminist space. The very perception of some spaces as being too soft might even be related to the harshness of the worlds we are organising to challenge. The idea that students have become a problem because they are too sensitive relates to a wider public discourse that renders offendability as such a form of moral weakness (and as being what restricts “our” freedom of speech). **Much contemporary racism works by positioning the others as too easily offendable, which is how some come to assert their right to occupy space by being offensive.** And yes: so much gets “swept away,” by the charge of being too sensitive. A recent example would be how protests against the Human Zoo in the Barbican, about how racism is disguised as art or education, are swept up as a symptom of being “over-sensitive. According to this discourse, anti-racists end up censoring even themselves because they are “thin skinned.” **So much violence is justified and repeated by how those who refuse to participate in violence are judged. We need to make a translation. The idea that being over-sensitive is what stops us from addressing difficult issues** can be translated as: we can’t be racist because you are too sensitive to racism. Well then: we need to be too sensitive if we are to challenge what is not being addressed. We might still need to ask: what is meant by addressing difficult issues? It is worth me noting that I have been met with considerable resistance from critical academics when trying to discuss issues of racism, power and sexism on campus. Some academics seem comfortable talking about these issues when they are safely designated as residing over there. Is this “there” what allows “difficult issues” not to be addressed here? In fact, it seems to me that it is often students who are leading discussions of “difficult issues” on campus. But when students lead these discussions they are then dismissed as behaving as consumers or as being censoring. How quickly another figure comes up, when one figure is exposed as fantasy. If not over-sensitive, then censoring; if not censoring, then consuming. And so on, and so forth.

#### Turn – the censorship that the aff opposes actually translates to challenging academic spaces and comfortability in criticisms which is key to a successful movement

Against students – ahmed

So much violence is justified and repeated by how those who refuse to participate in violence are judged. We need to make a translation. The idea that being over-sensitive is what stops us from addressing difficult issues can be translated as: we can’t be racist because you are too sensitive to racism. Well then: we need to be too sensitive if we are to challenge what is not being addressed. We might still need to ask: what is meant by addressing difficult issues? It is worth me noting that I have been met with considerable resistance from critical academics when trying to discuss issues of racism, power and sexism on campus. Some academics seem comfortable talking about these issues when they are safely designated as residing over there. Is this “there” what allows “difficult issues” not to be addressed here? In fact, it seems to me that it is often students who are leading discussions of “difficult issues” on campus. But when students lead these discussions they are then dismissed as behaving as consumers or as being censoring. How quickly another figure comes up, when one figure is exposed as fantasy. If not over-sensitive, then censoring; if not censoring, then consuming. And so on, and so forth. My own sense: our feminist political hopes rest with over-sensitive students. Over-sensitive can be translated as: sensitive to that which is not over. All of these ways of making students into the problem work to create a picture of professors or academics as the ones who are “really” oppressed by students. This is what it means to articulate a position or a view “against students.” One US professor speaks of being “frightened” by his liberal students. He blames so much on “identity politics.” And indeed so much is blamed on identity politics: that term is used whenever we challenge how spaces are occupied. It has become another easy dismissal. We are learning here about professors (their investments, emotions and strategies of dismissal) more than we are learning about students.

### Link: Deleuze

#### Their fetishization of movement and fluidity is violent because it essentializes what it means to be fluid, excluding oppressed bodies that are unable or can’t afford that risk

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Furthermore, the positing of an ideal of being free from scripts that deﬁne what counts as a legitimate life seems to presume a negative model of freedom; deﬁned here as freedom from norms. Such a negative model of freedom **idealises movement and detachment, constructing a mobile form of subjectivity that could escape from the norms that constrain what it is that bodies can do.** Others have criticised queer theory for its idealisation of movement (Epps 2001: 412; Fortier 2003). As Epps puts it: ‘Queer theory tends to place great stock in movement, especially when it is movement against, beyond, or away from rules and regulations, norms and conventions, borders and limits . . . it **makes ﬂuidity a fetish’** (Epps 2001: 413). The idealisation of movement, or transformation of movement into a fetish, **depends upon the exclusion of others who are already positioned as not free in the same way. Bodies that can move with more ease may also more easily shape and be shaped** by the sign ‘queer’. It is for this reason that Biddy Martin suggests that we need to ‘stop deﬁning queerness as mobile and ﬂuid in relation to what then gets construed as stagnant and ensnaring’ (Martin 1996: 46). Indeed, the **idealisation of movement depends upon a prior model of what counts** as a queer life, which may **exclude others, those who have attachments that are not readable** as queer, **or** indeed those **who may lack the** (cultural as well as economic) **capital to support the ‘risk’ of maintaining antinormativity as a permanent orientation**.

### Link: Foucault

#### 1)Foucault’s exposition and genealogies were written to create conflict and rub up against the walls of the institution – ahmed’s advocacy of the killjoy is just that next step. Foucault doesn’t critique Ahmed, he affirms her.

Guilmette 14 In What We Tend to Feel Is Without History: Foucault, Affect, and the Ethics of Curiosity Author(s): Lauren Guilmette Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 3, special issue with the society for phenomenology and existential philosophy (2014), pp. 284-294 Published by: Penn State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jspecphil.28.3.0284 Accessed: 07-07-2017 16:54 UTC KAE

While this search for grounds presents “sleepless evidence” we can never fully expose, Foucault’s ethics of curiosity demands a subversion of the paranoid desire for totalizing knowledge, which “does not rule out . . . the rigorous economy of the True and the False” but reveals, in this frac- tured dialectic of particulars and universals, that this economy “is not the whole story.”36 Foucault wrote genealogies “to incite rebellions against per- nicious disciplinary productions, to produce an experience of their costs, and to open the space for an alternative tradition of critique as well as a revised understanding of autonomy.”37 He “writes a ‘history of the present’ to disrupt toxic scripts, in effect, seeking to diagnose and suggest alter- native avenues of behavior, or at least their possibility.”38 Curiosity marks our relational and embodied engagement with difference—that with which “we” do not identify, whoever this “we” might be. Why curiosity rather than Humean sympathy, feminist ethics of care, the wonderment of Levinasian in nite responsibility? Maligned in the history of philosophy, curiosity has long been the inquisitive, nosy little sister to wonder’s awestruck calm.39 Curiosity nds its root in the Latin curiosus, an etymology suggesting care and diligence, which, in its modern incantation, has been eclipsed as impatient prying, mediated by connotations of “curiosity shops”—quirky objects on display. And yet, Foucault writes that curiosity has been central to his work, This content downloaded from 129.110.241.62 on Fri, 07 Jul 2017 16:54:50 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 292 lauren guilmette negatively through his attention to the cruel excesses of the medical-moral gaze but also positively as an unsettling and potentially transformative mode of attention that Foucault calls curiosity-as-care—“the care one takes of what exists and what might exist; a sharpened sense of reality, but one that is never immobilized before it; a readiness to nd what surrounds us strange.”40

#### 2)Unhappiness is in direct contrast with the function of power

Ahmed 07 MULTICULTURALISM AND THE PROMISE OF HAPPINESS Sara Ahmed <https://www.gold.ac.uk/media/documents-by-section/course-finder/ahmed1.pdf> Written in 2007 through the Journal publishing Company with Goldmaans DOA 7/7/17 KAE

You could say that images of happy housewives have been replaced by rather more desperate ones. I would argue that there is a diversification of affects tied to this figure, which gives her a more complex affective life, but that this does not necessarily dislodge the happiness that is presumed to reside in ‘what’ she does, even in descriptions of relative unhappiness. After all, explanations of relative unhappiness can also function to restore the power of an image of the good life. As Friedan shows, the unhappiness of the housewife is attributed to what is around her (such as the incompetent repair men), rather than the position she occupies. Unhappiness would here function as a sign of frustration, of being ‘held back’ or ‘held up’ from doing what makes her happy. It is hence far from surprising that a recent study on happiness in the US suggested that feminist women are less happy than ‘traditional housewives’, as the American journalist Megan O’Rourke explores in her aptly name article, ‘Desperate Feminist Wives’.2 Unhappiness is used as a way of signalling the need to return to something that has been lost: as if what we have lost in losing this or that is the very capacity to be happy. Happiness becomes in other words a defence of ‘this and that’. As Simone de Beauvoir argued in The Second Sex: ‘it is always easy to describe as happy the situation in which one wishes to place them’.3 Happiness functions as a displacement of a social wish, and a defence against an imagined future of loss.

#### 3) in Ahmed’s book The Willful Subjects she literally lauds Foucault with a proper understanding of power and subjecthood – this k isn’t competitive because all ahmed does is reimagine the relation and solution between power and affect. Means the impacts aren’t competitive

#### 4) The aff’s understandings of affect is specifically in relation to the pre-fiat performance of a debate round. Even if you buy a link from the aff into the k it either A) only triggers a marginal amount of the impacts or B) nullifies the impacts because they are non unique

#### 5) The aff isn’t specific to a specific identity – anyone can be the killjoy and it is just trying to provide voice to those silenced by the institution

#### Power in itself does not necessitate rejection – it enables points of resistance and a dual discourse

Lacombe 96, Associate Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser University, 96 (Dany, , PhD (Sociology) University of Toronton; MA (Criminology) University of Toronto; BA (Psychology) Universite de Sherbrooke, Quebec, “Reforming Foucault: A Critique of the Social Control Thesis,” The British Journal of Sociology Vol. 47 No. 2 (Jun 1996) p. 340, Blackwell Publishing, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Jstor)

This new species was made intelligible through a variety of power- knowledge strategies that objectified and subjugated. While he was now at the mercy of powerful discourses that named his condition, the homo- sexual was, nevertheless, in a position to resist these discourses. Foucault contends that once he acquires his new life, the homosexual can use his special positionality and assert his new identity in a variety of ways. He can show off, scandalize, resist- or passively accept that he is sick. The growth of the perversions, of the unorthodox sexualities is therefore, for Foucault, 'the real product of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their pleasures'. (1980b:48) It is in that sense, then, that Foucault asserts that power is neither an institution nor a structure but 'the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society'. (Foucault 1980b:93) This conception of power is different from the thesis of the enhancement and intensification of social control. Power, for Foucault, implies a network of relations of force between individuals. This relation of force does not suggest confinement; rather, power is a mechanism that both constrains and enables action. In fact, resistance is at the heart of power Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather conse- quently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power. (. . .) [O]ne is always 'inside' power, there is no 'escaping it'. (Foucault 1980b: 95) Foucault does not negate that power produces control. The effects of this control, however, are neither unifying nor unitary. Inherent in power relations is a 'strategic reversibility': power-knowledge strategies function both as instruments to control and as points of resistance. Foucault uses the nineteenth century's discursive construction of homosexuality to show power's dual movement. There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth century psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and 'psychic hermaphrodism' made possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of 'perversity'; but it also made possible the formation of a 'reverse' discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknow- ledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. **There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it**. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations. (Foucault 1980b: 101-2)-JC

### Link: Rhetoric

Aff comes first – we reconceptualize what rhetoric means in the context of the killjoy so either A) we sever out of past representations and discourse or B) we can solve by rehabilitating it

#### Their [k/da/turn] locks the trauma of oppression in the words themselves. By freeing up speech, the Aff takes away the oppressor’s ability to use those words as a weapon.

Butler 97, Judith (Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California-Berkeley), Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, Routledge, 1997.

Keeping such terms unsaid and unsayable can also work to lock them in place, preserv[es] their power to injure, and arrest[s] the possibility of a reworking that might shift[ing] their context and purpose. That such language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through the arduous effort it takes to [by] direct[ing] the [its] course of its repetition. It may be that trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: it is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might then begin to exercise agency at all. A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life. This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we might still call agency, the repetition of [a] originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is partially open.

### Link: Wilderson

#### Wilderson’s psychoanalysis arguments oversimplify and cement the abjection of Blackness.

Marriott 12 — David S. Marriott, Professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California-Santa Cruz, holds a Ph.D. in Literature from the University of Sussex, 2012 (“Black Cultural Studies,” *The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory*, Volume 20, Issue 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Oxford Journals Online, p. 47-49)

For example, in Chapter One (‘The Structure of Antagonisms’), written as a theoretical introduction, and which opens explicitly on the Fanonian question of why ontology cannot understand the being of the Black, Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being: ‘the essence of being for the White and non-Black position’ is non-niggerness, consequently, ‘[b]eing can thus be thought of, in the first ontological instance, as non-niggerness, and slavery then as niggerness’ (p. 37). It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, there is always the desire to have black lived experience named as the worst, and the politics of such a desire inevitably collapses into a kind of sentimental moralism: for the claim that ‘Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form’ means merely that the black has to embody this abjection without reserve (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of ‘ontological integrity’ [end page 47] to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem to reduce ontology to logic, namely, a logic of non-recuperability—moves through the following points: (1) Black non-being is not capable of symbolic resistance and, as such, falls outside of any language of authenticity or reparation; (2) for such a subject, which Wilderson persists in calling ‘death’, the symbolic remains foreclosed (p. 43); (3) as such, Blackness is the record of an occlusion which remains ever present: ‘White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity’ (p. 45); (4) and, as an example of the institutions or discourses involving ‘violence’, ‘antagonisms’ and ‘parasitism’, Wilderson describes White (or non-Black) film theory and cultural studies as incapable of understanding the ‘suffering of the Black—the Slave’ (they cannot do so because they are erroneously wedded to humanism and to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, which Wilderson takes as two examples of what the Afro-pessimist should avoid) (p. 56); as a corrective, Wilderson calls for a new language of abstraction, and one centrally concerned with exposing ‘the structure of antagonisms between Blacks and Humans’ (p. 68). Reading seems to stop here, at a critique of Lacanian full speech: Wilderson wants to say that Lacan’s notion of the originary (imaginary) alienation of the subject is still wedded to relationality as implied by the contrast between ‘empty’ and ‘full’ speech, and so apparently cannot grasp the trauma of ‘absolute Otherness’ that is the Black’s relation to Whites, because psychoanalysis cannot fathom the ‘structural, or absolute, violence’ of Black life (pp. 74; 75). ‘Whereas Lacan was aware of how language ‘‘precedes and exceeds us’’, he did not have Fanon’s awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks’ (p. 76). The violence of such abjection—or incapacity—is therefore that it cannot be communicated or avowed, and is always already delimited by desubjectification and dereliction (p. 77). Whence the suspicion of an ontology reduced to a logic (of abjection). Leaving aside the fact that it is quite mistaken to limit Lacan’s notion of full speech to the search for communication (the unconscious cannot be confined to parole), it is clear that, according to Wilderson’s own ‘logic’, his description of the Black is working, via analogy, to Lacan’s notion of the real but, in his insistence on the Black as an absolute outside Wilderson can only duly reify this void at the heart of universality. The Black is ‘beyond the limit of contingency’—but it is worth saying immediately that this ‘beyond’ is indeed a foreclosure that defines a violence whose traces can only be thought violently (that is, analogically), and whose nonbeing returns as the theme for Wilderson’s political thinking of a non-recuperable abjection. The Black is nonbeing and, as such, is more real and primary than being per se: given how much is at stake, this [end page 48] insistence on a racial metaphysics of injury implies a fundamental irreconcilability between Blacks and Humans (there is really no debate to be had here: irreconcilability is the condition and possibility of what it means to be Black).

#### Turns Case – essentialism makes true insurrection impossible

Newman 3, Postdoctoral fellow:University of Western Australia, conducting research in the area of contemporary political and social though, 2003 (Saul, “Stirner and Foucault,” Postmodern Culture)

The idea of transgressing and reinventing the self--of freeing the self from fixed and essential identities--is also a central theme in Stirner's thinking. As we have seen, Stirner shows that the notion of human essence is an oppressive fiction derived from an inverted Christian idealism that tyrannizes the individual and is linked with various forms of political domination. Stirner describes a process of subjectification which is very similar to Foucault's: rather than power

operating as downward repression, it rules through the subjectification of the individual, by defining him according to an essential identity. As Stirner says: "the State betrays its enmity to me by demanding that I be a man . . . it imposes being a man upon me as a duty" (161). Human essence imposes a series of fixed moral and rational ideas on the individual, which are not of his creation and which curtail his autonomy. It is precisely this notion of duty, of moral obligation--the same sense of duty that is the basis of the categorical imperative—that Stirner finds oppressive. For Stirner, then, the individual must free him- or herself from these oppressive ideas and obligations by first freeing himself from essence—from the essential identity that is imposed on him. Freedom involves, then, a transgression of essence, a transgression of the self. But what form should this transgression take? Like Foucault, Stirner is suspicious of the language of liberation and revolution--it is based on a notion of an essential self that supposedly throws off the chains of external repression. For Stirner, it is precisely this notion of human essence that is itself oppressive. Therefore, different strategies of freedom are called for--ones that abandon the humanist project of liberation and seek, rather, to reconfigure the subject in new and non-essentialist ways. To this end, Stirner calls for an insurrection: Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men's discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on "institutions." It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established. (279-80) So while a revolution aims at transforming existing social and political conditions so that human essence may flourish, an insurrection aims at freeing the individual from this very essence. Like Foucault's practices of freedom, the insurrection aims at transforming the relationship that the individual has with himself. The insurrection starts, then, with the individual refusing his or her enforced essential identity: it starts, as Stirner says, from men's discontent with themselves. Insurrection does not aim at overthrowing political institutions. It is aimed at the individual, in a sense transgressing his own identity--the outcome of which is, nevertheless, a change in political arrangements. Insurrection is therefore not about becoming what one is--becoming human, becoming man--but about becoming what one is not**.**This ethos of escaping essential identities through a reinvention of oneself has many important parallels with the Baudelarian**aestheticization** of the self that interests Foucault. Like Baudelaire's assertion that the self must be treated as a work of art, Stirner sees the self--or the **ego**--as a "creative nothingness," a radical emptiness which is up to the individual to define: "I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself" (135). The self, for Stirner, is a process, a continuous flow of self-creating flux--it is a process that eludes the imposition of fixed identities and essences: "no concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me" (324). Therefore, Stirner's strategy of insurrection and Foucault's project of care for the self are both contingent practices of freedom that involve a reconfiguration of the subject and its relationship with the self. For Stirner, as with Foucault, freedom is an undefined and open-ended project in which the individual engages. The insurrection, as Stirner argues, does not rely on political institutions to grant freedom to the individual, but looks to the individual to invent his or her own forms of freedom. It is an attempt to construct spaces of autonomy within relations of power, by limiting the power that is exercised over the individual by others and increasing the power that the individual exercises over himself. The individual, moreover, is free to reinvent himself in new and unpredictable ways, escaping the limits imposed by human essence and universal notions of morality. The notion of insurrection involves a reformulation of the concept of freedom in ways that are radically post-Kantian. Stirner suggests, for instance, that there can be no truly universal idea of freedom; freedom is always a particular freedom in the guise of the universal. The universal freedom that, for Kant, is the domain of all rational individuals, would only mask some hidden particular interest. Freedom, according to Stirner, is an ambiguous and problematic concept, an "enchantingly beautiful dream" that seduces the individual yet remains unattainable, and from which the individual must awaken. Furthermore, freedom is a limited concept. It is only seen in its narrow negative sense. Stirner wants, rather, to extend the concept to a more positive freedom to. Freedom in the negative sense involves only self-abnegation--to be rid of something, to deny oneself. That is why, according to Stirner, the freer the individual ostensibly becomes, in accordance with the emancipative ideals of Enlightenment humanism, the more he loses the power he exercises over himself. On the other hand, positive freedom--or ownness--is a form of freedom that is invented by the individual for him or herself. Unlike Kantian freedom, ownness is not guaranteed by universal ideals or categorical imperatives. If it were, it could only lead to further domination: "The man who is set free is nothing but a freed man [...] he is an unfree man in the garment of freedom, like the ass in the lion's skin" (152). Freedom must, rather, be seized by the individual. For freedom to have any value it must be based on the power of the individual to create it. "My freedom becomes complete only when it is my--might; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become and own man" (151). Stirner was one of the first to recognize that the true basis of freedom is power. To see freedom as a universal absence of power is to mask its very basis in power. The theory of ownness is a recognition, and indeed an affirmation, of the inevitable relation between freedom and power. Ownness is the realization of the individual's power over himself--the ability to create his or her own forms of freedom, which are not circumscribed by metaphysical or essentialist categories. In this sense, ownness is a form of freedom that goes beyond the categorical imperative. It is based on a notion of the self as a contingent and open field of possibilities, rather than on an absolute and dutiful adherence to external moral maxims.

### Link: Cap

#### TURN – Their focus on cap ignores the intersections of gender, race etc. that create new affect on marginalized bodies, means that the hegemony you critique will always be coopted by other violent power structures.

#### The advocacy of the feminist kill joy works to subvert the capitalist agenda – we solve better.

#### AND either cap is another link into the aff or the aff solves back all the impacts

Funk 12 Nanette, 2012. Professor Emerita, Brooklyn College, CUNY: Visiting Felllow, NYU Center for European Studies,Cocoordinator, GenderEurope. “Contra Fraser on Feminism and Neoliberalism,” Hypatia.

This same overstatement of the prevalence of Marxist and socialist feminism in¶ second-wave feminism appears in Fraser’s account that second-wave feminism criticized¶ the “androcentrism” and “etatism” of state-based capitalism and the political¶ economy. “Etatism” is a term for extensive state control, direction, and intervention¶ in a country’s economy. Using categories she had earlier adopted, Fraser interprets¶ early second-wave feminism as having challenged capitalism on grounds of distributive¶ injustice, failure of recognition, and representation (Fraser 2009, 104). By “representation”¶ Fraser means the representation of an issue, that is, the descriptive,¶ normative, and sociopolitical understanding of social, political, and economic issues,¶ what Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink call “framing” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Fraser argues that early second-wave feminism criticized the androcentrism of capitalism¶ for “decentering,” that is, ignoring the central role of the gendered division of¶ labor in capitalism. The latter ignored the economic value of women’s unpaid care¶ work and valorized paid work, and focused instead on the male worker and presumed¶ a male head of household working for a family wage. The claim is made that early second-wave¶ feminism also criticized the androcentrism of a welfare system that deemed¶ the absence of a man in the home as a prerequisite for receiving welfare benefits. Feminism, Fraser further claims, criticized the “etatism” of the welfare system, that¶ is, the way the welfare system looked to the state both to determine women’s needs¶ and to heavily police and monitor the families of those on welfare (Fraser 2009,¶ 105). Early second-wave feminism, she claims, thereby showed that women’s subordination¶ was “grounded in the deep structure” of a top-down, Fordist, production-based,¶ capitalist political economy. Such a system relied on just such hierarchical oversight¶ by a managerial elite to maximize efficiency, output, and profit in the case of assembly-line work. Second-wave feminism claimed that this capitalist political economy¶ was also based on a gendered division of labor that was presumed to be “natural,”¶ and that led to distributive injustices. Feminists, according to Fraser, also¶ criticized this “bureaucratic–managerial ethos of state organized capitalism in which¶ citizens were treated as clients, consumers” (Fraser 2009, 105). Fraser thus presents¶ early second-wave feminism as challenging the basic structure of capitalism. But, contrary to Fraser, such a criticism of the welfare system neither entailed nor¶ presupposed a broad-based criticism of a hierarachical production-based capitalism,¶ and feminists did not generally claim to be making such a fundamental criticism of¶ “state organized capitalism.” To assume otherwise is to over-generalize from socialist¶ feminism and the welfare rights movement to early second-wave feminism generally.¶ Second-wave feminism did generally criticize the androcentrism of capitalism on various¶ grounds: for not providing white, middle- class women a choice as to whether to¶ enter the paid work force; for presupposing that it was “natural” for women to stay in¶ the home; for men having better pay, higher paying jobs, and more powerful positions.¶ But the self-understanding of mainstream liberal feminism was that the needed¶ corrections could be made within capitalism. Liberal feminism, the overwhelming¶ majority of the movement, held that the gendered division of labor could be transformed¶ by legislation, such as anti-discrimination and harassment laws and mechanisms¶ for their enforcement. In addition, the mainstream feminist movement often¶ focused on gender relations in the private sphere and unequal decision-making in the¶ home; domestic violence, harassment and rape; women’s voices not being heard; and¶ discrimination in education and employment. It was only socialist feminists, including¶ Ann Ferguson, Nancy Folbre, Maria Rosa della Costa, and Joan Tronto, among others,¶ who linked criticism of androcentrism to criticism of the fundamental nature of¶ mid-twentieth-century capitalism. It was only socialist feminists who addressed the¶ concatenation of paid work, the gendered division of labor, the welfare system, and¶ the privileged position of paid labor. Within this minority position only some made¶ further, stronger claims that care work should be recognized as work and should be¶ paid, or even further, that paid work should not have the privileged normative position¶ it had under capitalism, and that adequately paid care work was incompatible¶ with capitalism. Fraser speaks as though these positions were held by second-wave¶ feminism generally, which was not the case. Most second-wave feminists who did discuss¶ care work argued for a redistribution of care work and gender hierarchy in the¶ home, rather than that care work should be paid. It is not obvious that the former¶ set of demands challenges the deep structure of capitalism, and Fraser provides no¶ argument that they do. Even pay for care work in itself does not challenge capitalism¶ if it is privatized, that is, if individual families that can afford to do so hire a care¶ worker.

### Link: Neolib

#### Their critique of neoliberalism is simply a mask that positions students that disagree with curriculum as a threat to the magnificent past of the university. Their critique is a regressive strategy to return the power of academic elites to the top of the ivory tower

Ahmed 15 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism/ Ahmed, Sara. Article from her independent research blog: Against Students Posted on June 25, 2015. Web. //Accessed 2/16/17 GK)

We need to challenge this assumption that some subjects only come into existence because universities are “in hot pursuit” of the “student purse.” We know the strong critiques of curriculum made by those working within departments that led to the diversification of the curriculum. We know of the work of “chipping away” at the walls that are sometimes called canons. We know of the long histories of feminist and queer activisms that led to sexuality as well as gender being taken up as legitimate subjects within the academy. If we don’t know, we should know. These histories of labour and activism are “swept away” by the assumption that such subjects only come into existence because of the “student purse.” It is this activism that enabled a challenge to some of the decisions made by departments as well as dons about what is of value; decisions that solidify as canons. These decisions are often protected by assumptions of universality, which is a way of making a decision “indefensible” (the usual sense of indefensible is unjustifiable – I want to make this mean “that which does not need justifying”). The various subjects made possible through the labour of political critique and activism are dismissed in the flourish of a “rather than,” as simple expressions of the wanton nature of the market (that monstrous body). The figure of the consuming subject, who wants the wrong things, a student who is found wanting, is hard at work. She is how: an idea of universal knowledge or universal culture can be so thinly disguised as a critique of neoliberalism and managerialism. She is how: an academic world can be idealised in being mourned as a lost object; a world where dons get to decide things; a world imagined as democracy, as untroubled by the whims and wishes of generations to come.[3] We have an understanding of how: when students are being critical of what we are doing, when they contest what is being taught, they can be treated and dismissed as acting like consumers. In other words it is when students are not satisfied that they are understood as treating our delivery as a product. Critique as such can be “swept away” by the charge of consumerism. Students become the problem when what they want is not in accordance with what academics want or what academics want them to want: students become willful when what they will is not what academics will or not what academics will them to will. What seems to be in place here is what Paulo Freire (1970) called the “bank model” of education in which teachers deposit knowledge into the bodies of students like money into a machine. Rather ironically, students are more likely to be judged as acting like consumers when they refuse to be banks. Luckily I would say: don’t bank on it.

#### The k links to the aff - Neoliberalism coopts feminist movements in order to legitimate its exploitive behavior towards women.

Funk 12 Nanette, 2012. Professor Emerita, Brooklyn College, CUNY: Visiting Fellow, NYU Center for European Studies, Cocoordinator, GenderEurope. “Contra Fraser on Feminism and Neoliberalism,” Hypatia. // KD

It is true that some feminist intellectuals, including those in developing countries,¶ argued that women’s employment in Walmarts, export processing zones, and maquiladoras¶ gave rural and poor urban women opportunities to break out of traditional gender¶ roles, freedom from patriarchal families, and higher status within the family. In¶ societies forcibly changed from non-monetary to monetary economies, what gave one¶ status had changed. But these were feminist accounts to explain to women in the¶ “global North” the impact of such employment on women, so that they would avoid¶ simplistic criticisms of such employment and instead take into account the benefits¶ to women, as well as the harm, of such employment. But explanations and legitimation, that is, normative justification, are not the same. These accounts were¶ not legitimations of such employment or justification of low-wage, unstable jobs under¶ extremely poor work conditions. Neoliberals, as opposed to feminists, may have coopted¶ feminist arguments in an attempt to legitimate to the world at large their¶ exploitive employment of women and use of women as targets of microlending programs,¶ but, as stated above, it is not such arguments that legitimated paid employment¶ to women workers themselves. There is also a difference between legitimation and cooptation. Neoliberalism¶ exploited, distorted, and coopted feminist arguments, as capitalism has long done¶ with progressive movements it is unable to defeat, justifying microcredit loans as¶ empowering women to start their own small businesses. Such cynical arguments are¶ not evidence of a “romance” or “elective affinity” between feminism and militarism,¶ capitalism, or neoliberalism. Weber did not mean that it was a cynical, unwarranted¶ cooptation of Protestantism and the Calvinist notion of a “calling” that made them¶ the spirit of capitalism. Cynical, unsound arguments relying on a purported commitment¶ to feminist premises, belied in action, conjoined with false empirical claims, or¶ invalidly drawn conclusions from those premises, thereby fail to legitimate neoliberalism.¶ Microcredit loans did not empower women, and there were no good grounds to¶ expect that they would. Instead, such loans led some women, as well as men, to¶ become pulled ever deeper into a spiral of debt and multiple loans, leading some to¶ suicide. Microcredit lending programs did serve neoliberalism by making women responsible¶ for their own economic well-being, relieving the state of its responsibility to¶ address poverty and unemployment. But microcredit programs are particularly problematic¶ and do not justify the general conclusion that the feminist demand for¶ women’s empowerment, women’s NGOs, and global feminism legitimated neoliberalism.¶ Although some feminists supported microcredit lending programs, and in doing¶ so legitimated neoliberalism, many others did not, and even strongly criticized those¶ programs, denying that they empowered women. Microcredit lending programs were¶ also not equally widespread in all regions. In post-communist European countries, microcredit¶ loans were not common, appearing more in Bosnia than elsewhere in this¶ region. Such loans were more common in other regions than in post-communist¶ areas. Many feminists in post-communist regions, as in other regions, also criticized¶ those programs.

## Impacts

### DA

#### Hate speech - Only when we are free from our masculine restrictions can we then solve for hate speech and its violence against bodies deemed as Other

**Hatfield et al. 5** [Hatfield, Katherine L., Schafer, Kellie, Stroup, Christopher A., 2005, Atlantic Journal of Communication, “A Dialogic Approach to Combating Hate Speech on College Campuses”, acc. 7/11/16, School of Communication Studies Ohio University, Speech Communication and Dramatic Arts Central Michigan University, School of Communication Studies Ohio University, pp. 43]

Owen (1998) wrote that “words can turn into bullets, hate speech can kill and maim, just as censorship can ... we are forced to ask: is there a moment where the quantitative consequences of hate speech change qualitatively the arguments about how we must deal with it?” (p. 37). This study was conducted to determine whether engaging students in discourse about hate speech would affect their perceptions of the appropriateness of hate speech. Tests indicated that when engaged in the discourse, participants are more likely to decrease their perception of appropriateness and have a more overt reaction to the hate messages.

## Alt

### Killjoy manifesto

#### The alt is a personal killjoy manifesto against the oppressive structures of happiness in academic spaces. We stand up against the complacency of happiness inside of the institution allows us to rupture the patriarchal and racialized history of the university's placating commitments. Our genealogy repeats the unhappy history of students and debaters alike, where every round forces the academic institution to continually take on the weight of its past. A manifesto allows us to use our personal experiences against the institution to reassert our wills and to collapse systems of violence. To be a killjoy is to be a political activist, a nonconforming queer, or the angry black woman. There can be joy in the killing of joy – our manifesto just determines a purpose of feminist flight.

Ahmed 3 (Sara Ahmed is formerly the director of a new Centre for Feminist Research (CFR) at Goldsmiths, Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, and a scholar that writes on the intersection of queer theory, feminist theory, critical race theory, and post-colonialism, Living a Feminist Life, “Conclusion II”, 2017, Duke University Press, pp 254-257 //Accessed 2/9/2017 GKKE)

We must stay unhappy with this world. The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, some of which 1 discusses in chapter I (see also Ahmed 2010). Happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods. As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely, "It is always easy to describe a, happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others] (1949] 1997, 28). Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon. A killjoy becomes a manifesto when we are willing to take up this figure, to assemble a life not as her (I discussed the risks of assuming we are her in chapter 7) but around her, in her company. We are willing to killjoy because the world that assigns this or that person or group of people as the killjoys is not to world a want to be part of. To be willing to killjoy is to transform a judgement into a project. A manifesto: how a judgment becomes a project. To think of killjoys as manifestos is to say that a politics of transformation, a politics that intends to cause the end of a system, is not a program of action that can be separates from how we are in the worlds we are in. Feminism is praxis. We enact the world we are aiming for; nothing Iess will do. Lesbian feminism, as I noted in chapter 9, is how we organize our lives in such a way that our relations to each other as women are not mediated through our relations to men. A life becomes an archive of rebellion, this is why a killjoy manifesto will be personal. Each of us killjoys will have our own. My manifesto does not suspend my personal story it is how that story unfolds into action. It is from difficult experiences, or being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that we gain the energy to rebel It is from what we conic up against that we gain new angles on what we are against. Our bodies become our tools; our rage becomes sickness. We vomit; we vomit out what we have been asked to take in. Our guts become our feminist friends the more we are sickened. We begin to feel the weight of histories more and more; the more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. We snap under the weight; things break. A manifesto is written out of feminist snap. A manifesto is feminist snap. And: we witness as feminists the trouble feminism causes. I would hazard a guess; feminist trouble is an extension of gender trouble (Butler 1990). To be more specific: feminist trouble is the trouble with women. When we refuse to be women, in the heteropatriarchal sense as beings for men, we become trouble, we get into trouble. A killjoy is willing to get into trouble. And this I think is what is specific about a killjoy manifesto: that we bring into our statements of intent or purpose the experience of what we come up against. It is this experience that allows us to articulate a for, a for that carries with it an experience of what we come up against. A for can be how we turn Something about a manifesto is about what it aims to bring about. There is no doubt in my mind that a feminist killjoy is for something; although as killjoys we are not necessarily for the same things. But you would only be willing to live with the consequences of being against what you come up against if you are for something, A life can be a manifesto. When I read some of the books in my survival kit, I hear them as manifestos, as calls to action; as calls to arms. They are books that tremble with life because they show how a life can be rewritten; how we can rewrite a life, letter by letter. A manifesto has a life, a life of its own; a manifesto is an outstretched hand. And if a manifesto is a political action, it depends on how it is received by others. And perhaps a hand can do more when it is not simply received by another hand, when a gesture exceeds the firmness of a handshake. Perhaps more than a hand needs to shake, If a killjoy manifesto is a handle, it flies out of hand. A manifesto thus repeats something that has already happened' as we know the killjoy has flown off. Perhaps a killjoy manifesto is unhandy; a feminist flight. When we refuse to be the master’s tool, we expose the violence of rods, the violences that built the master's dwelling, brick by brick. When we make violence manifest, a violence that is reproduced by not being made a manifesto, we will be assigned as killjoys. It is because of what she reveals that a killjoy he - comes a killjoy in the first place. A manifesto is in some sense behind her. This is not to say that writing a killjoy manifesto is not also a commitment; that it is not also an idea if how to move forward. A killjoy has her principles. A killjoy manifesto shows how we create principles from an experience of what we come up against, from how we live a feminist life. When I say principles here, I do not mean rules of conduct that we must agree to in order to proceed in a common direction. I might say that a feminist life is principled but feminism often becomes an announcement at the very moment of the refusal to be bound by principle. When I think of feminist principles, I think of principles in the original sense: principle as a first step, as a commencement, a start of something. A principle can also be what is elemental to a craft. Feminist killjoys and other willful subjects are crafty; we are becoming crafty. There are principles in what we craft. How we begin does not determine where we end up„ but principles do give shape or direction. Feminist principles are articulated in unfeminist worlds. Living a life with feminist principles is thus not living smoothly; we bump into the world that does not live in accordance with the principles we try to live. For some reason, the principles I articulate here ended up being expressed as statements of will; of what a killjoy is willing (to do or to be) or not willing (to do or to be). I think we can understand the some of this reason. A killjoy manifesto is a willful subject; she wills wrongly by what she is willing or is not willing to do. No wonder a willful subject has principles; she can be principled. She can share them if you can bear them.

### Killjoy general

#### Thus, we advocate the methodology of the killjoy – a symbol of willful deviance that refuses the requirement to be happy or complicit within systems of oppression. Our affective analysis contests hegemonic structures of deliberation that marginalize the oppressed, and kills the joy of white comfortability

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Killjoys To be unseated by the table of happiness might be to threaten not simply that table, but what gathers around it, what gathers on it. When you are unseated, you can even get in the way of those who are seated, those who want more than anything to keep their seats. To threaten the loss of the seat can be to kill the joy of the seated. How well we recognise the figure of the feminist killjoy! How she makes sense! Let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. One feminist project could be to give the killjoy back her voice. Whilst hearing feminists as killjoys might be a form of dismissal, there is an agency that this dismissal rather ironically reveals. We can respond to the accusation with a "yes." The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, of how happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods (a social good is what causes happiness, given happiness is understood as what is good). As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely "it is always easy to describe as happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others]."[[4](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end4)] Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. To be involved in political activism is thus to be involved in a struggle against happiness. Even if we are struggling for different things, even if we have different worlds we want to create, we might share what we come up against. Our activist archives are thus unhappy archives. Just think of the labor of critique that is behind us: feminist critiques of the figure of "the happy housewife;" Black critiques of the myth of "the happy slave"; queer critiques of the sentimentalisation of heterosexuality as "domestic bliss." The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made. We inherit this horizon. To be willing to go against a social order, which is protected as a moral order, a happiness order is to be willing to cause unhappiness, even if unhappiness is not your cause. To be willing to cause unhappiness might be about how we live an individual life (not to choose "the right path" is readable as giving up the happiness that is presumed to follow that path). Parental responses to coming out, for example, can take the explicit form not of being unhappy about the child being queer but of *being unhappy about the child being unhappy*.[[5](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end5)] Even if you do not want to cause the unhappiness of those you love, a queer life can mean living with that unhappiness. To be willing to cause unhappiness can also be how we immerse ourselves in collective struggle, as we work with and through others who share our points of alienation. Those who are unseated by the tables of happiness can find each other. So, yes, let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject "in the room" hence "brings others down" not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but by exposing how happiness is sustained by erasing the signs of not getting along. Feminists do kill joy in a certain sense: they disturb the very fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by what is supposed to cause happiness, but our failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others. We can consider the relationship between the negativity of the figure of the feminist killjoy and how certain bodies are "encountered" as being negative. Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angry or dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end6)] To be recognized as a feminist is to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty. You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, that we may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). There is a desire to believe that women become feminists *because* they are unhappy. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about. Feminist consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away. My point here would be that feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as *about* the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy *about*. Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described *as* unhappy. We must learn. The word "wretched" has its own genealogy, coming from wretch, meaning a stranger, exile, banished person. Wretched in the sense of "vile, despicable person" was developed in Old English and is said to reflect "the sorry state of the outcast." Can we rewrite the history of happiness from the point of view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very happiness of the familiar. Phenomenology helps us explore how the familiar is that which is not revealed. A queer phenomenology shows how the familiar is not revealed to those who can inhabit it. For queers and others the familiar is revealed to you, because you do not inhabit it. To be "estranged from" can be what enables a "consciousness of." This is why being a killjoy can be a knowledge project, a world-making project. Feminist Tables A feminist call might be a call to anger, to develop a sense of rage about collective wrongs. And yet, it is important that we do not make feminist emotion into a site of truth: as if it is always clear or self-evident that our anger is right. When anger becomes righteous it can be oppressive; to assume anger makes us right can be a wrong. We know how easily a politics of happiness can be displaced into a politics of anger: the assumption of a right to happiness can convert very swiftly into anger toward others (immigrants, aliens, strangers) who have taken the happiness assumed to be "by right" to be ours. It is precisely that we cannot defend ourselves against such defensive use of emotion that would be my point. Emotions are not always just, even those that seem to acquire their force in or from an experience of injustice. Feminist emotions are mediated and opaque; they are sites of struggle, and we must persist in struggling with them.[[8](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end8)] After all, feminist spaces are emotional spaces, in which the experience of solidarity is hardly exhaustive. As feminists we have our own tables. If we are unseated by the family table, it does not necessarily follow that we are seated together. We can place the figure of the feminist killjoy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman, explored so well by Black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde[[9](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end9)] and bell hooks[[10](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end10)]. The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. She might not even have to make any such point to kill joy. Listen to the following description from bell hooks: "a group of white feminist activists who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters the room. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory."[[11](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end11)] It is not just that feelings are "in tension," but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its enjoyment and solidarity. The body of color is attributed as the cause of becoming tense, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. As a feminist of color you do not even have to say anything to cause tension! The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. We learn from this example how histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an atmosphere, or in the tangibility of the bodies that seem to get in the way. Atmospheres might become shared if there is agreement in where we locate the points of tension. A history can be preserved in the very stickiness of a situation. To speak out of anger as a woman of color is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension; your anger is what threatens the social bond. As Audre Lorde describes: "When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are 'creating a mood of helplessness,' 'preventing white women from getting past guilt,' or 'standing in the way of trusting communication and action.'"[[12](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end12)] The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The woman of color must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on. The figure of the angry black woman is a fantasy figure that produces its own effects. Reasonable, thoughtful arguments are dismissed as anger (which of course empties anger of its own reason), which makes you angry, such that your response becomes read as the confirmation of evidence that you are not only angry but also unreasonable! To make this point in another way, the anger of feminists of color is attributed. You might be angry *about* how racism and sexism diminish life choices for women of color. Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But then in being heard as angry, your speech is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x. You become angry at the injustice of being heard as motivated by anger, which makes it harder to separate yourself from the object of your anger. You become entangled with what you are angry about because you are angry about how they have entangled you in your anger. In becoming angry about that entanglement, you confirm their commitment to your anger as the truth "behind" your speech, which is what blocks your anger, stops it from getting through. You are blocked by not getting through. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo's wonderful prose poem, *Our Sister Killjoy*, where the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back with "her friends," two black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates. "But to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn't it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess's obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers."[[13](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end13)] Power speaks here in this moment of hesitation. Do you go along with it? What does it mean not to go along with it? To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward. Maintaining public comfort requires that certain bodies "go along with it." To refuse to go along with it, to refuse the place in which you are placed, is to be seen as causing trouble, as making others uncomfortable. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom. Feelings can get stuck to certain bodies in the very way we describe spaces, situations, dramas. And bodies can get stuck depending on the feelings with which they get associated. Getting in the Way A killjoy: the one who gets in the way of other people's happiness. Or just the one who is in the way—you can be in the way of *whatever*, if you are already perceived as being in the way. Your very arrival into a room is a reminder of histories that "get in the way" of the occupation of that room. How many feminist stories are about rooms, about who occupies them, about making room? When to arrive is to get in the way, what happens, what do you do? The figure of the killjoy could be rethought in terms of the politics of willfulness. I suggested earlier that an activist archive is an unhappiness archive, one shaped by the struggles of those who are willing to struggle against happiness. We might redescribe this struggle in terms of those who are willing to be willful. An unhappiness archive is a willfulness archive. Let's go back: let's listen to what and who is behind us. Alice Walker describes a "womanist" in the following way: "A black feminist or feminist of color... Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or *willful* behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered 'good' for one... Responsible. In charge. Serious."[[14](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end14)] Julia Penelope describes lesbianism as willfulness: "The lesbian stands against the world created by the male imagination. What willfulness we possess when we claim our lives!"[[15](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end15)] Marilyn Frye's radical feminism uses the adjective willful: "The willful creation of new meaning, new loci of meaning, and new ways of being, together, in the world, seems to be in these mortally dangerous times the best hope we have."[[16](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end16)] Willfulness as audacity, willfulness as standing against, willfulness as creativity. We can make sense of how willfulness comes up, if we consider a typical definition of willfulness: "asserting or disposed to assert one's own will against persuasion, instruction, or command; governed by will without regard to reason; determined to take one's own way; obstinately self-willed or perverse" (OED). To be called obstinate or perverse because you are not persuaded by the reason of others? Is this familiar to you? Have you heard this before? When you are charged with willfulness it is as if your being is an insistence on being, a refusal to give way, to give up, to give up your way. Can what we are charged with become a charge in Alice Walker's sense, a way of being in charge? If we are charged with willfulness, we can accept and mobilize this charge. We have to become willful, perhaps, to keep going the way we are going, if the way you are going is perceived to be "the wrong way." We all know the experience of "going the wrong way" in a crowd. Everyone seems to be going the opposite way than the way you are going. No one person has to push or shove for you to feel the collective momentum of the crowd as a pushing and shoving. For you to keep going you have to push harder than any of those individuals who are going the right way. The body "going the wrong way" is the one that is experienced as "in the way" of the will that is acquired as momentum. For some bodies mere persistence, "to continue steadfastly," requires great effort, an effort that might appear to others as stubbornness or obstinacy, as insistence on going against the flow. You have to become insistent to go against the flow; you are judged to be going against the flow because you are insistent. A life paradox: you have to become what you are judged as being. It is crucial that we don't assume that willfulness is simply about lonely individuals going against the tide of the social. At the same time, we can note how the social can be experienced as a force: you can feel a force most directly when you attempt to resist it. It is the experience of "coming up against" that is named by willfulness, which is why a willful politics needs to be a collective politics. The collective here is not assumed as a ground. Rather, willfulness is a collecting together, of those struggling for a different ground for existence. You need to be supported when you are not going the way things are flowing. This is why I think of a feminist queer politics as a politics of tables: tables give support to gatherings, and we need support when we live our lives in ways that are experienced by others as stubborn or obstinate. A flow is an effect of bodies that are going the same way. To go is also to gather. A flow can be an effect of gatherings of all kinds: gatherings of tables, for instance, as kinship objects that support human gatherings. How many times have I had the experience of being left waiting at a table when a straight couple walks into the room and is attended to straight away! For some, you have to become insistent to be the recipient of a social action, you might have to announce your presence, wave your arm, saying: "Here I am!" For others, it is enough just to turn up because you have already been given a place at the table *before you take up your place*. Willfulness describes the uneven consequences of this differentiation. An attribution of willfulness involves the attribution of negative affect to those bodies that get in the way, those bodes that "go against the flow" in the way they are going. The attribution of willfulness is thus effectively a charge of killing joy. Conversations are also flows; they are saturated. We hear this saturation as atmosphere. To be attributed as willful is to be the one who "ruins the atmosphere." A colleague says to me she just has to open her mouth in meetings to witness eyes rolling as if to say, "oh here she goes." My experience as a feminist daughter in a conventional family taught me a great deal about rolling eyes. You already know this. However you speak, the one who speaks up as a feminist is usually viewed as "causing the argument," as the one who is disturbing the fragility of peace. To be willful is to provide a point of tension. Willfulness is stickiness: it is an accusation that sticks. If to be attributed as willful is to be the cause of the problem, then we can claim that willfulness as a political cause. Queer feminist histories are full of self-declared willful subjects. Think of the Heterodoxy Club that operated in Greenwich Village in the early 20th century, a club for unorthodox women. They described themselves as "this little band of willful women," as Judith Schwarz reveals in her wonderful history of this club.[[17](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end17)] A heterodoxy is "not in agreement with accepted beliefs, or holding unorthodox opinions." To be willful is to be willing to announce your disagreement, and to put yourself behind a disagreement. To enact a disagreement might even mean to become disagreeable. Feminism we might say is the creation of some rather disagreeable women. Political histories of striking and of demonstrations are histories of those willing to put their bodies in the way, to turn their bodies into blockage points that stop the flow of human traffic, as well as the wider flow of an economy. When willfulness becomes a style of politics, it means not only being willing not to go with the flow, but also *being willing to cause its obstruction*. One could think of a hunger strike as the purest form of willfulness: a body whose agency is expressed by being reduced to obstruction, where the obstruction to others is self-obstruction, the obstruction of the passage into the body. Histories of willfulness are histories of those who are willing to put their bodies in the way. Political forms of consciousness can also be thought of as willfulness: not only is it hard to speak about what has receded from view, but you have to be willing to get in the way of that recession. An argument of second-wave feminism (one shared with Marxism and Black politics) that I think is worth holding onto is the argument that political consciousness is achieved: raising consciousness is a crucial aspect of collective political work. Raising consciousness is difficult as consciousness is consciousness of what recedes. If the point of a recession is that it gives some the power to occupy space (occupation is reproduced by the concealment of the signs of occupation), then raising consciousness is a resistance to an occupation. Take the example of racism. It can be willful even to name racism: as if the talk about divisions is what is divisive. Given that racism recedes from social consciousness, it appears as if the ones who "bring it up" are bringing it into existence. We learned that the very talk of racism is experienced as an intrusion from the figure of the angry black woman: as if it is her anger about racism that causes feminist estrangement. To recede is to go back or withdraw. To concede is to give way, to yield. People of color are often asked to concede to the recession of racism: we are asked to "give way" by letting it "go back." Not only that: more than that. We are often asked to embody a commitment to diversity. We are asked to smile in their brochures. The smile of diversity is a way of not allowing racism to surface; it is a form of political recession. Racism is very difficult to talk about as racism can operate to censor the very evidence of its existence. Those who talk about racism are thus heard as creating rather than describing a problem. The stakes are indeed very high: to talk about racism is to occupy a space that is saturated with tension. History is saturation. One of the findings of a research project I was involved with on diversity was that because racism saturates everyday and institutional spaces, people of color often make strategic decisions *not to use* the language of racism.[[18](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end18)] If you already pose a problem, or appear "out of place" in the institutions of whiteness, there can be "good reasons" not to exercise what is heard as a threatening vocabulary.[[19](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end19)] Not speaking about racism can be a way of inhabiting the spaces of racism. You minimize the threat you already are by softening your language and appearance, by keeping as much distance as you can from the figure of the angry person of color. Of course, as we know, just to walk into a room can be to lose that distance, because that figure gets there before you do. When you use the very language of racism you are heard as "going on about it," as "not letting it go." It is as if talking about racism is what keeps it going. Racism thus often enters contemporary forms of representation as a representation of a past experience. Take the film *Bend it Like Beckham* (2002, dir. Gurinder Chada): the film is very much premised on the freedom to be happy, as the freedom of the daughter, Jesminder, to do whatever makes her happy (in her case playing football—her idea of happiness is what puts her in proximity to a national idea of happiness). Her father's memory of racism gets in the way of her happiness. Consider two speeches he makes in the film, the first one takes place early on, and the latter at the end: When I was a teenager in Nairobi, I was the best fast bowler in our school. Our team even won the East African cup. But when I came to this country, nothing. And these bloody gora in the club house made fun of my turban and sent me off packing... She will only end up disappointed like me. When those bloody English cricket players threw me out of their club like a dog, I never complained. On the contrary, I vowed that I would never play again. Who suffered? Me. But I don't want Jess to suffer. I don't want her to make the same mistakes her father made, accepting life, accepting situations. I want her to fight. And I want her to win. In the first speech, the father says she *should not play* in order not to suffer like him. In the second, he says she *should play* in order not to suffer like him. The desire implicit in both speech acts is the avoidance of the daughter's suffering, which is expressed in terms of the desire that she does not repeat his own. The second speech suggests that the refusal to play a national game is the "truth" behind the migrant's suffering: you suffer because you do not play the game, where not playing is read as self-exclusion. To let Jess be happy he lets her go. By implication, not only is he letting her go, he is also letting go of his own suffering, the unhappiness caused by accepting racism, as the "point" of his exclusion. I would suggest that the father is represented in the first speech as melancholic: as refusing to let go of his suffering, as incorporating the very object of own loss. His refusal to let Jess go is readable as a symptom of melancholia: as a stubborn attachment to his own injury.[[20](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end20)] As he says: "who suffered? Me." Bad feeling thus originates with the migrant who won't let go of racism as a script that explains suffering. The melancholic migrant holds onto the unhappy objects of difference, such as the turban, or at least the memory of being teased about the turban, as that which ties it to a history of racism. It is as if you should let go of the pain of racism by *letting go of racism as a way of remembering that pain*. I would even say that racism becomes readable as what the melancholic migrant is attached *to*, as an attachment to injury that allows migrants to justify their refusal to participate in the national game ("the gora in their club house"). Even to recall an experience of racism, or to describe an experience as racism, can be to get in the way of the happiness of others. Consciousness of racism becomes understood as a kind of false consciousness, as consciousness of that which is no longer. Racism is framed as a memory that if it were kept alive would just leave us exhausted. The task of citizenship becomes one of conversion: if racism is preserved *only* in our memory and consciousness, then racism would "go away" if only we too would declare it gone. The narrative implicit here is not that we "invent racism," but that we preserve its power to govern social life by not getting over it. The moral task is thus "to get over it," as if when you are over it, it is gone. Conclusion: A Killjoy Manifesto Audre Lorde teaches us how quickly the freedom to be happy is translated into the freedom to look away from what compromises your happiness.[[21](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end21)] The history of feminist critiques of happiness could be translated into a manifesto: *Don't look over it: don't get over it.* Not to get over it is a form of disloyalty. Willfulness is a kind of disloyalty: think of Adrienne Rich's call for us to be disloyal to civilization. *We are not over it, if it has not gone. We are not loyal, if it is wrong*.[[22](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end22)] Willfulness could be rethought as a style of politics: *a refusal to look away from what has already been looked over.* The ones who point out that racism, sexism, and heterosexism are actual are charged with willfulness; they refuse to allow these realities to be passed over. Even talking about injustices, violence, power, and subordination in a world that uses "happy diversity" as a technology of social description can mean becoming the obstacle, as the ones who "get in the way" of the happiness of others. Your talk is heard as laboring over sore points, as if you are holding onto something—an individual or collective memory, a *sense* of a history as unfinished—because you are sore. People often say that political struggle against racism is like banging your head against a brick wall. The wall keeps its place so it is you that gets sore. We might need to stay as sore as our points. Of course that's not all we say or we do. We can recognise not only that we are not the cause of the unhappiness that has been attributed to us, but also the effects of being attributed *as* the cause. We can talk about being willful subjects, feminist killjoys, angry black women; we can claim those figures back; we can talk about those conversations we have had at dinner tables or in seminars or meetings. We can laugh in recognition of the familiarity of inhabiting that place, even if we do not inhabit the same place (and we do not). There can be joy in killing joy. Kill joy, we can and we do. Be willful, we will and we are.

### Rage

#### Rage is a necessary tool to fight against privilege. Although our struggles are not the same, women of all races and ethnicities can come together through anger, learning the truths of our situations – refusing to listen to each other can only hurt the progress in our struggles. Womxn’s rage is beautiful. It is energizing. We must forefront the different manifestations of rage in order to produce any change.

Lorde 1981, Audre. *The Uses of Anger*. Source: Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1/2, Looking Back, Moving Forward: 25 Years of Women's Studies History (Spring - Summer, 1997), pp. 278-285. Published by: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York,. URL:<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40005441> . \*we do not endorse ableist language

Racism. The belief in the inherent superiority of one race over all others and thereby the right to dominance, manifest and implied. Women respond to racism. My response to racism is anger. I have lived with that anger, on that anger, beneath that anger, on top of that anger,ignoring that anger, feeding upon that anger, learning to use that anger before it laid my visions to waste, for most of my life. Once I did it in silence, afraid of the weight of that anger. My fear of that anger taught me nothing. Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing, also. Women responding to racism means women responding to anger, the anger of exclusion, of unquestioned privilege, of racial distortions, of silence, ill-use, stereotyping, defensiveness, misnaming, betrayal, and coopting. My anger is a response to racist attitudes, to the actions and presumptions that arise out of those attitudes. If in your dealings with other women your actions have reflected those attitudes, then my anger and your attendant fears, perhaps, are spotlights that can be used for your growth in the same way I have had to use learning to express anger for my growth. But for corrective surgery, not guilt. Guilt and defensiveness are bricks in a wall against which we will all perish, for they serve none of our futures. Because I do not want this to become a theoretical discussion, I am going to give a few examples of interchanges between women that I hope will illustrate the points I am trying to make. In the interest of time, I am going to cut them short. I want you to know that there were many more. For example: • I speak out of a direct and particular anger at a particular academic conference, and a white woman comes up and says, "Tell me how you feel but don't say it too harshly or I cannot hear you." But is it my manner that keeps her from hearing, or the message that her life may change? • The Women's Studies Program of a southern university invites a Black woman to read following a week-long forum on Black and white women. "What has this week given to you?" I ask. The most vocal white woman says, "I think I've gotten a lot. I feel Black women really understand me a lot better now; they have a better idea of where I'm coming from." As if understanding her lay at the core of the racist problem. These are the bricks that go into the walls against which we will bash our consciousness, unless we recognize that they can be taken apart. • After fifteen years of a women's movement which professes to address the life concerns and possible futures of all women, I still hear, on campus after campus. "How can we address the issues of racism? No women of Color attended." Or, the other side of that statement, "We have no one in our department equipped to teach their work." In other words, racism is a Black women's problem, a problem of women of Color, and only we can discuss it. • After I have read from my work entitled "Poems for Women in Rage" a white woman asks me, "Are you going to do anything with how we can deal directly with our anger? I feel it's so important." I ask, "How do you use our rage?" And then I have to turn away from the blank look in her eyes, before she can invite me to participate in her own annihilation. Because I do not exist to feel her anger for her. • White women are beginning to examine their relationships to Black women, yet often I hear you wanting only to deal with the little colored children across the roads of childhood, the beloved nurse- maid, the occasional second-grade classmate; those tender memories of what was once mysterious and intriguing or neutral. You avoid the childhood assumptions formed by the raucous laughter at Rastus and Oatmeal, the acute message of your mommy's handkerchief spread upon the park bench because I had just been sitting there, the indelible and dehumanizing portraits of Amos and Andy and your Daddy's humorous bedtime stories. I wheel my two-year-old daughter in a shopping cart through a super-market in Eastchester in 1967 and a little white girl riding past in her mother's cart calls out excitedly, "Oh look, Mommy, a baby maid!" And your mother shushes you, but she does not correct you. And so, fifteen years later, at a conference on racism, you can still find that story humorous. But I hear your laughter is full of terror and dis-ease. • At an international cultural gathering of women, a well-known white American woman poet interrupts the reading of the work of women of Color to read her own poem, and then dashes off to an "important panel." • Do women in the academy truly want a dialogue about racism? It will require recognizing the needs and the living contexts of other women. When an academic woman says, for instance, "I can't afford it," she may mean she is making a choice about how to spend her available money. But when a woman on welfare says, "I can't afford it," she means she is surviving on an amount of money that was barely subsistence in 1972, and she often does not have enough to eat. Yet the National Women's Studies Association here in 1981 holds a Convention in which it commits itself to responding to racism, yet refuses to waive the registration fee for poor women and women of Color who wished to present and conduct workshops. This has made it impossible for many women of Color - for instance, Wilmette Brown, of Black Women for Wages for Housework - to participate in this Convention. And so I ask again: Is this to be merely another situation of the academy discussing life within the closed circuits of the academy? To all the white women here who recognize these attitudes as familiar, but most of all, to all my sisters of Color who live and survive thousands of such encounters - to my sisters of Color who like me still tremble their rage under harness, or who sometimes question the expression of our rage as useless and disruptive (the two most popular accusations), I want to speak about anger, my anger, and what I have learned from my travels through its dominions. Everything can be used, except what is wasteful. You will need to remember this, when you are accused of destruction. Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in all those assumptions underlining our lives. I have seen situations where white women hear a racist remark, resent what has been said, become filled with fury, and remain silent, because they are afraid. That unexpressed anger lies within them like an undetonated device, usually to be hurled at the first woman of Color who talks about racism. But anger expressed and translated into action in the service of our vision and our future is a liberating and strengthening act of clarification, for it is in the painful process of this translation that we identify who are our allies with whom we have grave differences, and who are our genuine enemies. Anger is loaded with information and energy. When I speak of women of Color, I do not only mean Black women. We are also Asian American, Caribbean, Chicana, Latina, Hispanic, Native American, and we have a right to each of our names. The woman of Color who charges me with rendering her invisible by assuming that her struggles with racism are identical with my own has something to tell me that I had better learn from, lest we both waste ourselves fighting the truths between us. If I participate, knowingly or otherwise, in my sister's oppression and she calls me on it, to answer her anger with my own only blankets the substance of our exchange with reaction. It wastes energy I need to join with her. And yes, it is very difficult to stand still and to listen to another woman's voice delineate an agony I do not share, or even one in which I myself may have participated. We speak in this place removed from the more blatant reminders of our embattlement as women. This need not blind us to the size and complexities of the forces mounting against us and all that is most human within our environment. We are not here as women examining racism in a political and social vacuum. We operate in the teeth of a system for whom racism and sexism are primary, established, and necessary props of profit. Women responding to racism is a topic so dangerous that when the local media attempt to discredit this Convention they choose to focus upon the provision of Lesbian housing as a diversionary device - as if the Hartford Courant dare not mention the topic chosen for discussion here, racism, lest it become apparent that women are in fact attempting to examine and to alter all the repressive conditions of our lives. Mainstream communication does not want women, particularly white women, responding to racism. It wants racism to be accepted as an immutable given in the fabric of existence, like evening time or the common cold. So we are working in a context of opposition and threat, the cause of which is certainly not the angers which lie between us, but rather that virulent hatred leveled against all women, people of Color, Lesbians and gay men, poor people - against all of us who are seeking to examine the particulars of our lives as we resist our oppressions, moving toward coalition and effective action. Any discussion among women about racism must include the recognition and the use of anger. It must be direct and creative, because it is crucial. We cannot allow our fear of anger to deflect us nor to seduce us into settling for anything less than the hard work of excavating honesty; we must be quite serious about the choice of this topic and the angers entwined within it, because, rest assured, our opponents are quite serious about their hatred of us and of what we are trying to do here. And while we scrutinize the often painful face of each other's anger, please remember that it is not our anger which makes me caution you to lock your doors at night, and not to wander the streets of Hartford alone. It is the hatred which lurks in those streets, that urge to destroy us all if we truly work for change rather than merely indulge in our academic rhetoric. This hatred and our anger are very different. Hatred is the fury of those who do not share our goals, and its object is death and destruction. Anger is the grief of distortions between peers, and its object is change. But our time is getting shorter.

# Specific case answers/x-apps

## Cap

#### Perm do the aff and then the k – endorse the aff and mitigate any attempts to silence the kill joy by not endorsing the neg with a ballot

#### Perm do the aff and all non competitive parts of the alt – endorse the kill joy and reject cap in all competitive instances, net benefit Is ahmed 3

#### Perm do the aff then the k – praxis point comes first that’s ahmed 4

## Cap – idpx specific

#### They aren’t intersectional, they say class and other forms of identity are irreconcilable. That is directly what black feminism criticizes – means their k is another link into our aff.

#### Turn - Their focus on cap ignores the intersections of gender, race etc. that create new affect on marginalized bodies, means that the hegemony you critique will always be coopted by other violent power structures.

#### We don’t say that identity politics posits people as listeners In fact it’s the opposite – our role of the ballot articulates that we don’t just listen to the poltics and political praxis of the killjoy but rather use it as a form of affect to rebuild and adapt our survival strategies that’s ahmed 6. Theres just no link

#### Rejecting capitalism and not using a method to rupture it just maintains complacency in the institution – alt creates a ruse of solvency, the aff isn’t the only instance of capitalism so they may be claiming to hollow out structures but they are only using a kiddy shovel to do so. Error replication turns case.

#### We don’t support capitalism so you can perm, do both – alt and aff aren’t mutally exclusive

#### Or perm do the alt and all noncompetitive parts of the k. Puts them in a double bind, either the alt isn’t strong enough to overcome the links to the k or the links aren’t strong enough to trigger the impacts.

#### Any other praxis point than the aff creates obedience to non-performative actions which means that aff is key to alt solvency. Perm do the aff then the alt – allow for the killjoy to open space in the institutions to break down capitalism.

## Identity politics

#### Aff takes out k identity pol

#### Collectivization – Our methodology creates affective spaces of solidarity in which struggling bodies are able to find and support each other to create change – we refuse to concede to the power of the institution and reclaim our dismissals which creates spaces that motivate people to create change. This ultimately creates new forms of energy production because our method resists the ways institutions deplete bodies of energy and mean we empower bodies to create change.

#### Knowledge production – Taking the position of the feminist killjoy is key to open up spaces outside of white supremacist epistemology because it allows us to “go against the flow” which means our method is necessary to being able to engage in alternatives. We need to expose the questions before we can begin to answer them.

#### Our methodology combines a critique oriented against happiness which is the same critique of every political struggle – every type of activism from queer resistance to anti capitalism and antiracism are ultimately a deconstruction of the myth of happiness which means our methodology is effectively combined with any alternative.

## Wynter

#### NO link – Ahmed is a more intersectional version of wynter - wynter says that European politics & speech always construct a proper notion of humanity & racist speech is internalized, performance matters to frame normalization in debate & speech, you need to address those micro-aggressions first

#### Ahmed literally does that but has an better genealogical definition & would be a disads to the wynter k because it's p sexist, aff coopts their impacts

#### Turn – their k only looks at the impacts of racial oppression but ignores the intersections of gender, class and sexual orientation – means their alt will be coopted by another form of hegemony and power structure.

#### Perm – do both, no link means no competitive link/impact offense

#### Perm do the aff then the neg – break down the institutional walls of white, male hegemony in order to give the alt success

## Transphobia

#### No link – we don’t define what a killjoy or what a woman is – it’s open and changing, there aren’t restrictions – force them to quote lines from the 1AC to prove why we defend a biological definition of women

#### Turn - queer folks can use the figure of the killjoy to kill trans-exclusionary joy – our method solves

**u** T. L. Cowan "Transfeminist Kill/Joys Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance" TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly \* Volume 1, Number 4 \* November 2014 Duke Press

T his essay considers an affective trope that I have come to recognize as “the transfeminist kill/joy”: a set of proliferating dialectics expressed as the rage1 that comes into being through living the violent effects of transphobia and transmisogyny and the practice of transformational love as a struggle for existence.2 While the transfeminist kill/joy might certainly be understood as a politicize aesthetic and form of social action that extends well beyond (cis)gender feminist politics and social life,3 here I read for the poetics of killing trans-absent or transexcluding feminist joy. In this discussion of recent transfeminist critical creative work, I trace how the transfeminist kill/joy works both to spoil feelings of political and social well-being or pleasure that are contingent upon the tacit absence or explicit exclusion of trans women in feminist conceptual and physical spaces and to restructure, claim, and repair feminist happiness through what Chela Sandoval (2000: 180) has called “a hermeneutics of love.” In my framing of the “transfeminist kill/joy,” I hope to signal, as does Sara Ahmed (2010) in her original framing of the feminist killjoy, that the mere presence or arrival of perceived difference can be understood as “threaten[ing] the social bond” (68) within privileged feminist scenarios.4 While Ahmed frames the killing of feminist joy (67) mostly in terms of women of color in white feminist spaces, and certainly racism and transphobia and trans-misogyny are not interchangeable,5 I suggest that trans-absent or trans-excluding feminist political and social scenarios can be understood to experience a similar threat to the “organic enjoyment and solidarity” (67) of the (perceived homogeneity of the) group when forced to deal with the presence or proximity of trans women, since this arrival “exposes not only the unreliableness of the body as a source of their identities and politics, but also the fallacy of women’s universal experiences and oppressions” (Koyama 2006: 704). Put in the terms of Ahmed’s earlier work (2006), the transfeminist kill/joy is an assemblage of affects that reorients feminist happiness toward rather than against trans women,6 and uses anger and love to resist a feminism designed exclusively for non-trans women, not necessarily feminism by all non-trans women.7 Central to my exploration of the transfeminist kill/joy are the following questions: How do I (or can I) inhabit a transfeminist criticality without falling into the patriarchal trap of “recycling the most threadbare of cliche´s: the angry, man-hating lesbian” (Salamon 2008: 125)?8 Is it possible to inscribe the trope of the transfeminist kill/joy without reinscribing the trope of the straw feminist as demonic other? Rather than holding steady in a paranoid position, assured that “no time could be too early for having-already-known, for its having alreadybeen-inevitable, that something bad would happen” (Sedgwick 2003: 132), can this essay, along with the work of the kill/joys I study here, imagine a different inevitability, a reparative temporality constituted by the hopeful inevitability of love?

#### Turn – the killjoy isn’t essentialist – it opens up spaces to contest the hegemonic categories of binary gender identity

Ahmed 15 Sara Ahmed “Under the Skin”, http://feministkilljoys.com/2015/03/04/under-the-skin/, March 4, 2015

I hear this often: how can we initiate a dialogue, say between radical feminists and trans feminists? Can’t we just be seated at the same time, to talk this out, to talk this through? Can’t we just be reasonable: there are two sides, let’s hear them both? The only starting point is this: no one at a table has the right to decide in advance who counts as “women.” It is not up to us to decide who is and is not “women” in advance of a conversation.[[1]](http://feministkilljoys.com/#_ftnref1) When people use criteria to decide who counts, that criteria has already become a technique for exclusion because it is not a criteria that will be shared by others. This is why the criteria being used to exclude trans women from “women” keep changing:44 when content (a woman is x) is being used as an end (you are not x), ideas have already become weapons. Any way of saying you do not belong here, in this category, but also in this room, this shelter, in this group, any way of saying, if you arrive my safety will be compromised, any way of saying seems to be what ends up being said. You might think: but what if there is truth in the criteria? You might point to the biological facts. Well biology is contingent, mutable and variable. There are some who hold onto rigid ideas of biological sex, but feminists historically have not been among them! In some cases, I have heard people refer to “biology 101” or scientific basis of female and male sex difference to claim trans women are not “biologically women.” I want to rebuke: biology 101? Well patriarchy wrote that textbook and pass them a copy of Anne Fausto-Sterling’sSexing the Body (2000) or Andrea Dworkin’s Woman Hating, a radical feminist text that supports transsexuals having access to surgery and hormones and challenges what she calls “the traditional biology of sexual difference” based on “two discrete biological sexes” (1972: 181, 186). There is no point in being gender critical if you are going to leave this traditional biology intact as biology is already invested in meaning and value, as feminists have shown us for generations; it is invested in value because the desire to see two sexes (“it’s a girl, “it’s a boy”) not only creates a system of alignment (“if not one, then the other”) but does not see the immense heterogeneity and variability of biological existence. To be gender critical whilst assuming two discrete biological sexes is to tighten rather than loosen a gender system. Radical feminists have been among those who have shown us this! What is going on in this anti-trans work is the desire to exclude and police the boundaries of “women” on whatever basis can be found (hence the target is a moving target). This policing has a point; it is pointed. It surfaces as questions as well as assertions: you are not who you are say you are; we know better than you who you are. In our collective feminist histories the policing of who are “women” has been about how a specific group of women have secured their right to determine who belongs within feminism (whiteness has been a key mechanism for policing feminism). The policing of the boundaries of “women” has always been disastrous for feminism. And just remember this too, feminism is possible because of a premise that is a promise: we do not have to live by other people’s assignments.

#### The category of “woman” is assigned and commanded onto bodies – it is not about being born female but rather anyone who exists under the sign of woman.

**Ahmed 17** Sara Ahmed 2017 Duke University Press “Living a Feminist Life”

We should be asking ourselves the same sorts of questions when we write our texts, when we put things together, as we do in living our lives. How to dismantle the world that is built to accommodate only some bodies? Sexism is one such accommodating system. Feminism requires supporting women in a struggle to exist in this world. What do I mean by women here? I am referring to all those who travel under the sign women. No feminism worthy of its name would use the sexist idea “women born women” to create the edges of feminist community, to render trans women into “not women,” or “not born women,” or into men.7 No one is born a woman; it as an assignment (not just a sign, but also a task or an imperative, as I discuss in part I) that can shape us; make us; and break us. Many women who were assigned female at birth, let us remind ourselves, are deemed not women in the right way, or not women at all, perhaps because of how they do or do not express themselves (they are too good at sports, not feminine enough because of their bodily shape, comportment, or conduct, not heterosexual, not mothers, and so on). Part of the difficulty of the category of women is what follows residing in that category, as well as what follows not residing in that category because of the body you acquire, the desires you have, the paths you follow or do not follow. There can be violence at stake in being recognizable as women; there can be violence at stake in not being recognizable as women.

## Tuck and Yang

1. **NO LINK** – The aff says nothing about suffering – it focuses on the tools of oppression but the wounds which is what Tuck and Yang critique. We do not tie pain to identity – we just explain how oppression operates via spaces and how to resolve them. Our Ahmed 07 evidence indicates how institutions and structures sustain oppression, and our Ahmed 10 evidence explains how we engage with those structures.
2. They haven’t won uniqueness - Ahmed 07 says the academy is already exclusionary and commodifies suffering, only aff has chance to solve by disorienting the space
3. **Turn** – focusing on individual bodies is key to survive within structures of oppression – that’s Ahmed 14 – you are focusing on liberation from systems of oppression but first we need to survive in them.
4. Aff solves impact – commodification only happens in the current orientation of the instutition – we disrupt that paradigm of consumption of suffering which prevents that impact
5. **PERM** – Do Both – Use the figure of the killjoy as a way to disrupt the institutionalized politics of pain. Alt can’t solve without the aff because institutions will commodify pain without disorientations.

#### Tuck and Yang conclude that the solution is desire based research – that’s the aff and solves all impacts.

Tuck and Yang 14 Eve (Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz. Earned her Ph.D.in Urban Education at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York in 2008) and K Wayne (Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley), “R-Words: Refusing Research, pg. 225-231

In my own autobiographical performance projects, I identify this chiasmatic shift in the possibility that all those performances I did about getting bashed only provided knowledge of subjugation, serving almost as an advertisement for power: ‘‘Don’t let this happen to you. Stay in the closet.’’ In large part motivated by Elizabeth Bell’s writings about performance and pleasure, I decided to write more about the gratifications of same-sex relationships, to depict intimacy and desire, the kinds of subjugated knowledges we don’t get to see on the after school specials and movies of the week that parade queer bruises and broken bones but shy away from the queer kiss. (p. 312) Participatory action research and other research approaches that involve participants in constructing the design and collection of voice (as data) are not immune to the fetish for pain narratives. It is a misconception that by simply building participation into a project—by increasing the number of people who collaborate in collecting data—ethical issues of representation, voice, consumption, and voyeurism are resolved. There are countless examples of research in which community or youth participants have made their own stories of loss and pain the objects of their inquiry (see also Tuck & Guishard, forthcoming). Alongside analyses of pain and damage-centered research, **Eve** (Tuck 2009, 2010) **has theorized desire-based research as** not the antonym but rather the antidote for damage-focused narratives*.* Pain narratives are always incomplete. They bemoan the food deserts, but forget to see the food innovations; they lament the concrete jungles and miss the roses and the tobacco from concrete. **Desirecentered research does not deny** the experience of tragedy, trauma, and **pain, but positions the knowing derived from such experiences as wise.** This is not about seeing the bright side of hard times, or even believing that everything happens for a reason. Utilizing a desire-based framework is about **working inside a more complex** and dynamic understanding of what one, or a community, comes to know in (a) lived **life**. **Logics of pain focus on** events, sometimes hiding structure, always adhering to a teleological trajectory of pain, brokenness, repair, or **irreparability**—from unbroken, to broken, and then to unbroken again**.** Logics of pain require time to be organized as linear and rigid, in which the pained body (or community or people) is set back or delayed on some kind of path of humanization, and now must catch up (but never can) to the settler/unpained/abled body (or community or people or society or philosophy or knowledge system). In this way, the logics of pain has superseded the now outmoded racism of an explicit racial hierarchy with a much more politically tolerable racism of a developmental hierarchy.2 Under a developmental hierarchy, in which some were undeterred by pain and oppression, and others were waylaid by their victimry and subalternity, damagecentered research reifies a settler temporality and helps suppress other understandings of time. **Desire-based frameworks**, by contrast, **look to the past and the future** to situate analyses. **Desire is about longing, about a present that is enriched by both the past and the future**; it is integral to our humanness. It is not only the painful elements of social and psychic realities, but also the textured acumen and hope. (Tuck, 2010, p. 644) In this way, desire is time-warping**. The logics** of desire is asynchronous just as it is distemporal, living in the gaps between the ticking machinery of disciplinary institutions. To be clear, again, we are not making an argument against the existence of pain, or for the erasure of memory, experience, and wisdom that comes with suffering. Rather, we see the collecting of narratives of pain by social scientists to already be a double erasure, whereby pain is documented in order to be erased, often by eradicating the communities that are supposedly injured and supplanting them with hopeful stories of progress into a better, Whiter, world. Vizenor talks about such “the consumer notion of a ‘hopeful book,’” and we would add hopeful or feel-good research, as “a denial of tragic wisdom” bent on imagining “a social science paradise of tribal victims” (1993, p. 14). **Desire interrupts this metanarrative of damaged communities and White progress.**

#### You exclude discussions of oppression. Pedagogies of suffering can be good – status quo institutions ignore violence because suffering is unintelligible –re-framing key.

Campbell 2K Nancy D. Campbell (Assoc. Prof. Science and Technology Studies @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute). “Using Women: Gender, Drug Policy, and Social Justice” (xo1)

A feminist postpositivism would differ from the “relativism” of which postpositivist analysts often stand accused. Normative commitments form the basis for a multivocal feminist ethics that slips neither into relativism nor moral absolutism. For instance, feminists recognize that the gendered materiality of suffering and subordination **may** **work through** cultural forms of representation **or** actual policies that harm vulnerable groups. As a “pedagogy of suffering,” **an analysis of gendered materiality is an “**antidote **to** administrative **systems that** cannot take suffering into account **because** **they** are **abstract**ed **from** the needs of **bodies**. **When the body’s vulnerability** **and pain are kept in the foreground, a new social ethic is required**. The challenge is to state **this** ethic in terms that remain multivocal. A multivocal ethic does not imply relativism; it suggests the recognition of difference...the need to recognize multiple voices and afford each full legitimacy.”17 **Multivocality is partly the product of a postmodern moment that has strained many modern administrative systems**, in which many voices speak multiple and conflicting stories from myriad social locations. However, **multivocality is also the outcome of the hard work of social movements organized to compel the recognition of cultural difference within modernity. Therein lies the potential** of postmodernity as a paradigm for social action and theory that promotes democratic participation. Feminists are dedicated to discerning, defining, and changing structures of exclusion, marginalization, social isolation, and subordination based on gender wherever and however they occur.18 **By attending to how social structures, cultural practices, and discursive formations impinge on individuals, they cast the desirability of much policy into doubt**. For example, although we might “know” that some drugs harm the developing human fetus, we can also see that pregnant women do not maliciously intend such harm. Thus we could conclude that supportive social policies—such as universal health insurance—better facilitate healthy births, and might decide that our democratic goals and responsibilities are better met through such measures. We would be forced to reconsider our current reliance on incarceration as a response to the widespread use of illicit substances in the U.S. population. Incarceration would no longer accord with our values or our facts, and thus could no longer be considered a viable solution. It might even come to be seen as a form of irrational vengeance that is counterproductive to our goals.

## Opacity

*What does it look like to respect the subalterns opacity ?*

*Double bind – if they define then they link into thek*

*In the status quo can we already tell the difference between the black body, the queer body, the muslim body etc.* IF that is true then just doing a mindset shift from the aff wont solve problems already implicit in the status quo without changing it. Means the alt can never solve back, we cant render anything un-invisible, or the aff solves methodologically.

Aff doesn’t defend solvency but rather a method to stand up against the institution so that delinks from the 2nd card

The logic of the k say that we need to keep the subaltern opaque, non u because if we can identiy who the subalterns are then they aren’t opaque so we cant achieve opacity. Also means the impacts of the k would’ve already existed in the status quo.

Bjork turns the k – if we ignore the differences in individuals then we ignore the very real instances of oppression manifesting in the institutions. Creates a pathology of colorblindness which turns k.

1. Ahmed is already a subaltern and her narrative methodology are (women of color, queer women etc.)
2. Even if ahmed is discussing things like the subaltern, she isn’t doing anything in regards to coloniality
3. The killjoy is opaque – it is fluid and can take the identity and anything and anyone so we don’t call out the subaltern because we don’t identify as any definition. The killjoy embraces opacity, we are opaque, we do the alt.
   1. Thus the aff doesn’t trigger any of that because we exist outside of the colony like the subaltern and the identity of the killjoy is fluid therefore we are the best structure to respect opacity.

Nguyen delinks from the k – we don’t encourage labeled bodies out of the undercommons to protest, we redefine what it means to protest by no longer being complacent in formalities of definition – that means aff solves k pragmatically.

## All PICs

### Overview

#### Their belief that policy actions can solve all their problems is cute but an independent link into the aff – ahmed 2 shows inherency or that the use of ‘diversity policies’ made by institutions due jack shit to actually help the Other inside the walls. Ahmed 3 is the impact that these faith in diversity policies not only create serial policy failure and error replication for oppression against the already marginalized but also is an maintains more happiness or complacency which turns case.

#### The state ducks – we need a new starting point.

**Young, 1** (Iris Marion, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy”, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 670-690)

The deliberative democrat finds such refusal and protest action uncooper- ative and counterproductive. Surely it is better to work out the most just form of implementation of legislation than to distract lawmakers and obstruct the routines of overworked case workers. The activist replies that it is wrong to cooperate with policies and processes that presume unjust institutional con- straints. The problem is not that policy makers and citizen deliberations fail to make arguments but that their starting premises are unacceptable. It seems to me that advocates of deliberative democracy who believe that deliberative processes are the best way to conduct policies even under the conditions of structural inequality that characterize democracies today have no satisfactory response to this criticism. Many advocates of deliberative pro- cedures seem to find no problem with structures and institutional constraints that limit policy alternatives in actual democracies, advocating reflective political reasoning within them to counter irrational tendencies to reduce issues to sound bites and decisions to aggregate preferences. In their detailed discussion of the terms of welfare reform in Democracy and Disagreement, for example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson appear to accept as given that policy action to respond to the needs of poor people must come in the form of poor support rather than changes in tax policy, the relation of private and public investment, public works employment, and other more structural ways of undermining deprivation and income inequality.8 James Fishkin's innovative citizens' forum deliberating national issues in connection with the 1996 political campaign, to take another example, seemed to presume as given all the fiscal, power, and institutional constraints on policy alternatives that the U.S. Congress and mainstream press assumed. To the extent that such constraints assume existing patterns of class inequality, residential segrega- tion, and gender division of labor as given, the activist's claim is plausible that there is little difference among the alternatives debated, and he suggests that the responsible citizen should not consent to these assumptions but instead agitate for deeper criticism and change. The ongoing business of legislation and policy implementation will assume existing institutions and their priorities as given unless massive con- certed action works to shift priorities and goals. Most of the time, then, poli- tics will operate under the constrained alternatives that are produced by and support structural inequalities. If the deliberative democrat tries to insert practices of deliberation into existing public policy discussions, she is forced to accept the range of alternatives that existing structural constraints allow. While two decades ago in the United States, there were few opportunities for theorists of deliberative democracy to try to influence the design and process of public discussion, today things have changed. Some public officials and private foundations have become persuaded that inclusive, reasoned exten- sive deliberation is good for democracy and wish to implement these ideals in the policy formation process. To the extent that such implementation must presuppose constrained alternatives that cannot question existing institu- tional priorities and social structures, deliberation is as likely to reinforce injustice as to undermine it. I think that the deliberative democrat has no adequate response to this challenge other than to accept the activist's suspicion of implementing delib- erative processes within institutions that seriously constrain policy alterna- tives in ways that, for example, make it nearly impossible for the structurally disadvantaged to propose solutions to social problems that might alter the structural positions in which they stand. Only if the theory and practice of deliberative democracy are willing to withdraw from the immediacy of the already given policy trajectory can they respond to this activist challenge. The deliberative democracy should help create inclusive deliberative settings in which basic social and economic structures can be examined; such settings for the most part must be outside of and opposed to ongoing settings of offi-cial policy discussion.

### Womxnism pic

This PIC is the worst strat against the aff

1. No link - the aff isn't a mandate for all women to kill joy it's a mandate for the judge to endorse and put their ballot behind active killjoys
2. No link – we concede in cross ex that not only cis women can have the potential to A) be the killjoy or B) be oppressed in the institution. Severs the analysis done by Johnson 2.
3. No link – our author is literally a queer woman of color who writes about the intersections of colonialism, patriarchy etc. She writes about lorde, bell hooks etc. Rage is a method of the kill joy that is unique to black feminist studies. If their arguments are true that people who want to speak out and be the killjoy get shunned or killed – then ahmed would be dead.
4. AC solves net benefits of PIC – there is no alt without the aff reorienting the institution to allow people to transgress in and out of the kill joy, structures inside the university prevent individual orientation

Perm do both – the pic is not competitive, the aff is the epitome of inclusivity in oppressive spaces

### Happiness pic

1. Happiness is just discomfort and a refusal to be complacent – there can be normative joy, too bad you didn’t read the lit that you are trying to critique
2. Some bodies refuse to be happy at all in institution – requiring certain bodies to have any form of happiness is another link into the aff
3. Turn – their PIC tries to abstract away from the narrative of the aff, silencing our methodology is a reason to drop the debater

Perm do both– not competitive, Ahmed 5 & 6 highlight that there can be joy in the killing of joy

# T answers

## General T

Counter interp: Debaters can affirm the resolution through discursive methodologies if the aff has been full text disclosed and negs must not challenge the aff’s ability to read that advocacy. This is an OCI—if I win my rule is better for debate, you should lose for proposing a bad norm and avoiding engagement on the 1AC. Net benefits:

1. **Nagging DA** – Cross apply **Ahmed 6** – Discursive modes of decorum operate to exclude certain bodies – ie Women are not included in the political sphere and their complaints are dismissed as nagging which means your interpretation excludes certain bodies from engaging. We need to challenge the ways discursive arenas operate in order to create an inclusive space which outweighs because your offense requires people to be in debate in the first place. *Also* *independently takes out fairness – you assume equal playing fields are possible, but that ignores how certain marginalized groups are excluded and don’t have equal access to the ballot thus unfairness is inevitable.*
2. Critical Education – A) your interpretation forbids affs that engage the resolution through methods other than policy making which destroys critical education because we cannot have methods debates or engage in debates over how we should engage in the resolution when we are aff. B) I force critical engagement because if I defend a policy, you will just read DAs and outweigh the aff impacts without engaging with the substance of the aff. Kills the incentive to research and respond to the aff because you can just avoid research on the content of the 1AC – this means denying you links to DAs is critical to force discussion of the aff. This outweighs
   1. Uniqueness – you can debate topically every other neg round but it is try or die for debating this non T aff because no one else is reading it
   2. Portability – critical engagement is the most portable long term skill while fairness only lasts this roun

Critical education key to education because it is the most portable skill that lasts for the rest of our lives. *Education is a voter because it’s constitutive of debate as an academic activity.*

1. Aff flex – your interpretation means that the aff cannot explore the outer edges of the topic and has to read the same positions as everyone on the circuit. Kills aff strategy because 1N prep outs make the 1AR impossible and prevent affs from winning. Counter interp solves because we allow debaters to choose different affs to avoid losing to 1N prep outs. Also internal link to critical thinking – your interpretation forces us to have the same debates every round while ours allows a variety of different debates. Aff flex key to fairness because it’s key for affs to have a coherent strategy.
2. Content over form – even if you win your model of debate is better at imparting knowledge on students if the content of that knowledge reproduces exclusion then your model is still bad; you simply are better at producing future Ted Cruzes. THIS NEEDS TO BE IMPACTED—PROBABLY IN TERMS OF THEIR STATE GOOD ARGS

## Restrict

### Overview

#### Aff before T – Topicality is a paradigm of norm setting determining what debaters are supposed to talk about once in round A) Bjork and feinzig/atyeo articulate that there are substantive barriers that inhibit certain individuals from getting access to debate in the first place – aff is a first step B) Words have been used as a tools to incite violence by mandating restriction and control (ahmed 3) – means before we give credence to the words in the resolution we have to reorient our complacency in rhetoric C) paradigmatically aff takes out T – ahmed 1 proves that tools like topicality are a form of poisonous pedagogy – cross apply to the bottom of the shell; their voters of education & to drop the debater is another example of the masters rod.

### Top level

#### The engagement demanded by the resolution presupposes an encounter that is never actualized. Debate maintains the intelligibility of free speech and public colleges as imagined communities and bodies through the masquerade of encounters that never occur, thus ensuring that the production of these idealized entities is never interrupted by the realities of lived experience.

Ahmed 2000 [Sara. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths. *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality.* Routledge. Pg. number at bottom. SH]

I suggest that we can only avoid stranger fetishism – that is, avoid welcoming or expelling the stranger as a figure which has linguistic and bodily integrity – by examining the social relationships that are concealed by this very fetishism. That is, we need to consider how the stranger is an effect of processes of inclusion and exclusion, or incorporation and expulsion, that constitute the boundaries of bodies and communities, including communities of living (dwelling and travel), as well as epistemic communities. I describe such processes in terms of encounters in order to show how they are determined, but not fully determined. The term encounter suggests a meeting, but a meeting which involves surprise and conflict. We can ask: how does identity itself become instituted through encounters with others that surprise, that shift the boundaries of the familiar, of what we assume that we know? Identity itself is constituted in the ‘more than one’ of the encounter: the designation of an ‘I’ or ‘we’ requires an encounter with others. These others cannot be simply relegated to the outside: given that the subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject’s existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered. As such, the encounter itself is ontologically prior to the question of ontology (the question of the being who encounters). At one level, we can think about encounters as face-to-face meetings. Such face-to-face meetings can be thought of as ‘eye-to-eye’, involving a visual economy of recognition (see Chapter 1), and as ‘skin-to-skin’, involving an economy of touch (see Chapter 2). In face-to-face meetings, where at least two subjects get close enough to see and touch each other, there is a necessary movement in time and space. The face to face requires that at least two subjects approach each other. The encounter, as a face to face, can only be thought of as a discrete event when the temporal and spatial function of this approach is negated. An emphasis on encounters involves a radical rethinking of what it might mean to face (up to) others (see Chapter 7). The face-to-face encounter is mediated precisely by that which allows the face to appear in the present. The face-to-face is hence not simply about two persons facing each other – the face to face cannot be thought of as a coupling. This encounter is mediated; it presupposes other faces, other encounters of facing, other bodies, other spaces, and other times. To talk about the importance of encounters to identity is to remind ourselves of the processes that are already at stake in the coming together of (at least) two subjects. Thinking of encounters as ‘face-to-face’ meetings also suggests that identity does not simply happen in the privatised realm of the subject’s relation to itself. Rather, in daily meetings with others, subjects are perpetually reconstituted: the work of identity formation is never over, but can be understood as the sliding across of subjects in their meetings with others. However, meetings do not have to involve the face-to-face encounter of at least two subjects. Meetings do not even presuppose the category of the human person. More generally, a meeting suggests a coming together of at least two elements. For example, we can think of reading as a meeting between reader and text. In this context, to talk of encounters as constitutive of identity (that which makes a given thing a thing) is to suggest that there is always more than one in the demarcation of ‘the one’: there is always a relationship to a reader, who is not inside or outside the text, in the determination of the text as such. To make the encounter prior to the form of the text (what the text would be within itself) is, not only to refuse to assume that the text or reader have an independent existence, but also to suggest that it is through being read that the text comes to life as text, that the text comes to be thinkable as having an existence in the first place. A thesis on the priority of encounters over identity suggests that it is only through meeting with an-other that the identity of a given person comes to be inhabited as living. If encounters are meetings, then they also involve surprise. The more-than- one of such meetings that allow the ‘one’ to be faced and to face others, is not a meeting between already constituted subjects who know each other: rather, the encounter is premised on the absence of a knowledge that would allow one to control the encounter, or to predict its outcome. As a result, encounters constitute the space of the familial (by allowing the ‘I’ or the ‘we’ to define itself in relation to others who are already faced), but in doing so, they shift the boundaries of what is familiar. Encounters involve both fixation, and the impossibility of fixation. So, for example, when we face others, we seek to recognise who they are, by reading the signs on their body, or by reading their body as a sign. As I will argue, such acts of reading constitute ‘the subject’ in relation to ‘the stranger’, who is recognised as ‘out of place’ in a given place. The surprising nature of encounters can be understood in relation to the structural possibility that we may not be able to read the bodies of others. However, each time we are faced by an other whom we cannot recognise, we seek to find other ways of achieving recognition, not only by re-reading the body of this other who is faced, but by telling the difference between this other, and other others. The encounters we might yet have with other others hence surprise the subject, but they also reopen the prior histories of encounter that violate and fix others in regimes of difference (see Chapter 6). Encounters are meetings, then, which are not simply in the present: each encounter reopens past encounters. Encounters involve, not only the surprise of being faced by an other who cannot be located in the present, they also involve conflict. The face-to-face meeting is not between two subjects who are equal and in harmony; the meeting is antagonistic. The coming together of others that allows the ‘one’ to exist takes place given that there is an asymmetry of power. The relationship between the encounter and forms of social antagonism requires that we consider the relationship between the particular – this encounter – and the general. At one level, we can think of this relationship as determined by that which must already have taken place to allow the particular encounter to take place, that is, the social processes that are at stake in the coming together of (at least) two subjects. However, this would presuppose that the particular is an outcome of the general, and would assume that both are already determined at different times and places. I want to consider how the particular encounter both informs and is informed by the general: encounters between embodied subjects always hesitate between the domain of the particular – the face to face of this encounter – and the general – the framing of the encounter by broader relationships of power and antagonism. The particular encounter hence always carries traces of those broader relationships. Differences, as markers of power, are not determined in the ‘space’ of the particular or the general, but in the very determination of their historical relation (a determination that is never final or complete, as it involves strange encounters).

#### This performance is a voting issue and outweighs T – static notions of the debate space make their voters meaningless by inhibiting the activation of political agency.

Smith 14 Elijah Smith, NDT-CEDA ’13 Champion, College Policy Debater at Rutgers-Newark, “[Developing Our Environment: Planting the Seeds for the Activist Model](http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2014/1/developing-our-environment-planting-the-seeds-for-the-activist-model)”, Victory Briefs, 2014

Despite popular opinion, I think you should be rooted in the topic no matter what your politics, performance, or method of engagement is. Having a conversation about military force, animal rights, or economic sanctions provides unique moments for conversation that leads us to unearth scholarship buried in libraries and catalogues that inspire us each and every year. A lot of arguments on the January/February topic seem to be about avoiding or being able to initiate topicality debates to preserve the value in these conversations. What is seldom done in this search for the perfectly balanced conversation at the Tournament of Champions, unfortunately, is to question what do T debates mean outside of wins and losses? Even if a given topic is great, what does it mean for the individual competitors that might not share your subject position? What does a conversation mean and who is it for if it’s not accessible for the most disadvantaged students who find the time to compete? The conversations I’ve heard include people making bold statements about not footnoting structural violence who then destroy the names of non-Western countries and authors and amalgamate “Africa” as a country instead of a continent full of unique and diverse nations and identities. A development topic should be one of the best opportunities to learn about difference, but if debaters are going to continue to reduce both the topic and the debate space to a comfortable Western discussion of people who don’t have our geographic or national privilege, without including their voices or concerns on both sides of the topic, that should be up for discussion as well. No matter how wonderful your team’s interpretation of the topic is it doesn’t preclude linking that to the currents state of debate to shed light on the issues of power, privilege, and identity. They are already part of the conversation so we should both allow and encourage students to confront the apparatuses of power as they reveal themselves by engaging in radical speech acts that can expand our conception of what an argument even is. It is easy to get caught in the mold of debate, to be seduced by the wins, and to aim to reproduce arguments that are in “vogue”, however that isn’t a model of engagement that has changed anyone’s heart or mind. Debate has become so insular that when we say advocacy skills and education we forget that those are just buzz words absent a willingness to turn politics into action. Proponents of accessible debate invested in critical education should start to think of their politics as a question of praxis. Debate’s static notions of what it means to be topical (or even political for that matter) will fail students unless they can be allowed to grapple with those issues that are literally right in front of them. When I say “Activist model” I really mean that we should make room for students to practice the skills needed to activate their politics in the real world. Assumptions, performances, and discourses should be voting issue whether they indict the topic, an opponent, or even the debate community itself. Advocates who practice by allowing their contemporaries to garble the names of African nations, trade their stories and bodies like poker chips, and marginalize their voices in the process aren’t individuals I ever want advocating on my behalf. Portable skills start with how the activist chooses to engage in topical discussion or discussions of the topic, but their vision of a more accessible debate space itself. When competitors get settled into a room and ask me what I want to see for the next 45 minutes I tell them that it’s not my job to tell them. I don’t really care if they sit, stand, backflip, recite poems, or spread cards in and between every speech because LD isn’t my activity anymore, it’s theirs. My only job is to render a decision and remain invested and responsible for what norms I endorse for debate. A major requirement for making room for the activist model in LD is changing the way judges situate themselves. First and foremost, realize high school debate isn’t about you. Sucks to grow up, huh? As an adult you aren’t just some cool “first year out” or a point fairy but an adult and role model that coaches have left responsible for the care of their students until they can get back to their chaperone. That puts you in a unique position to support or break down someone in the middle of a tournament they hope to do well at or the end of their career. This is especially important in a world where students are trying to broaden the scope of the conversation and bring marginalized students into the space. If you are about to give an RFD to one of the few black or Latino students in the activity, think about what your words sound like in the context of a student who probably thought you were going to vote against them because of the subject matter of their arguments regardless of the substance of the debate.

## Substance Clash

### Interp proper:

#### We meet: We defend that public colleges and universities should not restrict and speech that’s an implementation. We meet that affirmative offense must come from the defense of the affirmative resolution, public colleges restricting speech inhibits the killjoy so we defend that there should not be a restriction.

### Standards - engagement

#### Ahmed 5 turns – topical engagement is an effort to constrain words and discourse to a matter that is comfortable and easy to engage or control. Their engagement is an attempt at happiness which the aff critiques. Means either they are a link into the aff or the aff comes first to break down the notions of happiness or complacency to give T its success.

#### [Steinberg & freely] we meet; we have a stasis point that they can engage with, disclose & clash check this abuse. There’s no warrant in the card that requires the stasis point to be a policy action

#### [Lundberg 10] 1) Aff outweighs, prior questions of epistemology and access through the aff are a prior question to deliberative democracy as it questions who can participate. 2) Ahmed 2 turns because using policy actions as the praxis point a) creates error replication through non performative actions and b) commodifies the experiences of the Other inside of the institution proper

#### Cross apply to their Underview about how T comes before aff cross apps of framework, premised on them winning engagement which they clearly can’t.

### Standards – topic education

#### Our aff is the most topical – we question what it means to speak inside of institutions and who can speak what means you affirm on topical education first – also takes out TVA, there is no more topical version of the aff OR no way to be topical without the aff

#### [Strazdins 16] 1) non unique – who knows what Trump is going to do next, the entire campaign was unpredictable and unprecedented and so were the first 100 days in office. 2) the aff is the vigilance against institutions like the Trump administration that the card calls for. 2) we are creating accountability for institutions to hold promises to students in other ways than just free speech.

### Standards - mechanism education

#### Blatant lie – there is still cost benefit analysis possible under the aff, we just defend our aff as a methodology to alleviate structural violence and exclusion in the squo. You can weigh competing methods under the aff or disads to the aff’s method.

#### [capulong 16] 1) Activism for the sake of resistance is always coopted by the institution without the affs method means aff is a prior question. 2) no link - aff isn’t just a matter of theoretical questions, we are a methodological endorsement of the killjoy to be able to concern material consequences, also takes out [Bracey 6/materiality standard] 3)cross apply ahmed 5, violence isn’t solely material they don’t go far enough. The goal of violence is to break the will of the subject so just addressing material violence can never solve for the deeper, structural violence that occurs – only the aff takes into account both and reconciles the differences.

### Standards – ground

#### Turn – counter interpretation gives you more ground because you can read discourse and reps Ks and counter methods as well as super specific Ks of our methodology – ie critiques of affect theory. This means you have more and better specific ground.

#### No impact – negs already have a ton of ways they can engage with affs, you need to win why having one more argumentative option is uniquely key given that you already win the majority of debates.

#### Ground loss inevitable – every argument trades off with ground – ie if I read a policy then you can’t read framework which means it’s just a question of what ground

### Standards – SSD

#### Our role of the ballot turns, extend ahmed 8 answers SSD: Every RFD, decision, performance and reading of the argument is to advance the goal of the critique, these become a new form of affect and push new impressions onto our methodology means every impact is unique and the aff literally pushes back against complacency of needing to switch sides & arguments. Also, predictability of the SSD violation turns the internal link to clash/limits in engagement because it would be much more predictable for you.

### Standards - Research Overload

#### 1. Empirical claim without empirical warrant, you have not proven that we cause huge research overload for debaters – you have a perverse incentive to claim there is a research overload because you are lazy

#### 2. This assumes everyone will read a non T aff which you have not won – only a couple people will read non T affs which means you have to prep maybe 5 more affs.

#### 3. Non unique – you have to prep for 100 different affs anyway, even if affs are topical you still need case negs, so it doesn’t matter if the case negs are against topical affs or non topical affs.

### Standards - Quit Debate

#### 1. No warrant – no one leaves debate because the topic is too big. Empirically proven by the nuclear energy topic which had endless amounts of affs.

#### 2. Nonunique – I would quit if I weren’t allowed to read non T affs

#### 3. Quitting is non verifiable – you don’t know if they quit because of money or elitism or research or sexism – you need to isolate the causal variable that they quit is the non T aff

#### 4. Empirical claim without an empirical warrant – name dropping one person is anecedotal. They have not given any empirical evidence about people actually quitting debate which means you have a missing link to your impact.

#### 5. The aff outweighs – even if you quit debate, you take lessons with you that will make you a better person in the long run.

### Standard - Pigeonholing

#### 1. Turn - Pigeonholing inevitable – every debate makes strategic decisions that force you into one strategy. We pigeonhole you into more educational strategies than generic stock affs do.

#### 2. Turn – you have so many more outs against non T affs like topicality, counter-K’s, PICs, impact turns, etc.

#### 3. No impact to pigeonholing – pigeonholing only affects the 1NC because the 2NR can still collapse to its best arguments.

#### 4. Switch side debate solves – when you are aff, you get to pigeonhole the neg

### On “cant weigh case”

#### They have to draw a line between what counts as case. The implication is that this creates even more of a time skew bc if I am not allowed to cross apply framework read in the 1AC then I have to read new fw in the 1AR, justify it and extend it. Also we aren’t cross applying case we are cross applying fw, its not substance about free speech on universities we are cross applying evidence about educational praxis in debate.

### Commodification arg

#### Goal is to get to nationals and spread my message, I’ve been a performance fan debater 2 years no change need larger stage

#### Don't say that it needs to happen every round just that every round is good

# A2 On case answers

## “bodies” turn

### General:

No link – we don’t define anyone as ‘body’ but rather the literature articulates the status of those marginalized inside of the institution as “The other”

Aff comes first – we reconceptualize what rhetoric means in the context of the killjoy so either A) we sever out of past representations and discourse or B) we can solve by rehabilitating it

### Creamer indict

No impact to this card – it just said that “bodies” is short hand but no impact/alternative to what rhetoric would be better creating a cycle of bad discourse with no end

## Performance indicts

### Internalization

Ahmed 1 outweighs – performing narratives is the only method that can decenter our use of poisonous pedagogy, internal link to utilizing the intellectual [solves for Gordon 06]

No link – the aff uses evidence as well, the narrative is just a part of the method that illustrates my use of rage and the killjoy as a personal survival strategy or reorientation of the debate institutions

### Rage [bell hooks]

We aren’t pessimism – in fact we say that the walls can be broken down through the method of the aff. Their [bell hooks evidence] has no link

Aff solves – we are literally critiquing the notion of complacency for identity, call for any of the evidence in the aff to see that

TAKE IT BACK! Ahmed and bell hooks are also literally best friends and write corresponding literature to back up each other, bell hooks wrote/endorsed on the cover of ahmed’s most recent book released in February 3rd of 2017 saying “everyone should read this book”

## West indicts

[oyuwemi] Ahmed is a Pakistani, queer and female. Her geneaology is from the middle east.

## Chen cards

We don’t say that bodies have ilfe or don’t have life, we just say that bodies are bodies and thye can interact and hsape one another

This critique is specific on if ahmed views animate or inanimate object – it ignores the specificity of our aff. We aren’t using stuff from the selected work that its criticizing, we just defend that the affect of relationships between bodies is real inanimate or not

## Berlant

We say that there are forms of empathy that the judge and other ppl can express that permits us to reconnect with our past so we can think forward. It is a process of not forgetting. Ahmed 6 articulates that empathy can be a useful tool strategically to weigh the weight of our will and obedience and break down the walls.

## IP indicts

### Page – stops coalition building

1. Not true, we aren’t traditional identity politics but politics of rage and survival behind the killjoy. B) The killjoy solves – their evidence is about identity groups ceding power to trump but the aff claims that minority groups should use their marginalized position to manifest their voices against the institutional walls that’s Ahmed 4. C) Ceding power to the right only happens when we maintain complacency in institutions (ahmed 3) which means we are the only one with risk of solvency

### Carty – some ppl have bad ideas

1. From huffington post article like lol what
2. We aren’t traditional IP so no link. This evidence is predicated on certain IP that the aff doesn’t defend
3. We recognize productive and unproductive dialogue, that’s rodriguez 11

## Anti state/patriarchy

### Mansbridge

No where in the aff are we anti-state, we just say we need to take a step back and rethink state involvement and appeasement scenarios – that’s ahmed 4

We are intervening against the state, either no link or aff sovles back harms of the card

This card has the assumption that everyone can participate in the political system to use the state, this isn’t true. People are funcionlly excluded from the poltical system all the time that’s nguyen11 and ahmed 3. We don’t ignore that the state is there we just say its there but does bad things.

## Ballot Commodification

#### Only the ballot forces teams to confront oppression within the debate space – Louisville movement proves

Reid Brinley 08 Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, 2008, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF ‘ACTING BLACK’: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,”

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. The Louisville Project has not convinced the debate community to change its normative practice. Given the adversarial nature of tournament competition, opposing teams seem most concerned with developing viable strategies to beat Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a resolution of conflict between the Louisville team and other community members. Yet, it seems that attempts to engage the structural barriers that maintain the lack of community diversity seems to not have substantially increased racial and ethnic inclusion. That the Louisville team shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate community to significantly increase its discussion of the problem. In other words, the Project may not directly result in sweeping changes in the policy debate community, it did create a rhetorical controversy that forced the issue of racial exclusion and privilege onto the community’s agenda. Thus, I argue that the tournament round is a critical plateau from which to force a reflexive conversation about the normative practices of debate that might operate to maintain racial exclusion and privilege.

## Some people cant speak out

#### Our method solves – the killjoy doesn’t require speaking out but rather includes many different tactics to survive and resist oppressive systems.

Ahmed 17 Sara Ahmed "Introduction to Killjoys@Work Panel, March 14, Cambridge" Published on feministkilljoys.com on March 28, 2017 https://feministkilljoys.com

Why the killjoy? She tends to come up whenever feminists speak up. To name sexual harassment, to account for the whiteness of the curriculum, to talk of domestic violence, to say they cut, we bleed, is to get in the way of happiness of others. So much happiness depends upon turning away from what compromises unhappiness. When violence disappears from view, and violence is often reproduced by not coming into view; then to speak of violence is to make violence appear. And then you do appear violent, as if you are forcing something unpleasant onto others, even being mean to others. I think of the killjoy as a kind of feminist memory. It is not just that we remember being her, those times at family tables, those dinners ruined, when we are wound up by someone who is winding up; though she is for many of us that. It is not just that we become her when as women of colour we bring up racism at the feminist table, or the atmosphere noticeable changes when we enter the room, turning up can bring racism up; though she is for many of us that too. As a figure she acquired her potency from a feminist history, a history not only of those who have been charged with unhappiness but those who have been willing to receive that charge. When we receive that charge, we don’t necessarily become unhappy or unhappier. I still remember when I first began giving talks about feminist killjoys how the atmosphere would become electric. I could almost hear a sizzle, snap, snap. Even though she brings up a difficult history, a painful history, she seems to pick us up. Feminism: how pick each other up. I have two conclusions in the book, a killjoy survival kit, followed by a killjoy manifesto. The sequence does matter: we must first survive. Audre Lorde once said that there were some of us who were not meant to survive. For Lorde, for some of us, survival is politically ambitious; you have to be inventive to survive. A manifesto might be how feminism survives. It is not that the feminist killjoy has a manifesto. The feminist killjoy is a manifesto. She makes violence manifest; she brings violence that is already in the room to surface because of what she says, because of what she does. To suggest that the feminist killjoy is a manifesto is not to say that we have obligation to speak out. We are not all in the same position; we cannot all afford to speak out. Killing joy thus requires a communication system: we have to find other ways for the violence to become manifest. We might need to use guerrilla tactics, and we have a feminist history to draw upon here; you can write names of harassers on books; graffiti on walls; turn bodies into art; put red ink in the water. We might even stop citing “white men” when we write our books. Yes we are willing to be that blunt. Sexism makes it hard to speak about sexism. Racism makes it hard to speak about racism. The harder it is, the more creative we have to become. We wiggle about, we create room. A kitchen table becomes a feminist of colour press. Some of you might have heard Angela Davis speaking in London on Saturday. She made yet another important contribution to our collective feminist survival. I really liked how she stressed that it is from activism that we generate new feminist ideas. She also stressed how much we receive from the work that has already been done; we receive rights yes, access to worlds, yes, at least for some; possibilities, yes, possibilities of living together, of being together. We also receive, I think, energy that passes through each of us like a jolt, switching us on. It is from difficult experiences, of being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that we acquire the energy to go on. The more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. Feminist snap: those moments we do not take it anymore; the work we have to do so that we do not take it anymore.

# Aff Answers

#### Sarah Ahmed does not take into consideration the specificities of animation and inanimation.

Chen 12, (Mel, 2012; Associate Professor of Gender & Women's Studies and director of the Center for the Study of Sexual Culture at the University of California, Berkeley; Board of Directors of the Society for Disability Studies, affiliate of the Center for Race and Gender, the Science and Technology Studies Center, and the Institute for Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences; Ph.D. in Linguistics from U.C. Berkeley, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect*, Duke University Press)

Cosmologies, of course, are as much written into Western philosophies as they are in Akwesasne cultures, and the life and death hidden within their objects has a binding effect on their theoretical impulse. In her important book Queer Phenomenology, Sara Ahmed gives extensive, unabashed attention to tables, at one point writing extensively about her “orientation” (in a larger discussion of sexuality and orientations) toward a table of hers and that table’s orientation toward her. She writes, “we perceive the object as an object, as something that ‘has’ integrity, and is ‘in’ space, only by haunting that very space; that is, by co- inhabiting space such that the boundary between the co- inhabitants of space does not hold. The skin connects as well as contains. . . . Orientations are tactile and they involve more than one skin surface: we, in approaching this or that table, are also approached by the table, which touches us when we touch it.”39 Ahmed works here with an important and profound assertion by Maurice Merleau- Ponty that sensory engagement binds sensing and sensed objects to one another; in this way, my skin is simultaneously the skin of the world. Yet, if we were to stretch this intercorporeality further, it appears that Ahmed still presumes the proper integrity of her body and of the table, an exclusion of molecular travel that permits her to position one thing against another. Ahmed is talking mainly about the perception of integrity; but I wonder what happens when percepts are to some degree bypassed, for instance, by the air itself. When physically copresent with others, I ingest them. There is nothing fanciful about this. I am ingesting their exhaled air, their sloughed skin, and the skin of the tables, chairs, and carpet of our shared room. Ahmed’s reading thus takes the deadness and inanimacy of that table as a reference point for the orientation of a life, one in which the table is moved according to the purposes and conveniences of its owner. And while it would be unfair to ask of her analysis something not proper to its devices, I do wonder how this analysis might change once the object distinctions between animate and inanimate collapse, when we move beyond the exclusionary zone made up of the perceptual operands of phenomenology. The affective relations I have with a couch are not made out of a predicted script and are received as no different from those with animate beings, which, depending on the perspective, is both their failing and their merit. 210